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General introduction 
 
“Therein is the tragedy. […] Ruin is the destination toward which all men rush, each 
pursuing his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons. 
Freedom in a commons brings ruin to all.” 
Garrett Hardin, in The Tragedy of the Commons 
 
I. Introductory remarks 
 
The year 2012 marks a number of watershed points in international environmental affairs. Not 
only is it the 40th anniversary of the adoption of the Stockholm Declaration
1
 and the creation 
of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). It is also the 30th anniversary of the 
adoption of both the UN World Charter for Nature
2
 and the UN Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS)
3
, the 25th anniversary of the publication of the Brundtland Report
4
 and the 
20th anniversary of both the Rio Declaration
5
, Agenda 21
6
, and the adoption of the three Rio 
Conventions: the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
7
, 
the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
8
 and the Convention to Combat Desertification 
(UNCCD).
9
  
 
Because of the predominantly transnational (and arguably global) character of environmental 
issues and the fact that international law defines solutions as intergovernmental, applying the 
                                                     
1
 UN, “Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment” (Stockholm Declaration), 
Stockholm, 16 June 1972, available at http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp? 
documentid=97&articleid=1503. 
2
 UN, “World Charter for Nature”, Doc A/RES/37/7, 28 October 1982, available at 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm.  
3
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1982, 1833 UNTS 396.  
4
 World Commission on Environment and Development, “Our common future”, 1987, Doc A/42/427, available 
at http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm (Brundtland report).  
5
 UN, “Rio Declaration on Environment and Development”, 14 June 1992, available at 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?documentid=78&articleid=1163. 
6
 UN, “Agenda 21”, 1992, New York, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/index.htm.  
7
 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992, 1771 UNTS 107. 
8
 Convention on Biological Diversity, 1992, 1760 UNTS 79; 31 ILM 818 (1992). 
9
 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or 
Desertification, especially in Africa, 1994, 1954 UNTS 3.  
12 
 
traditional concept of state sovereignty, all states are considered to have an equal interest in 
participating at the international level in the efforts to combat environmental degradation. The 
most visible result of that is the so-called conferencing: international efforts for the 
environment have been based upon a series of global United Nations Conferences, the so-
called Earth Summits. To name some of the most important ones: the Stockholm Conference 
on the Human Environment (1972), the Rio Conference on Environment and Development 
(1992) and the Johannesburg Conference on Sustainable Development (2002). In June 2012, 
world leaders gather once again in Rio de Janeiro for the Earth Summit 2012
10
 to secure 
renewed political commitment to the global agenda of sustainable development, of which 
environmental affairs are now considered to be an integral part. 
 
These summits have been essential drivers of the international environmental policy and law-
making processes and, perhaps more importantly, have been vitally important in raising 
awareness with the broader public of environmental degradation and the international 
community’s responses to it. The first major conference held in 1972, in Stockholm, led to the 
adoption of the Stockholm Declaration, which has since become an accepted part of 
customary international law.
11
 It also eventually led to the creation of UNEP, which has since 
been the most prominent institutional actor on environmental issues within UN echelons.
12
  
 
Apart from these Earth Summits, international efforts to combat environmental degradation 
have been piecemeal and disaster-driven: often environmental legislation would be adopted 
only after the emergence of a new threat to the global environment or after an environmental 
calamity had occurred. The effects of, for example, the Erica and Exxon Valdez oil spills and 
the Seveso disaster on the development of, respectively, marine pollution and chemicals 
management legislation are undeniable. One of the most well-known examples is the 
Chernobyl disaster, leading to a significantly more stringent control regime at the 
International Atomic Energy Agency.
13
 Apart from this, environmental efforts have focussed 
                                                     
10
 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, 2012, official website available at 
http://www.uncsd2012.org/rio20/.  
11
 Amongst others: ICJ, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case, Hungary v. Slovakia, 25 September 1997, 1997 ICJ 
Reports 3. For a detailed account of the negotiating history of the Stockholm declaration, see Sohn, L. B., “The 
Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment”, Harvard International Law Journal, 1973, 14 (3), 423-
515.  
12
 For a more detailed account of the processes leading to the establishment of UNEP, see infra, Chapter 1.  
13
 For a more detailed overview of the International Atomic Energy Agency, see Goeteyn, N., “Internationaal 
Atoomenergie Agentschap (IAEA)”, in Reyngaert, C. (ed.), De Gespecialiseerde Instellingen van de Verenigde 
13 
 
on different themes (for instance: waste and chemicals management, air pollution, water, 
biodiversity, etc.). Especially during the 1970s and 1980s, there was an enormous 
accumulation of the available international instruments for the environment.
14
 The 
development of international environmental law can thus best be described as thematic.  
 
Exemplary for this thematic approach is the development of the Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs), the principle carriers of international environmental legislation. These 
MEAs are international treaties as defined by the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Vienna Convention or VCLT)
15
 and as such only formally bind states if and when they have 
been ratified. Most of these international conventions have created their own institutions, 
aiming to oversee compliance with these thematic agreements. The enormous amount of 
MEAs, subsidiary bodies, compliance regimes, financing regimes, voting procedures and 
internal regulations, together with overarching issues of for example internal incoherence and 
questions of legitimacy, are considered to be the most important challenges for the future of 
international environmental policy and law. The growth of instruments of international 
environmental law is impressive, yet it has also made the overall system increasingly 
unwieldy.
16
 It is also considered to be one of the core reasons for the fragmented international 
environmental policy of today.  
 
Environmental concerns attract enormous attention at international fora nowadays. 
Nonetheless, international environmental law as such is a relatively young field of law.
17
 The 
1945 United Nations Charter
18
 for instance, which defines the purpose and principles of the 
United Nations Organisation (UN), does not once mention environmental protection as one of 
them.
19
 It did (and still does) not have any specific provisions about the environment or 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Naties, Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties, 2011, 211-227. Reprinted in Reyngaert, C. (ed.), De 
Gespecialiseerde Instellingen van de Verenigde Naties, Leuven, ACCO, 2011. 
14
 For a chronological list of environmental agreements, see 
http://www.unep.org/Law/Law_instruments/index_complete_list.asp.  
15
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, 1155 UNTS 331 and 8 ILM 679 (1969). 
16
 Najam, A., Papa, M. and Taiyab, N., Global Environmental Governance. A Reform Agenda, Winnipeg, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2006.  
17
 Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law (2
nd
 Edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003.  
18
 Charter of the United Nations, 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.  
19
 Bodansky, D., Brunnee, J. and Hey, E., The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford 
and New York, Oxford University Press, 2007, at 2.  
14 
 
environmental affairs. The only way environmental concerns could potentially be brought 
under the UN Charter was through the concept of good neighbourliness, a rather vague legal 
concept of which the practical value in terms of law-making was very limited. It was only 
through the practice and jurisdiction by the International Court of Justice and international 
arbitral awards that certain environmental rules could be made binding on all states, by 
declaring that these rules are part of international customary law.
20
 In this regard, reference 
must be made to the importance of (amongst others) the Corfu Channel case
21
, the Lac 
Lanoux case
22
 and the Nuclear Test cases.
23
  
 
The UN, as the most prominent inter-governmental organisation, was thus not intrinsically 
dedicated to environmental affairs nor did it originally host a specialised agency or 
programme specialised in dealing with environmental concerns. Some UN agencies or 
programmes had been dealing with specific environmental issues, but by and large no 
coherent policy- or law-making effort for the environment at the UN level existed before 
1972. As a consequence of this lack of an international coordinator for these processes, 
today’s international environmental legal system is highly fragmented, which in turn is 
considered to hamper effective environmental law and policy making.  
 
This debate for a more flexible, more coherent and more effective international response to 
environmental threats is being pursued under the term International Environmental 
Governance (IEG), which deals with a broad array of questions of international law and 
policy.
24
 There is no singular definition of IEG. For the purpose of this study, IEG should be 
                                                     
20
 Bodansky, D., Brunnee, J. and Hey, E., The Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford 
and New York, Oxford University Press, 2007; Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law (2
nd
 
Edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2003; Fitzmaurice, M., Ong, D. and Merkouris, P. (eds.), 
Research handbook on international environmental law, Northampton (MA), Edward Elgar Publishers, 2010. 
21
 The ICJ recognised in the Corfu Channel Case the princple that all states are under an obligation in 
international law to not knowingly allow their territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states. 
See ICJ, Corfu Channel Case, UK v. Albania, 9 April 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports 4 (specifically at 22).  
22
 The Lac Lanoux arbitration establishes rules concerning the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses. Lac Lanoux Arbitration, France v. Spain, 16 November 1957, 12 UN Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards, 281-317.  
23
 ICJ, Nuclear Test Case, Australia v. France, 20 December 1974, 1974 ICJ Reports 253 and ICJ, Nuclear Test 
Case, New Zealand v. France, 20 December 1974, 1974 ICJ Reports 457. Prior to all of these cases is the famous 
Trail Smelter Case, an arbitral award recognising that no state has the right to use its territory in such a way that 
is harmful to another state when the injury “is of serious consequence and the injury is established by clear and 
convincing evidence”. Trail Smelter Case, United States v. Canada, 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941, 1941 UN 
Reports of International Arbitral Rewards, 1905-1982 and specifically at 1907. 
24
 The debate used to be pursued under the term ‘Global Environmental Governance’, which was defined as “the 
sum of organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures and norms that regulate the 
15 
 
understood to refer to the processes used to steering the whole of legal and political structures, 
within which interactions (both formal and informal) between a broad range of actors are 
organized, aimed at establishing regulations, rules and norms that will benefit the architecture 
of instruments aimed at protecting the earth’s environment. To that end, IEG concerns itself 
with (amongst others) questions of effectiveness of international regimes, implementation and 
compliance issues (both at the institutional and convention levels), inter-relatedness and 
overlap of existing and potentially new MEAs, the diffusion of environmental legislation, and 
the further development of the normative content of environmental conventions and 
legislation. Moreover, the IEG debate concerns itself with issues at three levels: (i) the 
national level (questions of implementation, capacity building, etc.), (ii) the regional level 
(matters of regional environmental legislation, the regional presence of the institutions 
charged with environmental affairs, etc.) and (iii) the international level (proliferation and 
dispersion of environmental legislation, reform of the institutional framework, etc.). 
 
Numerous initiatives, both on a local, regional and international level, have not been able to 
overcome this series of structural problems in the field of international environmental policy 
and law-making. The relevance of these challenges could not be greater. Every level of 
policy-making shows a clear tendency towards a more holistic approach to environmental 
issues, by aligning different policy areas in order to achieve policy-coordinating goals (for 
instance through application of the concept of sustainable development). An efficient and 
effective policy now requires an innovative approach, which, because of the above-described 
fragmentation, is hindered in the field of international environmental law. 
 
II. About this project 
 
A. Nature, scope and added value of this study 
 
This text, which is submitted as a PhD dissertation to the Faculty of Law of Ghent University 
in order to obtain the academic degree of Doctor of Law, is the result of a 4-year BOF 
research project under the original title “De oprichting van een Wereld Milieu Organisatie”. 
As such, the initial research was aimed at creating a scientific legal framework for the debate 
                                                                                                                                                                      
processes of global environmental protection”. Najam, A., Papa, M. and Taiyab, N., Global Environmental 
Governance. A Reform Agenda, Winnipeg, International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2006, at 3. 
However, the term ‘global’ has since been substituted by ‘international’. This demarcates a departure from the 
traditional interpretation of looking at environmental governance.  
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on the desirability of the creation of a World Environment Organisation (WEO) or a United 
Nations Environment Organisation (UNEO). Mostly because of the enormous political impact 
and the economical interests at stake, this debate generally takes place outside of a strictly 
legal and academic context and has rather been focussed around a series of studies and 
scenarios assessing the political feasibility of the creation of such an organisation. 
Furthermore, the debate for the creation of a WEO, which has arguable been going on for 
over 40 years, is being dealt with as the institutional side of the much broader debate on IEG, 
which, as noted supra, deals with a much broader array of questions on international law and 
policy.  
 
It should immediately be clear from this enumeration that one project, which must ultimately 
lead to a self-contained result, cannot exhaustively incorporate all of the elements of the IEG 
debate in one surveyable and delimited text. Neither in terms of length nor research required 
would this be a feasible undertaking. Furthermore, during the course of the research, it 
became increasingly plain that in order to be able to develop a juridical-empirical perspective 
on the effectiveness of international legislation for the environment, which is the main 
concern of this study, more specific sub-themes would have to be identified. 
 
The IEG debate takes place over an impressive number of international fora, which, quite 
naturally, primarily deal with issues of significant political importance. The legal perspective 
on these issues however is often neglected or dealt with superficially. This study has therefore 
focussed on those issues that bear the most relevance from a legal perspective, namely: (i) a 
legal analysis and view on the institutional reform that may (or may not) be necessary to 
ensure greater coherence in environmental law-making and greater effectiveness of the 
policies and legislation already in place, and (ii) the dispersion of the environmental 
conventions and legal ways and limits to efforts to bridge the gaps between them. 
 
The study is thus subdivided in two major parts and focuses: on the one hand on international 
organisations for the environment; on the other hand on the rather heterogeneous group of 
environmental conventions commonly referred to as MEAs. It should be noted that the term 
‘organisation’ is used here in a legal sense, meaning an international body established by a 
particular constitutive legal instrument. The definitions and theories of political science on the 
term, which are arguably more advanced, are as such not within the scope of this study. 
Thematically, the research in this study deals with the following sub-themes: international 
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environmental law, the law of international organisations, law of public access and 
participation, and theories of international relations and multilevel governance. Furthermore, 
this study and its findings often balance on the slim border between treaty law and 
institutional law.  
 
At first sight such a study could appear to be superfluous or predictable, since a huge body of 
literature on the subject of IEG and institutional reform for the environment already exists. 
However, despite the abundance of attention the topic has received over the years, no study 
exists that looks at these issues from a primarily legal perspective. Up until now the IEG 
debate has been dominated by political scientists, explaining in depth the political challenges 
and consequences an institutional overhaul of the existing international environmental 
governance system would bring about. Little or no attention has been given to the legal 
challenges and consequences of such a transformation. Authors in general do not go into 
detail as to what legal challenges an institutional overhaul would have to overcome. Questions 
of collaboration between the environmental conventions for instance have primarily been 
dealt with from the perspective of their political feasibility rather than the legal effects, 
conditions for and limits to these processes. Matters of institutional reform are discussed in 
terms of political changes required, rather than legal ones. Personal experience and countless 
conversations with policy-makers have convinced me that even at the highest political level 
there is great demand for legal research dealing with the consequences of certain policy 
directions on the table. This demand, together with the realisation that legal research lags far 
behind the political science research on this topic, seems to indicate the need for and added 
value of this study. 
 
B. Goal of the study: research questions 
 
The main research question with which this study concerns itself is the question of how the 
international community can ensure more effective international environmental governance 
and enhance compliance with international environmental obligations.  
 
A study on improving the effectiveness of IEG, which by definition implies that the current 
status of IEG is one of ineffectiveness, would be incomplete without a historical overview on 
how the status quaestionis has come into being. At the same time, it is readily recognised that 
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many such overviews already exist.
25
 Adding another historical overview and analysis of the 
many underlying causes of the current situation of environmental affairs at the international 
level will most likely prove incomplete or without added value to the rest of the thesis. 
Furthermore, each individual chapter comes with its own introduction that further sets the 
scene for the debate. This introductory chapter and the historical overview in chapter 1 have 
therefore been greatly reduced in size from their original design and have intentionally been 
kept as concise as possible. 
 
Since this study concerns itself with formulating a legal analysis and response at two levels, 
the international institutional level and the international treaty level, research questions 
therefore also are broken apart in two categories.  
 
1. Questions concerning the institutional level 
 
The debate on improving the current governance system is not new. Given the sorrow state of 
the world’s environmental governance situation, with its lack of transparency, ineffective 
implementation and the duplicative or contradictory efforts in the field of environmental 
policy and law-making, this is hardly surprising. In the centre of this debate is the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the most prominent institutional actor in the field 
of environmental governance at the UN-level. Ever since its creation in 1972, an extensive 
body of literature has been devoted to assessing the working and results of the Programme. 
The majority of studies reach the seemingly inevitable conclusion that UNEP has been 
underperforming and that the international community is in dire need of a better-functioning 
coordination mechanism.
26
 It has been argued that the institutional side of the environmental 
governance system in its current form is conceptually flawed and starting anew after making a 
complete tabula rasa is the only viable way forward.
27
  
 
                                                     
25
 As a great example, see the historical overview of international environmental law by Sand: Sand, P. H., “The 
evolution of International Environmental Law”, in Bodansky, D., Brunnee, J. and Hey, E. (eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of International Environmental Law, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 2007. 
26
 See (amongst others) Newell, P., “New environmental architectures and the search for effectiveness”, Global 
Environmental Politics, 2001, 1 (1), 35-44. 
27
 See for instance Kirton, J. J., “Generating Effective Global Governance: the North’s Need for a World 
Environment Organisation”, in Biermann, F. and Bauer, S. (eds.), A World Environment Organisation. Solution 
or Threat to Effective International Environmental Governance?, London and Burlington, Ashgate, 2005. 
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It has also been argued that a new environmental institution is needed as an alternative to 
UNEP. Whether or not to call this new organisation a World Environment Organisation 
(WEO) is in itself heavily debated. Apart from the large number of proposals on the form this 
WEO would take (more than 17 in 2002) there is an even more impressive list of issues this 
future environmental organisation would have to resolve. All in all the idea is to create an 
organisation that would have more clout over faltering environmental negotiations, 
autonomous MEA secretariats and uncooperative states.
28
 For some, this WEO holds an 
answer to the global market failing by internalising externalities and a counterbalance versus 
the successful and dominant World Trade Organisation (WTO). Others believe that the 
combining or clustering of existing regimes, international organisations and treaties will make 
information-sharing easier and avoid duplication. That way, big gains in efficiency can be 
made, and it will be easier to predict and assess the impact of regulations that are imposed in a 
certain field. Still others believe there is no urgent need to create a WEO. Internalisation is an 
overarching issue that needs to be resolved first, before tinkering with the institutional 
structures. This has led some to conclude that there is no need for a new organisation or 
international structure, and that the political attention and available resources should be used 
to improve the existing framework. 
 
Over the years, UNEP has been harshly criticised and deemed to be largely ineffective. 
However, looking at the reform debate that has been going on for over forty years and its 
outcomes so far, it would seem that it is the reform debate itself that has been largely 
ineffective. This study starts from the finding that, after 40 years of debate, the creation of a 
WEO is still not widely accepted and investigates the reasons behind this failing. Firstly, a 
short historical overview is given of the coming into being of UNEP as the singular 
environmental organisation at the international level. The main arguments from the reform 
debate are analysed and put into their historic context and it is investigated to what extent a 
deep reform of the institutions for the environment at the international level would mean an 
improvement of the existing situation. Furthermore there is considerable overlap to be found 
in the arguments used in the debate for the creation of UNEP in 1972 and the creation of a 
WEO today. A comparative analysis is used to show why the reform debate has not been 
more successful. To that end, the original creation process of UNEP will be investigated. 
                                                     
28
 For an overview of the debate with attention for arguments pro and con, see Biermann, F. and Bauer, S. (eds.), 
A World Environment Organisation. Solution or Threat to Effective International Environmental Governance?, 
London and Burlington, Ashgate, 2005. 
20 
 
Understanding the reasons behind certain organisational choices in 1972 is imperative in 
order to fully grasp the current debate. Based on this assessment, parallels are drawn between 
the debate in 1972 and the ongoing debate.  
 
Furthermore, as part of the way forward, the legal challenges in the creation of a WEO are 
investigated. A detailed definition of the WEO is established, based upon a cross section of a 
selection of proposals for a WEO and a number of core elements this new organisation must 
incorporate are identified. An analysis will be made of the challenges the creation of this 
WEO will encounter, from a legal perspective, together with an assessment of the added value 
of a WEO to the existing framework at the UN level.  
 
2. Questions concerning the treaty level 
 
In general terms, the main characteristics of the MEAs are the following: (i) they are 
multilateral and open treaties, meaning that accession is possible for all nations, which makes 
MEAs potentially universal legal instruments; (ii) they establish an independent legal 
framework, in many cases with subsidiary bodies; and (iii) they are legally autonomous, 
meaning that the Conference of the Parties (COP), the plenary body established by the 
convention, is the highest legal and political authority of the convention.  
 
The MEAs and their institutional arrangements occupy a particular position in international 
law: they balance on a precarious border between institutional and treaty law. At least for 
their conclusion, ratification and acceptance, MEAs follow traditional international treaty law 
as codified in the 1969 VCLT. However, the establishment of permanent organs (in particular 
the Conference of the Parties) with autonomous decision-making powers and in most cases 
the competence to establish subsidiary organs as it sees fit, or to “exercise such other 
functions as are required for the achievement of the objective of the Convention”29, 
corresponds closely to traditional international institutional law and its implied powers 
                                                     
29
 For example, as determined in the UNFCCC, article 7 para 2 and the Kyoto Protocol, article 13. See also infra, 
Chapter 2.  
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theory.
30
 It has even been argued that the MEAs constitute intergovernmental organisations in 
the traditional meaning of the term.
31
  
 
Establishing an MEA each time an environmental issue arises for the international community 
certainly has benefits: (i) it allows flexibility to tackle a specific issue without being crippled 
by existing procedures or frameworks that may not be well suited to deal with that specific 
issue; (ii) it is a system that is highly adaptable to newly emerging scientific knowledge and 
political consensus, also in light of the system of the Conferences of the Parties that has been 
established; and (iii) most of all, it is part of a fundamentally inter-governmental system that 
allows all states through the process of ratification to determine for themselves to which 
international rules and regulations they will submit themselves. At the same time, the web of 
MEAs also has obvious drawbacks: environmental concerns are in many cases global 
concerns and often the inter-governmental response mechanism cannot formulate timely nor 
unified responses to these concerns. The proliferation of MEAs is therefore believed to pose 
an increasing risk to the coherence of environmental law- and policy-making. 
 
The Conferences of the Parties (COPs) of the MEAs have gradually but certainly become 
essential players in the environmental law-making process at the international level. As the 
highest legal authority of the MEA, the COP is responsible for setting out the general policy 
direction of the MEA, for establishing subsidiary bodies such as compliance mechanisms, and 
for adopting decisions that interpret and effectively put the convention into practice. 
However, international lawyers have become increasingly aware of the fact that these COPs 
act very much like international organisations. The distinction is essential in the debate, since 
the applicable law (treaty law vs. institutional law) depends on the classification of COPs, 
either as the plenary meetings of international treaties or as international organisations in their 
own right, and, vice versa, the applicable law demarcates the competences of the COPs. 
Furthermore, this difference is essential to the question to what extent MEAs and COPs are 
open to centralisation and steering. Especially in light of the ongoing clustering processes, this 
distinction is essential. 
 
                                                     
30
 Amongst others: Churchill, R. R. and Ulfstein, G., “Autonomous institutional arrangements in multilateral 
environmental agreements: a little-noticed phenomenon in international law”, American Journal of International 
Law, 2000, 94, 623-659. 
31
 Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law (2nd Edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2003. 
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Since the COPs are established to be more than international treaties but less than 
international organisations, the applicable law must be identified and applied. An analysis of 
the decision-making processes within the COPs will be done from a legal perspective and be 
based upon, amongst others, the different voting procedures applied by the COPs. Most 
commonly, the COPs adopt decisions by means of consensus and are therefore confronted 
with the problem of the lowest common denominator. Nevertheless, novel ways to deal with 
this are being applied, also leading to questions about the legal value of these decisions. A 
comparison between voting behaviour and legal effect of the decisions will add to the 
theoretical discourse on the decision-making processes within international organisations that 
pursue a global interest.  
 
Therefore, the normative powers of the COPs and the consequences of their decisions must 
first be clearly defined. The legal value of COP decisions is investigated from a formal legal 
perspective. To that end, the sui generis character of the COP model is established by looking 
at the development of the COP model as a hybrid between a traditional intergovernmental 
organisation and diplomatic conferences. The consequences of this hybrid status for the 
decision-making power and competences of the COPs are investigated. Furthermore, COPs 
adopt specific voting rules as part of their Rules of Procedure. These voting rules and the 
effect of their adoption to the legal status of COP decisions are also examined.  
 
The implementation deficit and compliance issues with the MEAs are well-known issues in 
international law. Increasingly the question is raised whether or not it is useful to keep 
creating new conventions and obligations, given that the existing ones are not sufficiently 
being complied with. One of the most commonly applied competences of the COP and a 
possible way to ensure and enhance compliance with the obligations emanating from the 
MEA is the establishment of a compliance mechanism.  
 
State practice shows a clear shift towards the establishment of more or less independent 
compliance mechanisms. However, a great variety remains in terms of political and legal 
clout: some mechanisms are purely facilitative in nature and aim to help states that are falling 
short of their international obligations, other mechanisms aim to punish states that are 
considered able yet unwilling to comply. In a limited number of cases, a combination of these 
two systems is installed. Furthermore, it is researched how effective these mechanisms are as 
a means to improve overall compliance with the international obligations emanating from the 
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MEAs. To that end, the different causes of non-compliance and the possible consequences 
and responses by the compliance mechanisms are examined. The obligations resulting from 
the compliance mechanisms are also part of this analysis - specifically the obligation to 
provide information, performance review and verification of information. A round-up is then 
made by comparing characteristics of the current compliance mechanisms. Also the effective 
practice of the MEAs is investigated, in order to determine whether or not the application of 
the convention is identical to what the convention texts determine. The goal is to have an 
assessment of the components of an ‘ideal’ compliance mechanism in the case of 
environmental protection. Finally, the role of compliance mechanisms as a means to settle an 
international dispute is investigated and put in contrast to the classical means of dispute 
resolution in international law.  
 
Linked to the idea that proliferation of institutions is problematic is the finding that most 
countries, especially in the developing world, are struggling with issues of participation. This 
is closely related to the idea that international environmental law-making has a problem of 
legitimacy.
32
 There are countless meetings in different locations in the world and the 
frequency of meetings increases, because of the many COPs, MOPs and workshops that are 
being organised by the secretariats of MEAs. Only the biggest developing countries (Brazil, 
India, South-Africa, China, etc.) are able to send representatives to all of these meetings. The 
Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have given up a long time ago. Even the smaller 
developed countries (such as Belgium) are finding it increasingly challenging to delegate 
enough experts to participate in all of these meetings. The participation of these countries 
affects the representativeness of the decision process and therefore on the implementation of 
these decisions. The question if centralising these meetings by clustering the MEAs or 
establishing a WEO might form a solution for this issue of representativeness will be 
examined.  
 
Similarly, many soft law instruments (such as for instance Agenda 21 and the Rio 
Declaration) call for more participation of broad layers of the population in the decision-
                                                     
32
 For instance, see Bodansky, D., “The legitimacy of international governance: a coming challenge to 
international environmental law?”, American Journal of International Law, 1999, 93, 596-624. See also Muñoz, 
M., Thrasher, R. and Najam, A., “Measuring the Negotiation Burden of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements”, Global Environmental Politics, 2009, 9(4), 1-13, and Franck, T. M., “Legitimacy in the 
international system”, American Journal of International Law, 1988, 82, 705-759.  
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making process. Today, NGOs have a certain influence on the setting of the agenda. This 
participation issue is closely connected to how these actors are included in the decision-
making process. Proposed alternatives to the current situation will be looked at from a legal 
angle to determine whether or not the clustering of MEAs or the creation of a WEO would 
improve on the current situation.  
 
3. Overview of the content of the chapters of this dissertation 
 
Part 1 of this dissertation, which holds Chapters 1, 2 and 3, provides an extensive status 
quaestionis of those elements of the IEG debate that have been identified as essential to our 
study. Chapter 1 deals with the issues related to international institutions for the environment 
and looks at the reasons behind UNEP’s creation – in terms of form, mandate, location and 
funding. Also the reform debate for a WEO will be introduced and critically assessed. 
Chapters 2 and 3 deal with the legal challenges facing the current IEG system at the treaty 
level. Chapter 2 deals with the normative powers of the COPs of the MEAs and attempts to 
define the functions of the COPs. Also the legal value of the decisions adopted by the COPs is 
investigated. Chapter 3 goes into greater detail about the competence of the COP to establish 
compliance mechanisms. The compliance mechanisms of 22 MEAs and their respective 
subsidiary bodies and procedures dealing with compliance issues are investigated. 
 
Part 2 of this dissertation then looks at two commonly proposed solutions for more effective 
International Environmental Governance: Chapter 4 deals with the idea of clustering MEAs 
and identifies the legal possibilities, challenges and limitations to clustering. The most 
important underlying questions raised here are if the boundaries of institutionalisation have 
been reached. Is it still viable to create new institutions or is it possible to reorganise or cluster 
existing ones? What would be the conditions for such a move and is it possible and/or 
desirable to do away with certain institutions? Chapter 5 looks into the creation of a WEO, by 
means of a cross section of ten proposals for institutional reform. The common elements in 
the proposals are defined, and the legal challenges in their implementation discussed.  
 
Lastly, the main findings, lessons learned and conclusions of this dissertation are compiled in 
Part 3.  
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C. Methodology applied in this study 
 
Researchers in international law and policy traditionally come across significant issues of 
methodology. Especially for a lawyer who does not have any theoretical nor practical 
experience in this matter and does not have the grounded and commonly used theories of 
political science at his disposal, methodology can prove to be challenging. When directly 
asked about her research methodology, one law professor described the process to me as 
follows: read a book, think about it, and then write something.  
 
In the first instance, the research has been carried out by means of a desktop and literature 
study. A vast body of literature in the field of environmental governance has been examined, 
both in the form of books and book chapters, peer-reviewed articles and internet-based 
sources. Also numerous official documents were included in this desktop research.  
 
It is important to check findings with practice. Close contacts have been established with the 
DG Environment of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (FOD Buitenlandse Zaken) at the 
Belgian federal level and with the department of environmental affairs (LNE) at the Flemish 
level. This has allowed access to numerous meetings, both at the international level (Belgrade 
negotiation process, the UNEP Governing Council of 2009 and 2011, etc.), at the national 
level (the COREMULTI and several working groups on IEG) and at the regional level. These 
meetings usually implied access to an important number of unofficial and (in some cases) 
unpublished texts. References to these texts have only been included in this thesis when 
directly quoted.  
 
Furthermore, in direct collaboration with the DG Environment of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs, a study stay was organised for a period of six months at the UNEP Headquarters in 
Nairobi (Kenya). There, the literature study was vastly expanded by making use of the UNEP 
library and the archives of the Belgian Embassy in Nairobi. At the same time, making use of 
discourse analysis, the decision-making procedures of UNEP and the other relevant 
institutional actors were analysed. Interim conclusions were discussed with UNEP personnel, 
country representatives and academic experts. These contacts with country delegates have 
proven to be an invaluable source of information. 
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Finally, research results have been checked and put to the test in the academic milieu through 
participation in numerous conferences and seminars. Lastly, several texts have been published 
focussing on global environmental governance and the possible role of a WEO. 
 
Uniformity and simplicity have been the major aims of the style used for referencing purposes 
in this thesis. However, because of the wide diversity and disparity of documents consulted 
and referenced in this thesis, not all documents could be fit in the same format. In those cases 
the style of the references and the bibliography used are that of Edward Elgar Publishers, as 
put forward in their Author and Editor Guidelines for Law submissions.
33
  
 
D. Publications 
 
During the course of research project, several articles have been published. Texts were 
published primarily in English, but some also in Dutch and one in French. The English texts 
have either been slightly reworked and incorporated in this dissertation, or have formed the 
basis for large parts of the different chapters. In both cases the first footnote in the 
introduction of each of the chapters identifies which is which. In the case where the published 
texts have been written in Dutch or French, no such incorporation has been applied: where 
relevant for the overall thesis, references have been made to the published texts.  
 
Here follows an overview of all published texts (in chronological order of publication): 
 
- Maes, F. and Goeteyn, N., “De ontwikkeling van nalevingmechanismen in 
multilaterale milieuverdragen: een bedreiging voor de klassieke geschillenregeling?”, 
in Boone, I., Claeys, I. and Lavrysen, L. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Hubert Bocken, 2009, 
Brugge, Die Keure, 417-433.  
- Goeteyn, N., “De UNEP Governing Council: de toekomst van het internationale 
milieubeleid op het spel”, Wereldbeeld, 33 (3), 2009, 10-15.  
- Goeteyn, N., “Internationaal Atoomenergie Agentschap (IAEA)”, in Reyngaert, C. 
(ed.), De Gespecialiseerde Instellingen van de Verenigde Naties, Vereniging voor de 
Verenigde Naties, 2011, 211-227. Reprinted in Reyngaert, C. (ed.), De 
Gespecialiseerde Instellingen van de Verenigde Naties, Leuven, ACCO, 2011 (190).  
                                                     
33
 Author and Editor Guidelines Law, Edward Elgar Publishers, last updated February 2012, available at 
http://www.e-elgar.co.uk/PDFs/Author_Ed_guide_LAW_Feb_2012.pdf.  
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- Goeteyn, N. and Maes, F., “Compliance Mechanisms in Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: An Effective Way to Improve Compliance?”, Chinese Journal of 
International Law, 2011, 10 (4), 791-826.  
- Goeteyn, N., “De UNEP Governing Council: in rechte lijn naar Rio+20?”, 
Wereldbeeld, 2011, 158 (2), 14-18.  
- Goeteyn, N. and Maes, F., “The quest for a World Environment Organisation: 
reflections on a failing debate as an input for future improvement”, in Martin, P., 
Zhiping, L., Tianbao, Q., du Plessis, A. and Le Bouthillier, Y. (eds.), Environmental 
Governance and Sustainability, The IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 2011, 
Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishers, 2011 (368). 
 
Several other articles have been submitted to editors and are in the process of publication:  
 
- Goeteyn, N. and Maes, F., “The clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: 
can the clustering of the chemicals-related conventions be applied to the biodiversity 
and climate change conventions?”, accepted for publication with the IUCN Academy 
of Environmental Law 2012, Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar Publishers 
(forthcoming). 
- Goeteyn, N., “Questions environnementales”, Chronique de la Pratique belge en 
matière de Droit International (2007-2011) (forthcoming). 
- Goeteyn, N., “Het Milieuprogramma van de Verenigde Naties (UNEP)”, in Reyngaert, 
C., De Programmas en Fondsen van de Verenigde Naties, 2012, Leuven, ACCO 
(forthcoming). 
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Chapter 1: International Institutions for the Environment - UNEP and the debate for 
the creation of a World Environment Organisation 
 
“To be yourself in a world 
that is constantly trying to make you something else 
is the greatest accomplishment.” 
Ralph Waldo Emerson 
 
I. Introduction34 
 
No international organisation exists to oversee environmental issues in a comprehensive and 
coordinated manner. The form and mandate of the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP) were deliberately designed for such a role, but many observers of the international 
environmental scene dismiss UNEP as an institutional failure.
35
 Given the deteriorating state 
of the global environment and the lack of a politically and legally authoritative body in the 
field of environmental policy and law-making, the idea that a profound institutional overhaul 
is needed is a compelling one.  
 
As is the case with all structural changes at the international level, the proposals for 
institutional reform at UN level meet considerable resistance. Both developed and developing 
states protest with the to-be-expected arguments: reform is too costly, the efforts will divert 
too much political and diplomatic attention to what is really a non-issue, etc. Examining the 
debate that has been going on for the last 40 years, it appears to have failed in its core 
business: engaging people for improving the level of environmental protection through an 
upgraded International Environmental Governance (IEG) system, in which an institutional 
overhaul of UNEP would be the centrepiece. In the build-up towards the Rio+20 conference 
in 2012, advocates feel that now is the time to press for fundamental changes on the IEG 
scene.  
                                                     
34
 This chapter is a thorough expansion of a previously published article: Goeteyn, N. and Maes, F., “The quest 
for a World Environment Organisation: reflections on a failing debate as an input for future improvement”, in 
Martin, P., Zhiping, L., Tianbao, Q., du Plessis, A. and Le Bouthillier, Y. (eds.), Environmental Governance and 
Sustainability, The IUCN Academy of Environmental Law 2011, Cheltenham and Northampton, Edward Elgar 
Publishers, 2011.  
35
 For examples of such reasoning, see (amongst others) Biermann, F. and Bauer, S. (eds.), A World Environment 
Organisation. Solution or Threat to Effective International Environmental Governance?, London and 
Burlington, Ashgate, 2005.  
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This chapter focuses on the development of UNEP as the international hub for policy-making 
for the environment, and investigates why the idea of institutional reform is not met with 
general enthusiasm and acceptance. Why have institutional reform efforts so far proven 
unsuccessful? Firstly under (II), the original creation process of UNEP will be investigated. 
Understanding the reasons behind certain organisational choices in 1972 is imperative in 
order to fully grasp the current debate. Secondly, the critiques on UNEP are investigated and 
the proposed alternatives to the programme discussed under (III). Focus is given to the 
proposal to create a World Environment Organisation (WEO) as an alternative to UNEP. 
Furthermore, under (IV), based on these assessments, parallels are drawn between the debate 
in 1972 and the current debate. Based on this, in (V), recommendations for the ongoing and 
future debate are made.  
 
II. The creation of UNEP 
 
A. A brief historical background 
 
During the 1960s a broad environmental movement started and took root in many of the 
developed countries. New organisations and civil initiatives concerned with the environment, 
such as the WWF, were founded in this period and heightened the general public’s interest in 
and knowledge of environmental issues. As such, these initiatives fulfilled essential 
awareness-raising functions.
36
  
 
The general public became increasingly aware of the limits to the environment’s capacity to 
sustain the whole of human activities. For instance, Chayes contended that  
 
“[...] it has become increasingly clear that present trends in population, 
energy production and industrial activity cannot be extrapolated 
indefinitely without reaching the limits of the capacity of the earth to 
sustain them. [...] The fundamental message of the environment is that 
mankind inhabits a finite planet with finite resources. If the human 
race is to survive under conditions that make life worthwhile, it must 
devise ways of maximizing the productivity of this finite stock of 
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resources and of sharing the product in some rational and equitable 
way.”37  
 
Consequently, this growing sense of urgency about the world’s environmental situation 
created a surge in conservationist thinking. When discussing the apparent dilemma between 
conservation and exploitation in light of the idea of sustainable development, Kennan 
concluded as follows:  
 
“It may be boldly asserted that of the two purposes in question, 
conservation should come first. The principle should be that one 
exploits what a careful regard for the needs of conservation leaves to 
be exploited, not that one conserves what a liberal indulgence of the 
impulse to development leaves to be conserved”.38  
 
Then United Nations Secretary-General U Thant considered the apparent dilemma between 
economic development and ecologic conservation to be serious enough to openly discuss the 
creation of a global authority for the environment that would have the competence to police 
countries and enforce its decisions. To that effect, he envisioned that the global authority 
would depart “from the hitherto sacred paths of national sovereignty”39.  
 
Of course, at the time of these calls for action and the establishment of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), which took place in 1972, many efforts 
for the conservation of the environment were already in place both at the national and at the 
international level. Several international actors were actively involved in dealing with 
environmental issues and had been active in the field of environmental protection for many 
years. Especially some of the UN specialised agencies, for example the World Meteorological 
Organisation (WMO) and the World Health Organisation (WHO), had been bringing 
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emerging environmental issues to the international community’s attention long before 1972. 
These efforts were not part of the core business of those organisations and their scale was 
limited to specific programmes. Nevertheless, these organisations were active in the 
environmental sphere and had long-running action programmes about, amongst others, the 
long-term survival of the polar bear, hydrology, fresh water, air pollution, climate change, 
forest management and malaria. Some of these programs had been running for a decade or 
more.
40
  
 
As such, the contention that international environmental policy-making only really started in 
the 1970s is fundamentally flawed. However it is true that no central unit or organisation was 
charged with the guiding of these processes. The comments of the time make reference to a 
“bewildering”41 amount of initiatives and “considerable bodies of international 
arrangements”42. These arrangements for the environment were considered to be in a state of 
“ineffectiveness and disarray”43 and their activities were “badly fragmented throughout the 
UN system, and [...] this is one of the problems to be solved”44.  
 
At the same time, these growing concerns about the environmental situation of the world and 
the international institutional response to it could not conceal that the overall scientific 
knowledge about these emerging environmental issues was in many cases still embryonic. 
Many observers considered this scientific uncertainty to be one of the main problems an 
international policy response should attempt to address. 
 
B. Early proposals for institutional reform 
 
Several commentators and scholars of the time made calls for an international institutional 
response to the environmental issues and called for the creation of an international 
organisation for the environment. The two leading proposals at the time of the UNCHE were 
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from the hand of Kennan
45
 (1970) and Chayes
46
 (1972) respectively. Both proposals will be 
briefly elaborated on here.  
 
1. Kennan 
 
Kennan proposed the establishment of a new organisation, which he named the “international 
environmental agency”, to be created at the 1972 Stockholm Conference. The new 
organisation would have the following functions. Firstly, it would provide adequate facilities 
for the collection, storage, retrieval and dissemination of information on all aspects of 
environmental issues. This new organisation would not conduct any original research itself, 
yet be a funnel and assembly point of existing research and as such be involved only in meta-
research. Secondly, the new organisation would promote the coordination of research and 
(both the existing and newly developed) operational activities in the field of environment at 
the international level. The idea behind this function was mostly to limit the risks of double 
work, duplication and omission, by pooling and centralising as much as possible existing 
efforts. At the same time Kennan admitted that these existing efforts by other international 
institutions should not simply be ignored, copied or centralised. They would have to be 
assessed based on their performance and the decision whether or not to supplant them or bring 
them under the authority of this new organisation would have to be made on a case-by-case 
basis. Thirdly and essentially, the new organisation would be competent to establish 
international standards in environmental matters. While he did not advocate the transfer of 
sovereignty as such, Kennan asserted that some form of pressing the governments to adopt 
and enforce environmental standards would be necessary. Fourthly, for the global commons 
where no single government can claim exclusive sovereignty, such as the high seas, outer 
space, the stratosphere and the Arctic and Antarctic regions, the new organisation should set 
internationally binding conservatory standards.  
 
Remarkably, this new organisation as envisioned by Kennan would not necessarily stay 
within the limits of the UN diplomatic scene. Substantive decisions would not be taken based 
on political compromise between representatives of governments, but by a team of experts, 
scientists and scholars, who would not be bound by loyalty to national governments. The bulk 
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of the personnel of this organisation would thus consist mainly of scientists and technically 
competent people, ideally not bound to any government.  
 
Kennan admitted that broad political support for such a organisation would be very unlikely. 
Therefore he placed his hopes on a “relatively small group of governments”, who he believed 
would likely consist of “the leading industrial and maritime nations”47.  
 
2. Chayes 
 
Chayes on the other hand considered that the environmental concerns could not be solved 
outside of the UN system. He considered the problem to be a global one, to which also the 
developing countries contributed. Consequently, so must the solution be fundamentally 
global. The best available framework for formulating such a global answer would be the UN.  
 
What was needed according to Chayes was “some form of high-level policy planning, 
coordination and review unit within the UN proper”48. The unit would not do any policing or 
standard-setting, but plan and manage the use of the available global environmental resources. 
For this purpose the unit would have to be autonomous and neutral to any government. 
Finances should be provided for from the general UN budget in order to avoid too great a 
dependence from the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).
49
 While Chayes contended 
that environmental affairs fitted well within the original mandate of ECOSOC, he also 
considered that: (i) ECOSOC was too low in the UN hierarchy for the purpose of the new 
organisation; (ii) it did not have a good track-record as a policy-making or coordinating 
institution; and (iii) it fell under the general administrative arrangements for UN personnel 
and would therefore be unfit to make sure people of the highest quality alone would be hired. 
Lastly, ECOSOC was regarded as dominated by developed nations. Instead, Chayes believed 
the new environmental unit should be placed under a special committee of the General 
Assembly. He envisioned the establishment of a small secretariat of no more than 50 
professionals. Because the personnel of this unit would have to be of the highest quality, he 
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considered the possibility to apply the administrative UN requirements with a higher degree 
of flexibility than would normally be the case.  
 
The principle idea was that this unit would make sure that environmental concerns would 
systematically be taken into account across the UN system, in all decisions and administrative 
actions and to “infuse these agencies with what might be called an environmental 
perspective”50. Therefore, existing actions within other UN agencies should not be considered 
a hindrance, but a necessity that should be reinforced as much as possible. The unit would 
thus explicitly not have a centralising task, which is the opposite of Kennan’s proposal and 
exemplifies the contrary views on the role an international institution for the environment 
should take.  
 
Lastly, apart from the policy-planning unit, a world environmental research institute would be 
a necessary addition to the international institutional scene. This reflects Chayes’ awareness 
of the scientific uncertainty at the time and the belief that further research would be necessary 
as a basis for further policy-planning.  
 
The principal functions of the policy unit would be as follows. Firstly, it would provide for a 
periodic forum for the governments to meet and discuss further policy for the environment. 
Secondly, the unit would review and analyse reports on environmental matters submitted to it 
by the governments and other UN organisations such as the specialised agencies. Thirdly, it 
would be a central point for the collection and dissemination of best available national 
practices. It would conduct on-site inspections and hearings as part of its awareness-raising 
function and convoke international conferences on matters where international action would 
be considered necessary. Lastly, the unit would provide a form of dispute settlement for 
governments.  
 
C. Opposition to new institutions for the environment: the Group of Brussels 
 
All of these public calls and proposals made by prominent scholars, combined with the 
apparent graveness of the environmental situation, lead to the (at least perceived) need for the 
creation of a flexible mechanism with expertise and clout, to streamline the environmental 
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efforts within the UN system, to make these efforts more accountable and susceptible to 
scientific input and to manage the environmental expertise within the UN system. The United 
States and Sweden in particular were proponents of the creation of such a new international 
organisation.
51
  
 
Nevertheless, most governments were not convinced that a new organisation was what was 
required. On the contrary, many governments were wary of creating a new costly and 
unwieldy administration in an already overly costly and unwieldy UN system.
52
 This 
opposition to the creation of a new institution at the Stockholm Conference is perhaps best 
exemplified by the efforts of the so-called Group of Brussels. This group of countries was 
convened by the government of Belgium and furthermore consisted of the governments of 
France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, completed with the UK. Interestingly, 5 of the 6 
founding members of the EU were thus members of the Group of Brussels. At a later stage the 
United States also joined the group. The basic intention of the group was to be in opposition 
to the coming UNCHE and to try as much as possible to limit its outcomes. At the same time, 
the Netherlands, the UK, France, Italy and the United States were also part of the preparatory 
committee for the Conference, so that the role of these countries, both within the preparatory 
committee as in the Group of Brussels is somewhat ambiguous.
53
  
 
Furthermore, an important number of communist countries boycotted the UNCHE completely 
by staying away from the Conference. The reason for this was the specific situation 
concerning East- and West-Germany. By 1972, West-Germany had secured full membership 
of the United Nations. As such it intended to participate in full to the Conference as a voting 
member. East-Germany on the other hand had not yet obtained its UN membership and would 
not be eligible to vote on substantive matters during the Conference. The preparatory 
committee, under pressure of (amongst others) the USSR, was willing to remedy the 
politically sensitive situation by giving East-Germany a special observer status, which meant 
that it would be capable of participating in the Conference, but not vote. East-Germany, 
                                                     
51
 Ivanova, M., “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location”, Global 
Environmental Politics, 2010, 10 (1), 30-59. 
52
 McDonald, J. W., The Shifting Grounds of Conflict and Peace building: Stories and Lessons. Lanham, 
Lexington Books, 2008, at 108–109. See also UN, “A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development 
System” (The Jackson Report), 1969, Geneva, Doc DP/5. For more detailed information on the Jackson Report, 
see also infra, this chapter.  
53
 Ivanova, M., “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location”, Global 
Environmental Politics, 2010, 10 (1), 30-59. 
37 
 
together with the Soviet-Union and a score of East-European countries were not satisfied with 
this proposed solution and subsequently decided to boycott the Conference as a whole. It is 
important to note that the Conference was boycotted because of an external political reason, 
not because the group of countries would be unwilling to discuss the issues that would form 
the core of the UNCHE.
54
  
 
D. The Stockholm Conference of 1972 
 
The official establishment of the Conference
55
 began by Resolution 1346, adopted during the 
45
th
 Session of ECOSOC in 1968.
56
 The Council underlined the need for intensified action, 
both at the national and international level, to eliminate the eminent threat to the human 
environment and ensure sound economic and social development in the long term. This call 
was translated by the General Assembly later that same year by the adoption of Resolution 
2398 into a decision to convene, in 1972, a UN Conference on the Human Environment. The 
purpose of the conference would be 
 
“[...] to provide a framework for comprehensive consideration within 
the United Nations of the problems of the human environment in order 
to focus the attention of the Governments and public opinion on the 
importance and urgency of this question and also to identify those 
aspects of it that can only or best be answered through international 
cooperation and agreement.”57  
 
Special attention was given to the specific issues concerning the developing countries. As 
such, the relationship between economic development and environmental conservation was 
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extensively debated as part of the preparatory process. For instance, article 2 of Resolution 
2657 confirmed the importance of this element in the discussions.
58
 Furthermore, in what can 
be seen as the basis for what would become Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration,  
 
“[a]t its twenty-sixth session, the General Assembly adopted a 
resolution (2849 (XXVI)) in which it affirmed that development plans 
should be compatible with a sound ecology and that adequate 
environmental conditions could best be ensured by the promotion of 
development, at both the national and the international level. The 
General Assembly also stressed, inter alia, that the action plan and 
action proposals to be submitted to the Conference should respect 
fully the sovereign rights of each country; recognize that 
environmental policies should avoid adverse effects on the 
development possibilities of developing countries, including the 
international trade position of those countries, international 
development assistance and the transfer of technology; and promote 
programmes designed to assist the developing countries, including the 
provision of additional technical assistance and financial resources”.59 
  
In Resolution 2581, the General Assembly accepted the invitation by the government of 
Sweden to host the Conference. It furthermore considered that the main purpose of the 
Conference would be to  
 
“[...] serve as a practical means to encourage, and to provide 
guidelines for, action by Governments and international organisations 
designed to protect and improve the human environment and to 
remedy and prevent its impairment, by means of international 
cooperation, bearing in mind the particular importance of enabling the 
developing countries to forestall the occurrence of such problems”.60  
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The Stockholm Conference, under chairmanship of later UNEP Executive Director (ED) 
Maurice Strong, focussed on six major areas of deliberation: (i) human settlements, (ii) 
resource management, (iii) identification and control of international pollutants, (iv) 
development and the environment, (v) education and information, and (vi) future 
organisational needs. All of these themes are reflected in the principle outcome of the 
conference, the Declaration of the UNCHE (also known as the Stockholm Declaration).
61
 
From an institutional point of view however, the Stockholm Conference was specifically 
important for the creation of UNEP, since most of the discussions and negotiations on that 
creation were conducted in preparation of and during the UNCHE.  
 
E. The creation of UNEP: form, mandate, finances and location 
 
UNEP was created not at the Stockholm Conference itself, but at the UN General Assembly 
several months later, in November 1972. The decisions on its form, mandate, finances and 
location were all adopted by the General Assembly.  
 
UNEP was established to meet the “urgent need for a permanent institutional arrangement 
within the United Nations system for the protection and improvement of the environment”.62 
The idea of form follows function was adopted early in the preparatory process: decisions on 
UNEP’s outlook and means were expected to depend upon the functions it would be given.63  
 
These elements, namely: UNEP’s form (1), mandate (2) and finances (3) will be elaborated on 
here. Lastly, the background of the decision on where UNEP’s headquarters should be located 
will be examined (4).  
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1. UNEP’s form  
 
Most countries in the end accepted the idea that some form of an organisation or centralised 
entity for the environment was necessary. However, in light of the growing apprehension 
towards UN bureaucracies
64, this entity would ideally be created as “a brain, not a 
bureaucracy” 65.  
 
At the time, the UN Charter allowed basically for two different possibilities: the new entity 
could be designed as a UN specialised agency; or it could be a looser entity, in the form of a 
UN programme.  
 
The most straightforward solution, and one has since heavily been advocated, would have 
been to create a specialised agency under articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter. However, the 
specialised agency option was explicitly rejected as a possible form for UNEP. In order to 
fully understand why this decision was made, the following part will first go into more detail 
about the difference between UN specialised agencies and UN programmes. 
 
a. UN Specialised Agencies 
 
Specialised UN agencies are inter-governmental organisations founded by means of a specific 
legal instrument. They are competent to manage a specific international issue, such as 
agriculture (Food and Agriculture Organisation - FAO), health (World Health Organisation - 
WHO), labour (International Labour Organisation - ILO) or maritime-related issues 
(International Meteorological Organisation - IMO). These agencies were essentially created to 
allow the UN to have a certain degree of specialisation in dealing with international concerns. 
Furthermore, at the time the UN Charter was adopted in 1945, several intergovernmental 
bodies specialised in a particular international issue already existed. The specialised agency-
format under auspices of ECOSOC allowed these organisations to be integrated in the UN 
                                                     
64
 UN, “A Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System” (The Jackson Report), 1969, 
Geneva, Doc DP/5. For more detailed information on the Jackson Report, see also infra, this chapter.  
65
 Statement attributed to Maurice Strong, the first UNEP Executive Director. Quoted in (amongst others): 
Ivanova, M., “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, Location”, Global 
Environmental Politics, 2010, 10 (1), 30-59. See also Ivanova, M., “Assessing UNEP as Anchor Institution for 
the global environment: Lessons for the UNEO debate”, Yale Centre for Environmental law & policy, Working 
Paper 05/01, 24 may 2005; Ivanova, M., “Can the Anchor Hold? Rethinking the United Nations Environment 
Programme for the 21st Century”, Yale school of forestry & environmental studies, Report 7, September 2005. 
41 
 
system and created the possibility also for future specialised organisations to be linked to the 
UN system.
66
 Today, 16 UN specialised agencies are operative.  
 
The legal basis for the link between the specialised agencies and the UN can be found in 
Articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter. Article 57 of the UN Charter determines that 
  
“1. The various specialized agencies, established by 
intergovernmental agreement and having wide international 
responsibilities, as defined in their basic instruments, in economic, 
social, cultural, educational, health, and related fields, shall be brought 
into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with the 
provisions of Article 63. 2. Such agencies thus brought into 
relationship with the United Nations are hereinafter referred to as 
specialized agencies.” 
 
Article 63 of the UN Charter determines that  
 
“1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with 
any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on 
which the agency concerned shall be brought into relationship with the 
United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the 
General Assembly. 2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the 
specialized agencies through consultation with and recommendations 
to such agencies and through recommendations to the General 
Assembly and to the Members of the United Nations.” 
 
Thus, according to article 63 para 1 of the Charter, the relationship between the UN and its 
specialised agencies is decided and regulated by means of an “agreement” between ECOSOC 
and the specialised agency in question. This agreement will therefore be the main legal link 
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with the UN and in general stipulates matters of membership, budget and cooperation with 
other agencies.  
 
Since they are autonomous, agencies derive their legal personality directly from their 
founding document. This means that no additional institutional backing is required for their 
decisions to take effect. For instance, specific treaties or conventions that have been adopted 
by the plenary organ of a specialised agency take immediate effect upon ratification by the 
states and are administered by the agency’s secretariat.67 This is in sharp contrast to other UN 
subsidiary bodies, such as programmes, where the UNGA is required to adopt decisions 
before they take legal effect.
68
  
 
Specialised agencies get their funding through assessed contributions, which is a mandatory 
contribution based on the national income of UN member states. Furthermore, specifically 
earmarked trust funds and additional voluntary contributions replenish their budget. UN 
specialised agencies in most cases have a formal plenary meeting in which all member states 
are represented and which is the central decision-making power, and a smaller meeting which 
deals with the day-to-day working of the agency. Furthermore, their activities are coordinated 
through consultations with the UNGA which may make (legally non-binding) 
“recommendations”. Article 96 para 2 of the Charter furthermore awards specialised agencies 
the legal standing to request the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for advisory opinions “on 
legal questions arising within the scope of their activities”69.   
 
Special reference must be made to the Bretton Woods Institutions (the World Bank (WB), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD)) which are - contrary to popular belief - specialised agencies, and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which is a specialised agency sui generis, in 
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that its agreement with the UN has been concluded with the General Assembly rather than 
ECOSOC as provided for by the UN Charter.
70
  
 
b. UN Programmes  
 
The legal basis for the establishment of UN programmes is article 22 of the UN Charter, 
which determines: “The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems 
necessary for the performance of its functions.” 
 
This provision is rather vague, which has allowed for greater flexibility: the General 
Assembly has used it as the legal basis for a multitude of highly heterogeneous bodies. These 
include permanent bodies
71
, commissions
72
 and ad-hoc specialized working groups. Because 
they are subsidiary bodies of the General Assembly, the programmes established under this 
article 22 of the UN Charter derive their legal personality from the UNGA rather than from 
their constituting document. Consequently, all decisions by article 22-bodies must be 
confirmed and adopted by an UNGA resolution before taking legal effect.
73
 This is also the 
main reason why norm-setting by UN programmes tends to be a cumbersome process: if a 
certain decision is taken at the programme level, then the whole discussion must be done 
again in the General Assembly before finally being adopted and becoming effective.  
 
UN programmes tend to have a plenary body in which typically between 30 and 60 members 
are represented in a regionally balanced way.
74
 Unlike specialised agencies however, 
programmes do not have a separate legal instrument (the “agreement” as provided for by 
article 63 of the UN Charter) establishing its relation with the UN system. They are 
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established through a resolution by the General Assembly, which also regulates the mandate, 
functions, decision-making and relationship with the UNGA (which is either a direct 
relationship or goes through ECOSOC). Financially, programmes are also partly dependant 
from the UNGA. Their money comes mainly from two sources: the UN regular budget takes 
care of staff costs, while trust funds and voluntary contributions by member states provide for 
the rest. Lastly, programmes are also subject to the general administrative UN rules and 
procedures.
75
  
 
More than 10 programmes have been established by the UNGA under article 22 of the UN 
Charter; among them are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNICEF and 
the World Food Programme (WFP).  
 
c. Founding Resolution 2997 
 
When determining the format and bodies of UNEP, the General Assembly in its Resolution 
2997, under the header “Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme”, 
declares as follows:   
 
“[…] Decides to establish a Governing Council of the United Nations 
Environment Programme, composed of fifty-eight members elected by the 
General Assembly for three-year terms […]; Decides that a small secretariat 
shall be established in the United Nations to serve as a focal point for 
environmental action and co-ordination within the United Nations system in 
such a way as to ensure a high degree of effective management; […] 
Decides that the environment secretariat shall be headed by the Executive 
Director of the United Nations Environment Programme, who shall be 
elected by the General Assembly on the nomination, of the Secretary-
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General for a term of four years and who shall be entrusted, inter alia, with 
the following responsibilities: […]”76 
 
The Governing Council (GC) counts 58 member states elected from the General Assembly. 
The number of members is thus limited. At the same time the GC works under the system of 
universal composition and universal participation. Universal composition means that all UN 
regions are represented in its meetings. Universal participation means that all countries are 
encouraged to participate in the negotiations on the decisions taken at the Governing Council, 
not only the elected member states of the Governing Council. Lastly, since the decisions 
adopted by the Governing Council must be confirmed officially by the General Assembly in 
New York, all UN member states have the possibility to weigh in on these decisions.
77
  
 
UNEP was thus installed as the hub for environmental concerns within the UN echelons. Its 
form is that of UN programme based on article 22 of the UN Charter, with the Governing 
Council as the central plenary body with the competence to determine the policy, and a 
secretariat, headed by the Executive Director as the main executive power. The “small 
secretariat” was intended to “serve as a focal point for environmental action and co-ordination 
within the United Nations system”78.  
 
d. Why UNEP was intentionally not designed as a UN Agency 
 
The specialised agency format would have had specific advantages over other forms of UN 
entities: it would mean that the new institution would be independent, both politically and 
financially. Also, the specialised agency format would mean that it would be high in the UN 
hierarchy and thus gain important visibility, essential to the core tasks that were set for it. 
However, at the same time, the new organisation was expected to “provide central leadership, 
to assure a comprehensive and integrated overview of environmental problems, and to 
develop stronger linkages among environmental institutions and the constituencies they 
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serve”.79 As established supra, Chayes considered that it would be necessary to create “some 
form of high-level policy planning, coordination and review unit within the UN proper”80. 
This unit should make sure that environmental concerns would systematically be taken into 
account across the UN system, in all decisions and administrative actions, and would “infuse 
these [other UN] agencies with what might be called an environmental perspective”81.  
 
However, the idea of creating a new UN agency met with fierce resistance and the conclusion 
in 1972 was that the UN specialised agency format was not the best available to effectively 
manage the tasks set for the new organisation. There are a number of reasons for this decision. 
First of all, many countries, developing nations and developed states alike, posed question 
about the effectiveness of the existing UN specialised agencies. Only shortly prior to the 
UNCHE, the Jackson Report had critically assessed not only the UNDP, but had also made 
broader observations about the effectiveness of the UN architecture in general and the system 
of UN agencies in particular. The report had concluded that UN agencies in general were 
largely ineffective and inefficient.
82
 Secondly, the specialised agency format was not 
considered to be a well adapted for the coordinating role the new environmental organisation 
would have to assume. Having all governments as members was considered an unnecessary 
burden on the decision-making process and a new agency would be only “one among 
many”83. Given the fact that other agencies such as the IMO and the WHO were already 
active in the environmental field with action programmes, and were older and well-rooted in 
the system, a new agency would be hard-put to coordinate these agencies or fulfil a leadership 
role within the system. As Ivanova describes, the existing UN bodies were reluctant to do 
away with their existing programmes and initiatives, to transfer the field of expertise to the 
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new body, or to compete with a new player for financing. They actively lobbied with 
governments to ensure that their existing efforts would be allowed to continue.
84
  
 
There were thus serious concerns that the agency format would not be appropriate for an 
environmental organisation. Added to this was the widespread conviction among governments 
that no new institution at the UN level was necessary.
85
 Therefore, the governments chose for 
the format of a more flexible programme, a subsidiary body of ECOSOC, with the general 
UN budget covering its costs. The rationale behind that decision is that environmental 
concerns were considered to be integrative issues that needed to be addressed at all levels of 
the UN, in all sectors and at all policy fora. The environment could only be well protected if 
its institutional actor could exert its influence over most other, more traditional, policy areas 
such as health, agriculture, development and trade. Moreover, the new organisation was 
expected to steer the UN echelons from top to bottom, including the other, more experienced 
agencies that had no intention of relinquishing their influence over and financial means for 
environmental concerns. A new specialized agency would therefore not be well-placed to play 
a coordinating role, since it would be one among many, rather than the “primus inter pares”.86 
It also did not help that UN agencies bore the label of being unwieldy, costly, badly managed 
and overall ineffective. How could one specialized agency be expected to deal with all of 
this? 
 
The new programme was also linked to the General Assembly by placing it under the auspices 
of ECOSOC (with the general UN budget covering for the Nairobi headquarters’ costs), in 
order to enhance its coordinating function. If the Governing Council of UNEP were to take 
decisions worth noting by the rest of the UN, then the decisions would be taken up by the 
General Assembly again and in one move make sure their impact would be considered to be 
“system-wide”. 
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2. UNEP’s mandate 
 
UNEP’s mission is “to provide leadership and encourage partnership in caring for the 
environment by inspiring, informing, and enabling nations and peoples to improve their 
quality of life without compromising that of future generations”. UNEP’s mandate is set out 
in its founding resolution and was rearticulated and expanded by the Nairobi Declaration of 
1997, in order to be “the leading global environmental authority that sets the global 
environmental agenda, that promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental 
dimensions of sustainable development within the United Nations system and that serves as 
an authoritative advocate for the global environment”.87  
 
UNEP is tasked to do the following:  
 
“(a) To promote international cooperation in the field of the 
environment and to recommend, as appropriate, policies to this end; 
(b) To provide general policy guidance for the direction and 
coordination of environmental programmes within the United Nations 
system; (c) To receive and review the periodic reports of the 
Executive Director of UNEP on the implementation of environmental 
programmes within the United Nations system; (d) To keep under 
review the world environmental situation in order to ensure that 
emerging environmental problems of wide international significance 
receive appropriate and adequate consideration by Governments; (e) 
To promote the contribution of the relevant international scientific and 
other professional communities to the acquisition, assessment and 
exchange of environmental knowledge and information and, as 
appropriate, to the technical aspects of the formulation and 
implementation of environmental programmes within the United 
Nations system; (f) To maintain under continuing review the impact of 
national and international environmental policies and measures on 
developing countries, as well as the problem of additional costs that 
may be incurred by developing countries in the implementation of 
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environmental programmes and projects, and to ensure that such 
programmes and projects shall be compatible with the development 
plans and priorities of those countries; (g) To review and approve the 
programme of utilization of resources of the Environment Fund.”88 
 
UNEP was thus not designed to be an actor with sanctioning powers and norm-setting 
abilities. Instead, UNEP was intended to be a promoter of international co-operation in the 
battle against environmental problems of broad international significance, able to set out 
general policy guidelines and stimulate regional cooperation, to provide a funnel for scientific 
assessment and exchange of environmental knowledge, endorse country progress reports and 
to serve as an early warning mechanism for newly emerging environmental threats.  
 
Furthermore, these tasks would have to be performed with due respect to the sovereign rights 
of states and with the presupposition that protecting the environment is a task that rests 
primarily and can be exercised more effectively at the national and regional levels. Lastly, a 
small secretariat that would serve as a focal point for environmental action and co-ordination 
within the United Nations system was established under the auspices of the Economic and 
Social Council.
89
   
 
It is remarkable to note how the eventual decision by the General Assembly mixes elements 
of both proposals made by Chayes and Kennan and how broadly the functions of UNEP are 
described.  
 
3. UNEP’s finances 
 
The creation of UNEP of course also meant that the countries would have to provide for a 
budget for the new programme. Since the principle purpose of UNEP would be to act as a 
“brain, not a bureaucracy” in order to ensure the system-wide impact of environmental 
concerns, it would need less funding than other already existing programmes or agencies (for 
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instance: UNDP). At the same time it was well understood that, in order for UNEP to be 
effective, it would need to gather the largest budget possible. Sources indicate that Maurice 
Strong, the first ED of UNEP, initially set the budget target at 25 million USD per year; he 
later revised that number to 40 million USD per year.
90
 He considered this to be sufficient to 
cover all the basic costs and for the organisation to effectively fulfil its mandate.  
 
In its eventual resolution, the General Assembly set up the so-called “Environment Fund”.91 
The budget it was provided with however greatly exceeded the initial estimations: the 
Environment Fund would have control over a yearly budget of about 100 million USD. 
Especially in light of the mandate that UNEP was given, this number was much larger than 
what would be expected considering the standards of 1972. Partly, this can be explained by 
the idea that the environmental agenda was expected to grow in the years to follow and would 
become more present, both in terms of public participation and attention at the international 
level that it would demand. As such, the budget was intended to cover the growing costs that 
many countries expected to see. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the budget was, even 
with the expectations of rising costs in mind, royal.  
 
The contributions states were requested to make were voluntary rather than assessed. Again, 
this decision was taken with flexibility in mind: the idea was that this would allow the largest 
polluters to contribute more to the environmental programme of the UN. There was also a 
specific political reason for the decision: the Unites States’ Congress had taken the decision to 
reduce the US contributions to any given UN agency to maximum 25% of that agencies’ 
budget through assessed contributions. Voluntary contributions however were attributed at the 
discretion of the executive power, being the US President. Setting up the Environmental Fund 
through voluntary contributions thus allowed the US to put extra funds on the table: in 1972, 
under the Nixon administration which was very supportive about the creation of the new 
programme, the United States provided up to 40% of the annual budget of UNEP.
92
 It was 
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thus expected that the voluntary contributions would in the end provide UNEP with more 
money than assessed contributions would. This is also the reason why the General Assembly 
in the end decided against assessed contributions in favour of voluntary contributions.  
 
Today, with an accumulated budget of 85 million USD in 2010, UNEP’s financial base is the 
highest it has been since its creation in 1972.
93
 In 2000 however its financial prowess had 
shrunk to the lowest level in its history, at barely 40 million USD. Some claim that this is 
linked to the aforementioned proliferation of institutions and treaties
94
; others link the 
shrinking budgetary means to the collapse of the Soviet Union.
95
 Either way, UNEP’s 
influence had diminished and reached an all-time low level around the turn of the century. 
However, the relatively new focus on implementation and the need for coordination also 
coincides with growing finances for UNEP. Also the new financing mechanism of voluntary 
contributions seems to have positive effects: more countries pledge and contribute more 
money than ever before to UNEP. Clearly, states still believe that UNEP is well-placed to take 
on a central coordinating role in the UN system. 
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4. UNEP’s location 
 
At the time of its creation, UNEP was the only UN programme whose headquarters were 
located in a non-OECD country. Ever since its conception in 1972, Nairobi (Kenya) has been 
hosting the programme.
96
 
 
The discussion about UNEP’s location was not settled at the UNCHE itself but at the General 
Assembly session in November 1972. No less than 10 cities were in the running to host the 
new organisation’s headquarters: Cairo, Geneva, London, Malta, Mexico City, Monaco, 
Nairobi, New Delhi, New York and Vienna.
97
 Since UNEP’s core mission would be the 
coordination of all environmental efforts throughout the UN system, it seemed to make 
political sense to locate UNEP close to (one or more of) the other existing UN negotiation 
hubs. This rationale was strengthened further in light of the principle of “form follows 
function”. Especially Geneva, Vienna and New York were thought to be in pole-position to be 
named as the host of the headquarters of UNEP, because of (1) their importance in 
environmental negotiations and (2) the fact that they all had existing infrastructure at their 
disposal, with subsequent low start-up and operational costs. The decision to locate UNEP’s 
headquarters in one of these three cities seemed therefore a mere formality.  
 
There are two different (and only partly compatible) explanations as to why the General 
Assembly in the end decided upon Nairobi as UNEP’s host city. The first one is the fear of 
developing nations for an environmental organisation; the second one is an aggressive 
Kenyan campaign. 
 
The first explanation begins with the general observation that the creation of UNEP initially 
met with important resistance from the developing nations. Therefore, its location in Nairobi 
has been explained as being a tactical choice – namely, that Nairobi was chosen precisely to 
counter this opposition. Developing nations feared that the newly created UNEP would be 
susceptible only to (Northern) environmental agendas and become an obstacle in their 
struggle for development. Therefore, in hindsight, locating the headquarters of such an 
organisation in the South may be seen to have been a diplomatic masterstroke, as it is for long 
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clear that today it is mostly southern nations that are on the barricades for UNEP-induced 
policies and programmes. 
 
The other, more likely, explanation is an aggressive Kenyan lobbying campaign to host the 
headquarters of the new UN programme.
98
 Kenya had introduced a draft resolution in the 
General Assembly calling for a more equitable distribution, in geographical terms, of UN 
bodies. This proposal made sure that developing nations no longer looked upon the decision 
of UNEP’s location as a mere formality: the dossier became symbolically charged in the 
(hyperbolically worded) struggle for development of the South versus the environmental 
standard-setting of the North.  
 
At the same time, Kenya convinced other developing nations to withdraw their bid and to put 
all the proverbial eggs in one basket. Most developing countries were susceptible to the 
Kenyan request; India initially was not. New Delhi believed that it had entered a strong bid 
and would be a strong contender as a populous developing nation. In this case it took a threat 
by the Kenyan government that it would expel its Indian population if India would not 
withdraw its candidacy. The threat was taken seriously by New Delhi since its economical 
interests in Kenya were huge and Idi Amin Dada had done exactly the same with the Indian 
population in Uganda only 3 months earlier.  
 
Finally, Kenya succeeded in altering the balloting procedure in the General Assembly from a 
secret to an open ballot; this meant that last-minute deal-making between developing and 
developed countries was effectively impossible without it being visible to everyone. Nairobi 
believed that it had lost the attribution of the UNIDO headquarters to Vienna in 1966 in a 
secret ballot vote in which the balance tipped in Austria’s favour at the last moment, 
especially because of horse-trading.
99
  
 
Whichever explanation is true, the resolution granting the new Programme to Nairobi was 
adopted by the General Assembly with ninety-three countries voting in favour; all developed 
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countries abstained, except for one (the United States) that voted against. It is clear that 
rationality, effectiveness and efficiency were not decisive elements in the decision to place 
UNEP’s headquarters in Nairobi, but UN politics.  
 
III. The political debate for a WEO/UNEO: from Rio to Rio – 1992-2012100  
 
A. The call for an institutional alternative 
 
UNEP was as such the very first institution created at UN level to explicitly and exclusively 
deal with environmental concerns. Ever since its conception however, UNEP has been under 
heavy public and scholarly scrutiny: too lenient to the adherents of potent environmental 
governance, too intrusive in national policies to others. Over the years, the IEG system (and 
by extension, as its main institutional representative, UNEP) has been diagnosed with many 
deficiencies. Every other observer has identified ever changing “key issues” to the system as 
was created. It has been judged too exclusive
101
; too inclusive
102
; too Northern-dominated and 
(therefore) ill-conceived in the South
103
; with too vague and broad a mandate
104
; in short: 
UNEP has been judged to be toothless and largely ineffective. Furthermore, during the 
seventies and eighties, the environmental degradation did not slow down – quite on the 
contrary. Figures showed that the degradation had been speeding up significantly.
105
 This has 
been used by proponents of institutional change as another argument to criticise UNEP.  
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1. Assessments of UNEP 
 
As explained supra, ever since the creation of UNEP in 1972, there have been calls for an 
institutional overhaul at the international scene. UNEP has, to say the least, provoked mixed 
assessments by the scientific community: unrelated to the author’s vision on the need or 
desirability of the creation of a WEO, UNEP has been called both an organisation that has 
“chronically underperformed”106 and one that has been “immensely successful”107, albeit 
much more rarely and in a limited field of expertise. Above all this, for many authors, the 
reasons behind the failing of UNEP are less clearly distinguishable than the bare assessment 
that it was a failure. Making abstract of the argumentation behind the diverse perspectives, it 
is unavoidable to conclude that the common denominator of the assessments of today’s 
environmental protection and governance structure is that it is not satisfactory. If one looks at 
the state of the world’s environmental situation, with the many duplicative or even 
contradictory efforts on the environmental plane, and the lack of basic transparency, 
effectiveness, or a well-functioning coordination effort in one form or another, one is tempted 
to conclude that the current IEG system, by itself, is conceptually inapt and a new leaf needs 
to be turned over. Kirton articulated this point of view when he wrote that  
 
“It is not simply that they have secretariats too small, or budgets too 
modest, or locations too distant, or national government members too 
controlling [...]. It is rather a case of massive institutional failure writ 
large”, and “[...] it is the overall system of [...] incomplete 
environmental institutions that has failed in its basic design”.108  
 
This line of reasoning is often used to advocate the creation of an institutional alternative for 
UNEP.  
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2. Proposal by Palmer 
 
It is therefore not surprising to see that calls for reform have been made almost incessantly 
since UNEP’s creation in 1972. Mostly, these proposals tend to support the creation of an 
institution that is more authoritative in nature than UNEP.
109
 One of the leading political 
proposals that fits perfectly within this evolution came from the hand of Geoffrey Palmer
110
, 
who made his passionate call on the eve of the Rio Conference in 1992.  
 
Palmer considered the existing methods of making international law for the environment to be 
“slow, cumbersome, expensive, uncoordinated and uncertain”.111 The issues to be dealt with 
were formidable, the existing framework within the UN was clearly not sufficient to turn the 
worldwide environmental degradation around, and the means at the disposal of the 
international community to enact international environmental law were unsatisfactory. First of 
all, he considered, the UN lacks “any coherent institutional mechanism for dealing effectively 
with environmental issues”.112 UNEP is the result of a “mere General Assembly resolution”, 
and has no sanctioning powers: it cannot coerce states and “lacks teeth”. While its 
“achievements are substantial, [...] it is not an adequate international organisation for 
protecting the world’s environment”.113  
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While denouncing UNEP as an adequate forum for the creation of and compliance control on 
international environmental law, Palmer did consider, by and large, UNEP to be a success: it 
did much more than its limited powers suggested. For instance, in terms of MEAs negotiated, 
UNEP had produced some remarkable results – the Ozone regime for example would 
probably not have been developed without UNEP’s guidance and leadership. 
 
Therefore, Palmer considered that “bold” action would be necessary. Following 
recommendations that had been first surfaced at international stage in 1987 in the Brundtland 
report he proposed the creation of a “legislature”, which he defined as “some structured and 
coherent mechanism for making the rules of international law”.114 The use of consensualism, 
cornerstone in the legislative process in international law, was considered to be an obstacle 
compelling negotiators to strife for the lowest common denominator in international 
negotiations, and therefore, international agreements that were quite simply not ambitious and 
far-reaching enough.
115
 Therefore, a legislature competent to take simple majority decisions 
based on, for example, their contribution to the pollution, would have to be created. These 
decisions, enacting new international environmental legislation, would be binding upon all 
states, regardless of whether they had supported the decision or not. The legislature would 
also be competent to control the compliance with internationally adopted legislation and 
punish states that were not in full compliance.  
 
3. The Hague Declaration 
 
Palmer was not alone in his criticism on the consensus rule. In 1989, a group of 24 
governments
116
 including Germany, France, India and Japan had adopted the Hague 
Declaration, calling for a “new institutional authority” that would deal with climate change in 
a non-consensualist manner.
117
 This authority would be responsible for conducting studies, 
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setting internationally binding standards, propagating membership to international legal 
instruments (MEAs), and taking appropriate measures in order to ensure full compliance.  
Even though the Declaration has had very limited practical results, as Bodansky points out 
“what is striking is the adoption of the Declaration at all, not its lack of immediate results”.118 
Indeed, it is remarkable that the Hague Declaration called for a limiting of the consensualist 
decision making in international law. And it is remarkable that over 20 nations considered this 
to be a viable alternative and supported the adoption of this Declaration at all. It shows a 
tendency to demand for more authoritative alternatives for the existing institutional 
framework, in the first place UNEP.  
 
B. The 1992 Rio Conference on Environment and Development and the adoption of 
Agenda 21 
 
The 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (Rio Conference or UNCED) 
was unprecedented both in terms of size and scope. Official figures show that 172 
governments participated, with 108 sending their heads of state or government. Some 2400 
NGO representatives attended, with some 17000 people participating at the parallel NGO 
Global Forum. The proceedings were covered by some 10000 journalists.
119
 Also in terms of 
its actual result, the Rio Conference was a resounding success: apart from the adoption of the 
well-know Rio Declaration
120
 and the conclusion of three new global environmental 
agreements (the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Convention 
on Biological Diversity and the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification), the 
Conference also adopted Agenda 21.
121
 Agenda 21 was a programme of action agreed to 
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during the Rio Conference, and was considered to be one of the most important and holistic 
policy documents the UN had ever produced.
122
 It outlines key policies for achieving 
sustainable development that reconciles the requirements for poverty reduction and the needs 
of the poor with the necessity of economic development.  
 
In terms of organisational improvements however, the Rio Conference was a disappointment. 
Not only had governments not succeeded in reforming the institutions for the environment – 
somewhat understandably, since this was not the focus of the conference. But the Rio 
Conference had in effect worsened the situation: because of the creation of three new global 
environmental law instruments and the establishment later in 1992 of the United Nations 
Commission on Sustainable Development, the institutional landscape became even more 
fragmented than it had been before.
123
  
 
C. The Nairobi Declaration of 1997 
 
Since the UNCED had not resulted in any specific change at the institutional level, the 
ministers of the environment took action. At the nineteenth regular session of the UNEP 
Governing Council, on 7 February 1997, the Governing Council adopted the “Nairobi 
Declaration on the Role and Mandate of the United Nations Environment Programme”.124 In 
this document, the governments reaffirmed: 
 
“1. That the United Nations Environment Programme has been and 
should continue to be the principal United Nations body in the field of 
the environment and that we, the ministers of the environment and 
heads of delegation attending the nineteenth session of the Governing 
Council, are determined to play a stronger role in the implementation 
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of the goals and objectives of the United Nations Environment 
Programme; 2. That the role of the United Nations Environment 
Programme is to be the leading global environmental authority that 
sets the global environmental agenda, that promotes the coherent 
implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development within the United Nations system and that serves as an 
authoritative advocate for the global environment;” 
 
In other words, UNEP was and would remain the primary institution for environmental 
concerns within the UN system. To that end, the governments considered that UNEP’s 
mandate would need reinforcing. Apart from the already known mandate (namely: serve as an 
early-warning mechanism, assessing global environmental trends, provide policy advice, and 
to catalyse and promote international cooperation and action, based on the best scientific and 
technical capabilities available), UNEP would be “revitalised”125 in order to be fully capable 
of implementing its founding resolution 2997 and Agenda 21.  
 
Elements that were inserted in the UNEP mandate are, amongst others, furthering the 
development of international environmental law aiming at sustainable development, including 
the development of coherent linkages among existing international environmental 
conventions
126
; to enhance the implementation of and compliance with existing international 
norms and environmental principles; to strengthen its role as a coordinator in the UN system 
for environmental action; and to strengthen UNEP’s role as a driver and link between science 
and policy on the one hand and policy and the public on the other hand.
127
 
 
While in effect the Nairobi Declaration did not do much to change the fragmentation of 
environmental law at the international level, it is still an interesting response from the 
governments to the calls for change. Despite these frequent calls for change, the governments 
decided to firmly endorse the existing institutional framework. If anything, the Nairobi 
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Declaration can be seen as a rebuff of the many calls for institutional reform. The 
governments reaffirmed their trust in UNEP as the leading UN institution for environmental 
concerns and in the pertinence and relevance of its mandate. The role of UNEP within the 
United Nations system was again recognized by the General Assembly. UNEP was to be “the 
leading global environmental authority that sets the global environmental agenda, that 
promotes the coherent implementation of the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development within the United Nations system and that serves as an authoritative advocate for 
the global environment”.128 
 
D. From Malmö to Cartagena 
 
The 2000 Malmö Declaration, which was the outcome of a ministerial conference in 
preparation for the 2002 Johannesburg UN Conference on Sustainable Development, in its 
paragraph 24, determined:  
 
“The 2002 Conference should review the requirements for a greatly 
strengthened institutional structure for international environmental 
governance based on an assessment of future needs for an institutional 
architecture that has the capacity to effectively address wide-ranging 
environmental threats in a globalizing world. UNEP’s role in this 
regard should be strengthened and its financial base broadened and 
made more predictable.”129  
 
The 2001 UNEP Governing Council installed an Open-Ended Intergovernmental Group of 
Ministers in order to identify institutional weaknesses and a list of options to better fulfil the 
future needs of the international community in terms of environmental governance.
130
 The 
outcome was Decision SS.VII/1, adopted during the Seventh Special Session of the UNEP 
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GC/GMEF in 2002, known as the Cartagena Package.
131
 This reform package “includes 
recommendations aimed at strengthening international environmental governance through 
improving coherence in international environmental policymaking, strengthening the role and 
financial situation of UNEP, improving coordination among and the effectiveness of 
multilateral environmental agreements and further promoting capacity building, technology 
transfer and country-level coordination.”132 UNEP intended to make the implementation of 
the Package a priority, under the banner of “UNEP+”. Also, the Cartagena Package intended 
to install universal membership for the Governing Council. However, this part of the reform 
package was never implemented. To this day, universal membership remains one of the 
important considerations in the reform debate.  
 
E. The 2005 World Summit and the Options Paper 
 
The 2005 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in New York agreed to the 
exploration of “the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework [...], including a 
more integrated structure”133 for environmental activities in the United Nations system.134 In 
realization of the WSSD outcome document, two Co-Chairs of the Informal Consultative 
Process on the Institutional Framework for the UN’s environmental activities were appointed. 
In June 2007 the Co-Chairs presented their so-called ‘Options Paper’ in which they gave an 
overview of the ideas that had been propagated during the past consultations, around seven 
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thematic building blocks. The Options Paper contained a list of over fifty recommendations 
for an improved IEG system.
135
  
 
Strikingly, most of the proposed solutions were not new. They are a reflection of the 1972 
resolution founding UNEP, elaborated and ready to be implemented. Apart from making it 
clear that time was not yet ripe to be expecting final results in the reformation process of the 
IEG system, the Co-Chairs observed that a political consensus on a comprehensive IEG 
design may be far off since “more rapid and more substantive replies to more pressing issues 
would demand for stronger institutions and financial arrangements, while the exact design of 
such arrangements would largely depend on new policy approaches which [are] still to be 
defined”136.  
 
Based on these ideas and experiences, the co-chairs saw the IEG reform process develop in 
two parallel ways. Firstly, there is the reform and strengthening of the existing structures, for 
which there is a “wide volume of consensus”. Secondly, there’s the debate on a “broader 
transformation” of the IEG system (i.e. structural change), an evolutionary process concerned 
with the “future needs”. However, the co-chairs concluded that in their experience, “there is 
insufficient momentum for a fundamental reform now”. 
 
Consequently the co-chairs came out with the “Draft Resolution on Strengthening the 
Environmental Activities in the United Nations System” in May 2008.137 It consists of two 
major parts, with the first part reflecting the progress on the reform and strengthening of the 
existing structures and the second part on structural changes in the IEG system. There is clear 
progress on the reform and strengthening of existing structures around the seven building 
blocks that formed the basis of the Options Paper, with (amongst others) the creation of a 
Global Environmental Financial Tracking System
138
, appointing a chief-scientist at UNEP, 
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expanding and deepening the regional presence of UNEP and extra efforts to fully implement 
the Bali Strategic Plan. Any real progress on the broader transformation of the IEG 
framework is lacking. It is only minimally discussed in two rather vague paragraphs, where 
“further consultations to explore the possibility of a more coherent institutional framework” 
are recommended.
139
 The preamble literally states that: “The strengthening of IEG is a long-
term process, evolutionary in nature, which needs continued discussion in order to reflect 
emerging challenges and adapt the system to the needs of the international community”140.  
 
As far as institutional reform goes, this is indeed a limited outcome. The EU repeated its 
UNEO proposal; Brazil reiterated its support for the creation of an umbrella organisation for 
sustainable development. It is striking however that both proposals remain vague and no one 
really seems willing or able to go into the details as to how exactly this organisation would 
function and what the implications for the whole of the UN system would be. This gave rise 
to the belief that both proposals are not much more than repackaged priorities: economic-
social affairs for the EU; economic development for Brazil. With the competition between 
different proposals and the discord on the timeframe for the broader transformation, it is 
probably all that could reasonably be expected. More importantly, it shows that the lack of a 
common vision on what exactly we expect from UNEP or a WEO in whichever form hampers 
progress on the political level.  
 
F. The Belgrade Process 
 
The initial failure of the debate in New York to make substantial progress created a window 
for UNEP to step into the debate, in which it had had only a marginal voice before. The idea 
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that UNEP might indeed be the best placed to revive the reform debate gathered momentum 
with the publication of the management review of the Joint Inspection Unit in December 
2008.
141
 Apart from a scathing analysis of the current IEG system, the report made several 
important recommendations about the future technical and organisational features of UNEP, 
not refraining from praising UNEP for the work it had been doing over the last 5 years and 
recommending to the UN Secretary-General to use the UNEP Medium-Term Strategy system-
wide. But especially the last part, “Observations on future institutional arrangements”, is 
interesting from an IEG perspective. The report observes in clear terms that “Any future 
institutional overhaul of global environmental governance needs to build on the reform of 
UNEP […]”142. 
 
The need to kick-start the reform debate prompted UNEP at the 25th Regular Session of its 
Governing Council in February 2009 to make IEG one of the two central themes to be 
discussed in the ministerial conference. The idea was to look at IEG from a country-level 
perspective and in doing so identifying the most interfering consequences for national policies 
of the lack of strength and coherence within the IEG system. In the build-up to the actual 
negotiations many delegates in Nairobi had the feeling that the IEG debate had become a 
nuisance in itself. No progress had been made since the Malmö Declaration, 9 years prior, and 
countries were unwilling to leave their entrenched positions. The perception was that the 
GC/GMEF was the “last chance” to save the IEG debate since governments are getting 
increasingly “fed up” with it. Therefore, although admittedly the decision in which a round of 
ministerial consultations is being organised
143
 is on process rather than content, the 
importance of the continuation of the process at a high-level could hardly be overestimated. It 
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is important to note that co-chairs of the process in New York have by no means ended their 
mandate and that the main venue for discussion on IEG is still the UNGA. The ministerial 
consultations do not create a parallel process, but aim only to help the debate in New York.  
 
The ministerial group had thus two questions it needed to answer: (i) what are the functions 
the governance structures for the environment at the international level should fulfil, and (ii) 
which form should those structures take, in order to ensure the highest level of efficiency and 
efficacy? The ministers met twice in 2009, in Belgrade (27-29 June 2009) and Rome (26-29 
October 2009), and presented the results of their deliberations on architectural reform of IEG 
at the special session of the GC/GMEF in February 2010. The meetings focused, after the 
principle of form follows function, on the functions of the IEG system. The first meeting 
focused on the classic IEG components, namely the strengthening of the policy guidance of 
the GMEF, the strengthening of synergies between MEAs and assistance for capacity building 
in the developing world. The real institutional debate was explicitly dealt with during the 
Rome meeting.  
 
The result of the two meetings was promising: apart from reaching agreement on a list of 
incremental changes, such as the launching of a bottom-up process to create synergies 
between the various biodiversity conventions and a closer collaboration between UNEP and 
UNDP through yearly reports on the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the two 
institutions, tangible progress was made towards a broader transformation of the existing 
environmental structures. The fact that a number of developing countries were beginning to 
change their position vis-à-vis the UNEO proposal should be mentioned. Many countries 
reiterated the view that environmental governance and sustainable development should not be 
mixed; however, this position was argued from both sides of the debate: the EU considers the 
environmental structures in the UN to be too weak and wishes to strengthen them, while 
developing nations seem to be hinting at strengthening sustainable development and eclipsing 
environmental concerns in one movement.  
 
The 11th Special Session of the GC/GMEF in Bali, Indonesia, confirmed that view. Two 
decisions on IEG were taken.
144
 The most important fact is that the Governing Council 
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decided to extend the special ministerial consultations for another year, this time to explicitly 
focus on the broader transformation of the IEG scene, explore the different options on the 
table extensively and in depth, and to conclude its workings by the following Governing 
Council meeting. The outcome of these ministerial consultations, which took place in Nairobi 
(in June) and Helsinki (in November) in 2010, is known as the Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome 
Document.
145
 The Nairobi Helsinki Outcome gives an overview of the IEG debate by listing 
the possible options ministers have defined for further enhancing the international 
environmental governance structures at the international level.
146
  
 
The options on the table are the following. In terms of functions, the ministers defined the six 
following options: (i) strengthen the science-policy interface; (ii) develop a system-wide 
strategy for environment in the United Nations system; (iii) encourage synergies between 
compatible multilateral environmental agreements; (iv) create a stronger link between global 
environmental policy making and financing; (v) develop a system-wide capacity-building 
framework for the environment; and (vi) continue to strengthen strategic engagement at the 
regional level.
147
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
GCSS/XI, Bali, 2010, available at http://www.unep.org/GC/GCSS-XI/downloads/Nusa_Dua_Declaration.pdf, 
specifically under C.   
145
 UNEP, “Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome”, Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives, Second 
meeting of the Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives on International Environmental 
Governance, Espoo (Finland), 23 November 2010, available at 
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/NairobiHelsinkifinaloutcomeedited.
pdf.  
146
 See also Goeteyn, N., “De UNEP Governing Council: in rechte lijn naar Rio+20?”, Wereldbeeld, 158 (2), 
2011, 14-18.  
147
 “[…] the Consultative Group identified a number of potential system-wide responses to the challenges in the 
current system of international environmental governance, including: (a) To strengthen the science-policy 
interface with the full and meaningful participation of developing countries; to meet the science-policy capacity 
needs of developing countries and countries with economies in transition, including improvement of scientific 
research and development at the national level; and to build on existing international environmental assessments, 
scientific panels and information networks. The overall purpose would be to facilitate cooperation in the 
collection, management, analysis, use and exchange of environmental information, the further development of 
internationally agreed indicators, including through financial support and capacity-building in developing 
countries and countries with economies in transition, early warning, alert services, assessments, the preparation 
of science-based advice and the development of policy options. In this context, the Global Environment Outlook 
process must be strengthened and work in cooperation and coordination with existing platforms; (b) To develop 
a system-wide strategy for environment in the United Nations system to increase the effectiveness, efficiency 
and coherence of the United Nations system and in that way contribute to strengthening the environmental pillar 
of sustainable development. The strategy should increase interagency cooperation and clarify the division of 
labour within the United Nations system. It should be developed through an inclusive process involving 
Governments and seeking input from civil society; (c) To encourage synergies between compatible multilateral 
environmental agreements and to identify guiding elements for realizing such synergies while respecting the 
autonomy of the conferences of the parties. Such synergies should promote the joint delivery of common 
multilateral environmental agreement services with the aim of making them more efficient and cost-effective. 
They should be based on lessons learned and remain flexible and adaptive to the specific needs of multilateral 
68 
 
Following these functions, the ministers also identified five possible options for institutional 
reform: (i) enhancing UNEP; (ii) establishing a new umbrella organisation for sustainable 
development; (iii) establishing a specialized agency such as a world environment 
organisation; (iv) reforming the United Nations Economic and Social Council and the United 
Nations Commission on Sustainable Development; and (v) enhancing institutional reforms 
and streamlining existing structures. The Ministers added that  
 
“Based on the principle that form follows function, and recognizing 
that it had not achieved consensus on institutional form, the Group 
suggested that existing institutions be strengthened and enhanced and 
that options (a) (enhancing UNEP), (c) (establishing a specialized 
agency such as a world environment organisation) and (e) (enhancing 
institutional reforms and streamlining existing structures) were 
potential options for strengthening the form of the environment pillar 
in the context of sustainable development and achieving effective 
international environmental governance”148. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
environmental agreements. They should aim at reducing the administrative costs of secretariats to free up 
resources for the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements at the national level, including 
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During the 26
th
 regular Session of the Governing Council, this outcome document was 
forwarded to the Preparatory Committees of the Rio+20 Conference.
149
 The ministers 
formally requested the Preparatory Committee to conduct a “full analysis of the financial, 
structural and legal implications and comparative advantages of the options identified in the 
Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome”. This was considered to be a necessary step to deepen the 
understanding around the table about the different institutional proposals.  
 
G. Rio+20: political chances for the creation of a WEO? 
 
The Rio+20 Conference, taking place from 20-22 June 2012, has two major focuses: Green 
Economy and the Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD).
150
 In the so-
called zero draft
151
, two leading proposals for reform of environmental institutions are brought 
to the fore: the “GA, ECOSOC, CSD, SDC” proposal and the “UNEP, specialized agency on 
environment proposal, IFIs, UN operational activities at country level” proposal. Under the 
first, the ministers are asked to decide to either reaffirm the role of the Commission on 
Sustainable Development (CSD) or to transform it into a Sustainable Development Council 
(SDC).
152
 The second proposal leaves policy makers a choice between (i) the strengthening of 
UNEP, meaning establishing permanent membership to its Governing Council and calling for 
an increase of its financial basis, and (ii) the establishment of a specialised agency for the 
environment, based upon UNEP, also with universal membership of the GC, with a revised 
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and strengthened mandate, supported by stable, adequate and predictable financial 
contributions and operating on an equal footing with other UN specialized agencies.
153
 
 
UNEP’s own official input in the preparatory process has supported the proposal to strengthen 
UNEP, rather than the UNEO/specialised agency proposal. Given the fact that it is unclear at 
this point what exactly this organisation would do and what its added value would be, this is 
perhaps most easily understood as self-preservation.
154
   
 
During the Rio+20 Conference, the debate on environmental governance will be held in the 
context of the IFSD, which means that also the role of institutions comprising the economic 
and social pillars will be considered. The idea is to strengthen the integration of the economic, 
social and environmental pillars of sustainable development.
155
 This also means that, more 
likely than not, the discussions on the reform of the institutions for environmental governance 
will be overarched by the sustainable development agenda, making a strong outcome for the 
environment less likely.  
 
H. Assessment: the failed debate for a WEO 
 
Various assessments of UNEP start with the premise that the state of the global environment 
is continuously declining and use this as a point of departure for arguing that today’s world 
still lacks adequate environmental protection and existing structures are failing; that, given 
that premise, UNEP has underperformed awfully; and that therefore there is an urgent need to 
create a new organisation in the form of a WEO.
156
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This line of argumentation fails to convince in several aspects. It is argued that it is defect, 
and worse, that is one of the causes for the failing of the IEG reform debate up until today. 
Firstly, it does not take into account the radically changing circumstances under which a by 
and large unaltered UNEP has had to perform its duties. Therefore, many of the critiques on 
the IEG system as it stands today are either ill-considered or unfounded, or both, and reached 
alternatives remain ill-defined. Secondly, it fails to pose the adequate questions as to what 
exactly is going wrong within UNEP and the IEG system as a whole, and as a result proposed 
alternatives based on these assessments remain purely academic at best. There is in other 
words no guarantee whatsoever that the new-to-be-founded substitute would perform better 
than its predecessor. Furthermore, the assessments that were made of UNEP were extremely 
diverse. It is argued here that the criticism on UNEP is imbalanced, overly diverse and as a 
consequence thereof not convincing. This directly affects the proposed alternatives to the IEG 
system, which fail to have an effective impact on policy-makers. While IEG is arguably much 
broader than (the reform of) UNEP alone, it is argued that the failed WEO debate seriously 
hampers progress in the deliberations on reforming the environmental institutions and the 
ongoing IEG debate.  
 
While the pace of change in world affairs has never been higher than during the last 
century
157
, UNEP has remained unaltered in its core form and substance, apart from some 
minor alterations after the 2002 Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development 
(WSSD). It is rather disconcerting that authors do not always fully appreciate that this has 
gravely affected UNEP’s possibilities to attain positive effects.  
 
In other words, if one is to carefully and usefully assess UNEP’s overall performance and 
accomplishments, one must take into account the rationale behind the creation of UNEP, the 
budget that it was provided with, the source of those resources, and the goals that it was set 
out to achieve given the 1972 background. It is therefore important to determine the founding 
principles and policy goals the Programme was set up with, in order to be able to 
meaningfully judge upon its performance. 
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1. UNEP’s original design 
 
As established before, UNEP was not designed to be a body with sanctioning powers and 
norm-setting abilities. Instead, the programme was intended to be a promoter of international 
co-operation in the battle against “environmental problems of broad international 
significance”, able to set out general policy guidelines and stimulate regional cooperation, and 
to provide a funnel for scientific assessment and exchange of environmental knowledge, 
endorse country progress reports, and to serve as an early warning mechanism for newly 
emerging environmental threats. Furthermore, these tasks would have to be performed “with 
due respect to the sovereign rights of States” and with the presupposition that protecting the 
environment is a task that rests primarily and “can be exercised more effectively at the 
national and regional levels”. Lastly, a “small secretariat” that would “serve as a focal point 
for environmental action and co-ordination within the United Nations system” was established 
under the auspices of the Economic and Social Council.
158
 
 
Seeing the broad description and wide range of tasks set forth in the founding resolution it is 
understandable for UNEP to have sought for a (number of) niche(s) in which it could excel. 
With its limited staff, its broad array of tasks, its limited funding and relatively scarce political 
weight, there is widespread agreement that at least in the field of agenda-setting and the 
creation of new legal instruments, UNEP can pride itself over some remarkable 
achievements.
159
 
 
2. Changing environment, changing perspective 
 
The IEG landscape has altered drastically since 1972.
160
 Many contemporary writings on IEG 
start with the remark that over 500 MEAs exist today - up from 52 major ones in 1972, of 
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which only 23 were global in scope. In May 1991, on the eve of the Rio Conference, 
approximately 152 major conventions were in force.
161
 Nowadays, countless international 
organisations, commissions and programmes are dealing with environmental concerns, both 
within and outside of the UN structure (e.g. (non-exhaustive): the WB, the IMF, the WTO, the 
FAO, the ILO, the CSD and the UNDP. In 1972 on the other hand, environmental degradation 
as a policy issue was a relative newcomer at the international scene. An overwhelming 
amount of stakeholders, both in the political and social sphere, have since then entered the 
field to participate in the deliberations.
162
  
 
Additionally, environmental issues nowadays are very visible and under international 
scrutiny. However, this accumulated interest, the great number of organisations involved in 
environmental governance and the continuously growing number of civil and social 
stakeholders has not brought significant improvement to the overall state of the environment - 
or its institutions.
163
 Apart from this, world population has nearly tripled over the last 60 
years.
164
 In the same period the level of development, both in the developed and the 
developing nations, has risen substantially and the economy has globalised to unprecedented 
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levels.
165
 Therefore, one could rightfully argue that rising pressure on the environment is but 
an evolution to be expected.
166
  
 
The point made here is that, apart from UNEP itself, practically everything around it has 
changed profoundly compared to 1972, the situation for which UNEP was essentially 
designed. It is fair to say that UNEP was designed to be the focal point for environmental 
action throughout the UN echelons. However,  
 
“[...] it had severe obstacles placed in its path [...]. It had too little 
money, too few staff, and too much to do. It had the thankless task of 
coordinating the work of other UN agencies against a background of 
interagency jealousy and suspicion, and national governments were 
unwilling to grant UNEP significant powers”167.  
 
This assessment gives reason to believe that UNEP was handicapped from the outset in 
fulfilling its task. Above this, many states feared that the new Programme would interfere too 
much with their domestic affairs and were unwilling to let UNEP fully play the role it was 
designed for. It has therefore been argued that UNEP was “designed to fail”.168  
 
A somewhat different perspective is argued here: the creation of UNEP in its original form 
was the maximum reachable outcome of a political process in the early seventies. Considering 
the spirit of the age and mindset and given the low visibility and relative importance of 
environmental degradation issues in international fora at that time, the choices in the design of 
UNEP were defendable and made political sense. Above all, the choices were the results of 
real politik, both at the national and the international level.  
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Perhaps today it is understood that environmental degradation or institutional coordination at 
the UN level needs more focus and attention than a minimal “anchor institution”169 such as 
UNEP can provide in its current form. That is, however, no just reason to equate current 
environmental degradation with the failing of the institution. The real question that often 
remains unasked is how being successful should be described, given the level of expectations, 
the available resources and the amount of goodwill the international system as a whole is 
willing to dedicate to environmental concerns. However much improvement may be needed to 
the IEG system, the current mechanisms have their present-day form because of their political 
and economical feasibility at the time of their conception, rather than their sheer efficiency in 
the strife against environmental degradation. It does not serve UNEP, the WEO debate or the 
IEG system to compare those mechanisms to the present standard, because it leads to 
misplaced and distorted conclusions about the problem and the proposed solutions.
170
  
 
Because of the growing importance of environmental issues and the pressure on the 
international system as a whole to alleviate these issues in a consistent manner, the challenge 
UNEP faces has changed significantly, while its design, financial resources and founding 
principles have remained, by and large, unaltered. It is of paramount importance to take into 
account these changing circumstances and expectations when it comes to UNEP’s role in the 
IEG system and the changing public opinion on environmental issues as a whole.
171
  
 
3. Enter the WEO – or not? 
 
Kennan and Chayes’ aforementioned proposals were followed by an impressive line of failed 
attempts to improve the level of global environmental protection by overhauling the IEG 
institutional framework. In fact, one could convincingly argue that the debate for a WEO has 
not ceased since the creation of UNEP in 1972.
172
 The fact that UNEP is perceived as unable 
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to achieve the expected outcomes and carry out its mandate should make the case for its 
reform even more appealing. However, reality has proven different. After decades of debate 
and subsequent reform proposals the only conclusion from the overall lack of progress in the 
reform process can be that, so far, it is the debate to reform UNEP that has failed.  
 
The reasons behind the perceived weakness of UNEP are, as stated above, diverse and 
plentiful. “The problems of UNEP stem from its low status within the UN bureaucracy, its 
disadvantageous and dangerous location in Nairobi, its inadequate and insecure funding, and 
its detachment from many of the MEAs”.173 Without wanting to redo the well-known debate, 
this is an appealing enumeration, because the four distinct elements in it tend to come back in 
one form or another within most authors’ assessment of the contemporary IEG system in 
general and UNEP in particular. Most interestingly, it is also mostly these issues that authors 
try, in their respective (WEO) proposals, to alleviate. 
 
While these issues are very real indeed and have not made the task UNEP has been faced with 
any easier, the question comes to mind why WEO advocates are so strikingly convinced that a 
WEO would not face the exact same issues, or why a WEO would succeed where UNEP has 
failed in overcoming these obstacles. Taking into account the political sensitivity and 
financial consequences, why do reform proponents keep demanding to relocate UNEP or its 
successor away from the current UNEP headquarters’ hub in Nairobi? Why is it necessary in 
so many WEO advocates’ heads to give a WEO a much broader mandate than the 
environment alone, even if the scholarly and political debate has made abundantly clear that 
states are unwilling to accept such a drastic overhaul? Why is it that a WEO would be able to 
secure so much more budget than UNEP presently can, knowing that the states that would be 
funding a WEO are the same ones that have protested vehemently during the last 2 years of 
diplomatic negotiations against the adoption of the Voluntary Indicative Scale of 
Contributions, modest a change to UNEP’s financial base it is? And why would a WEO be 
better equipped than UNEP to overlook and, indeed, govern the existing MEAs or even 
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cluster them, when the present debate makes perfectly clear that states are unwilling to let 
anyone meddle with the legal autonomy of these agreements?
174
 
 
The point made here is that these questions need satisfactory answers before they can be set 
aside and that this is lacking in many reform proposals. Often proposals are made without 
considering the actual need to change anything, or are done in a disorderly fashion. While 
“form follows function”175 should be the guiding principle in any international forum, 
advocates seek to reform institutions without being able to define the mission that this 
organisation would have to, or need to, fulfil, by “first positing reorganisation and then 
searching for a mission”.176 In the rare cases that a concrete agenda for a WEO is formulated 
it often goes well beyond environment. It has authoritatively been argued that poverty 
reduction has been usurping the environmental agenda.
177
 Strikingly, WEO proposals are 
often guilty of the exact same defect: building an environmental organisation that would have 
the power to meddle in trade issues, or foreign aid, or any field of policy with ties to the 
environmental agenda. It should come as no surprise then that both states and other existing 
organisations are not eager to have this new and unpredictable WEO tipping the existing 
balances – however feeble they may be.  
 
It seems therefore more appropriate to alleviate the problems at hand rather than to make 
tabula rasa of the existing structures altogether, seeing that no UNEP replacement will be 
allowed more elbow room to do a better job and that the proposed alternatives are not 
authoritative or convincing enough to push the reform process forward.
178
 Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that those elements that are being conceived today as the main reasons for 
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the failure of UNEP were considered fundamental assets and strengths of the newly founded 
Programme in 1972.  
 
Indeed, a “small” secretariat (“no more than 50 professionals”179) was deemed necessary to 
maintain the highest possible degree of quality and independence of the personnel, although 
today many WEO advocates feel that the present approximate 450 officials is way too small a 
number to effectively tackle UNEP’s tasks.180 The much contested funding from the general 
budget, which is nowadays considered too little and because yearly fluctuating, too uncertain 
to work with
181, was one of the other key elements in Chayes’ proposal on the eve of the 1972 
Stockholm UNCHE, again to maintain UNEP’s independence. And the assessed contributions 
that are often called for were explicitly not adopted in 1972 in order to give UNEP more 
money, not less. 
 
The above is not to say that UNEP, in the present wave of environmental concerns, is 
sufficiently equipped to be an effective, successful and comprehensive environmental 
governance organisation. It is not argued that diversity in vision is not beneficial or adds to 
the richness of the debate; nor is it contested that improvements to the system as it stands 
today are needed. What is contested, however, is the idea that the mere existence of today’s 
environmental issues is evidence enough in itself for claiming that UNEP has been 
“chronically underperforming”. WEO advocates have failed to properly address the existing 
issues within the IEG system, and it is unclear exactly what it is a WEO could change in the 
present situation. There is no growing convergence in views as to what exactly is going wrong 
and what might be done to alleviate these issues. Some arguments have not been adequately 
advocated; others have been hastened and are not ripe to stand the test of a larger debate, if 
they are not harmful for the cause of an institutional overhaul (like a WEO) in themselves. As 
a result thereof the proposed alternatives are too diverse to have any real impact in the field, 
and the expected improvements they would bring remain highly questionable.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 
What do we expect from an environmental institution at UN level? Seeing the political debate 
of the last decades and the outcomes of the recent ministerial consultations on the future of 
IEG, countries want to have a coordinating agency that serves as an early-warning mechanism 
for emerging environmental threats, assists developing countries in the execution of their 
environmental obligations and developmental potential, and which would be considered as the 
scientific powerhouse of the UN on environmental issues. It should also encourage synergies 
between the existing MEAs, without touching the legal independence and autonomy of these 
conventions.  
 
Strikingly, with the exception of the latter, all of these elements were part of the original 
proposal which led to the creation of UNEP in the early 1970s. The goals we envision today 
for an environmental institution at UN level are thus not fundamentally different from those in 
the early seventies. The question comes to mind why so many believe that the outcome today 
of what is essentially the same debate would be so fundamentally different from what we 
already have in place.  
 
For over 40 years advocates have tried to convince the international community of the merits 
of the idea that a more potent environmental organisation is needed. So far this has proven to 
be a fruitless exercise. Indeed, looking back, the landscape of IEG is littered with failed 
attempts to break the political deadlock on the creation of a WEO. It inspired the famous 
remark that a WEO was the organisation of the impossible.
182
 Taking into account the 
profound changes over the last 40 years and given the unwavering criticism on UNEP, why is 
it proving so hard to hammer out a WEO proposal that is both politically feasible and 
practically germane?  
 
There’s a multitude of reasons for this failing of the reform debate. Firstly, there’s no unity in 
the different assessments of UNEP. UNEP is benchmarked against contemporary expectations 
for which it is not equipped. Secondly, WEO advocates have not been able to satisfactory 
explain: (i) what exactly is going wrong in the present environmental protection system; (ii) 
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what should be done to alleviate these issues; and (iii) why the proposed WEO would do a 
better job than what is presently available and being achieved in the IEG system.  
 
WEO proposals and alternatives to the present IEG system are based upon very divergent and 
even incompatible assessments of UNEP and the other presently existing structures. As a 
result, the argument that there is a real need for a new international structure because the 
existing ones simply don’t meet expectations loses much of its appeal. If there is no 
agreement on the issues and their underlying reasons, it should come as no surprise that there 
is no agreement on the best solution to resolve them. Furthermore, one of the central 
dichotomies in environmental law, namely the question of centralisation vs. specialisation, is 
a continuous debate that was already visible with Palmer and Chayes and has never been 
resolved. At the same time, as Palmer puts it, “Some of the demands for coordination reflect a 
desire for order and symmetry in organisational affairs that is simply at odds with the real 
world. Some of it bespeaks a misconception of the nature and role of UN specialised 
agencies”.183  
 
The goal for such an international organisation for the environment would be, ideally, to 
reverse the degradation of the environment, or at least the damaging effects of this 
degradation. One has to wonder, given the changing circumstances (of which population 
growth is but one element), whether that is at all a realistic goal. Above this, proposed 
alternatives are either insufficiently worked out or fail to take into account basic elements of 
the legal and political requirements any solution will have to meet. Partly this is explained by 
the fact that so many different ideas for a WEO exist and that there is no clear unified goal for 
or rationale behind a WEO in the literature. That is unfortunate, because it is slowing much-
needed improvements to the IEG system.  
 
Due to the lack of any tangible progress the permanent negotiations achieve little more than 
alienating initially interested parties and create negotiation fatigue with many players. It is 
abundantly clear that given the present state of the debate, the political prospects for the 
creation of a powerful WEO as envisioned by many are dire indeed. If states are unwilling to 
go beyond what has been achieved thus far and what is on the table today, proposals for an 
institutional overhaul of the IEG system will remain fruitless.  
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The IEG debate will come to a formal conclusion at the Rio+20 Conference later this year. 
The most likely outcome will be that a new negotiating process will be established at the 
upcoming Earth Summit, where ministers will be charged with the task to find enough 
common ground and mutual understanding about the functions and consequent form of a 
future environmental governance institution. If nothing else, the political debate for the 
creation of a WEO has successfully spread the conviction that the present IEG system has got 
to change and that inaction will come at too high a price.  
 
Furthermore, the ongoing consultations at Rio+20 will likely lead to the start of a new 
negotiating process with the aim to find ways to strengthen UNEP. Both proposals on the 
table currently support opening up the GC to universal membership. Whether or not this will 
actually change anything in terms of effective decision-making, is further discussed infra, in 
Chapter 5. It is however clear that given the initial responses to the zero draft and the long 
standing positions of certain countries, it seems very unlikely a WEO, or indeed, a specialised 
agency for the environment, will be created at the UNCSD. Apparently, states are still not 
convinced that a WEO would be beneficial – to them, and the system as a whole.  
 
A fundamental institutional overhaul will only be possible if agreement can be reached on (i) 
which fundamental issues need addressing first, and (ii) a vision for the future structure of 
IEG. That is a fundamental task. At the same time and despite all of these critical sounds, it is 
argued that there is still room for progress in the negotiations. There is growing convergence 
in the diplomatic efforts for a step-by-step strengthening of the environmental institutional 
framework.  
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Chapter 2: International Conventions - Normative powers of the Conference of the 
Parties under Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
 
“It is in your moments of decision that your destiny is shaped.” 
Anthony Robbins 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As established supra, according to an estimate by UNEP of 2001 over 500 multilateral 
environmental agreements, 323 of which are regional in scope, are in force. Roughly 60% of 
these MEAs were established after 1972, the year of the UNCHE in Stockholm.
184
  
 
The institutional arrangements of the MEAs in force show considerable overlap. For instance, 
most of them have a permanent secretariat, either established by the MEA itself or through 
decisions adopted by the Conference of the Parties. In some cases, such as the Ramsar 
Convention, existing organisations such as the international NGO International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) are designated as the host organisation for the MEA 
secretariat.
185
 In addition, MEAs commonly use the system of COPs as the central authority 
and decision-making forum within the MEA regime. The COP is typically the plenary 
meeting of all parties to the MEA and is considered to be the highest political and legal organ 
of the MEA.
186
  
 
The terms for the organisation of the COPs are established by the conventions themselves and 
vary considerably. The Convention on Biological Diversity
187
 (CBD) for instance calls for the 
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COP to decide on the term for its regular sessions.
188
 Initially, that term was set at one 
meeting every year; however, after a COP decision to that effect, COPs are now held 
biennially. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
189
 (Cartagena Protocol) explicitly provides 
for its COP/MOPs to be held “in conjunction with”190 the COPs of the CBD, its framework 
convention, unless the COP/MOP would consider that other arrangements are necessary and 
decide otherwise. The COP of the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species 
of Wild Fauna and Flora
191
 (CITES) on the other hand is held “at least once every two 
years”192, meaning that more frequent COPs are possible. Moreover, in the same article the 
convention provides that the COP may decide on a different term (“unless the Conference 
decides otherwise”). The Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild 
Animals
193
 (CMS) and the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as 
Waterfowl Habitat
194
 (Ramsar) both hold their COPs every three years, as does the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer
195
 (Ozone Convention). The Ramsar 
Convention and the CMS also explicitly provide the competence to change the term for their 
respective COPs.
196
 This means that to change the term for regular COP meetings no 
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amending of the conventions is necessary and the COPs themselves may determine the 
intervals between COP meetings. The Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone 
layer
197
 (Montreal Protocol), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change
198
 (UNFCCC) and its Kyoto Protocol
199
 all provide for yearly meetings.
200
 Apart from 
that, COPs have the competence to organize extra-ordinary meetings or convene subsidiary 
bodies and ad-hoc working groups.  
 
COP and MOP meetings are characterized by a special dynamics in which numerous 
decisions are adopted that are necessary to clarify certain treaty provisions or to ensure 
consistent implementation of treaty obligations. These decisions are often a political and legal 
necessity, to interpret or clarify certain provisions of the convention or to ensure consistent 
implementation by all parties of the obligations emanating from the convention. The parties to 
the Kyoto Protocol for instance took 36 decisions during the first MOP in 2005 in 
Montréal
201
, one of which was the approbation of the Marrakech Agreements. The Kyoto 
Protocol also introduced the so-called flexible mechanisms, but the actual implementation of 
the Joint Implementation (JI), the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and the emissions 
trading scheme (ETS) was to be agreed upon by means of COP/MOP decisions.
202
 The 
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UNFCCC contains provisions on the storage of carbon dioxide in sinks, the financing of and 
technology transfers to developing countries, all of which are under constant control and are 
being implemented through decisions by the COP.
203
  
 
A quantitative research into the output of a selection of MEAs by UNEP in the period 1992-
2007 shows that the COPs are extremely productive and generate an enormous amount of 
decisions.
204
 During this period, the COP of the Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal (1989)
205
 took no less 
than 247 decisions and recommendations; the Convention on Biological Diversity adopted 
216 decisions and 136 recommendations; the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer produced only 2 COP decisions, while the MOP of the Montreal Protocol to this 
convention adopted 502 decisions and/or recommendations; the UNFCCC harbours 245 COP 
decisions and the Kyoto Protocol 58 (in the period 2005-2007). The most productive 
convention in terms of decisions however is undoubtedly CITES with 858 decisions and/or 
recommendations by de COP and 1034 by the Standing Committee in the period 1992-
2007.
206
  
 
In the COP, Parties adopt decisions relating to the further development and interpretation of 
the MEAs, and it also provides a forum for ongoing negotiations. In that capacity it usually 
has a broad array of competences, which are by and large comparable between the different 
MEAs. For instance, in the cases of (amongst others) the CBD and its Cartagena Protocol, 
CITES, Ramsar and the CMS, the COP is responsible for the organisation of the actual 
meetings of the parties, and can set the terms and time-frame within which the COP or MOP 
meetings will effectively take place.
207
 These COPs also have the competence to organise 
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extra-ordinary meetings or convene subsidiary bodies and ad hoc working groups as they see 
fit. These subsidiary bodies report to the COP and in practice fulfil a multitude of functions, 
dealing with compliance, enforcement or scientific analysis; they may be technical working 
groups or specific scientific councils. On top of that, the COPs have the competence to set up 
compliance procedures and committees. Additionally, they are instrumental in the amendment 
procedures of the MEAs and in the adoption of protocols.
208
 It is clear that the development of 
international environmental law is a fast-growing aspect of international law, in which COPs 
and MOPs continuously contribute to the establishment of the rule of law.
209
 
 
The COPs and MOPs are, in other words, essential to the further development of the 
normative content of the MEAs that established them. They adopt numerous decisions on 
internal matters such as the rules of procedure to be followed or the interpretation of the 
convention, on external matters such as the relationship of the MEA with other international 
institutions, and on compliance issues.
210
 It is therefore submitted that (i) the COPs fulfil a 
multitude of functions under the MEAs and that (ii) as such they are essential drivers behind 
the establishment and development of the modern rule of law within the context of 
international environmental law. 
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The powers of the COPs are essential to the development of international environmental law 
and these legislative powers are considered to be expanding.
211
 Indeed, COPs take decisions 
on a multitude of subjects, being flexible in terms of the rules used to take a decision and in 
terms of the interpretation of MEA provisions establishing their competences. One of the 
most attractive features of these COP decisions is that, unlike amendments, they do not 
require ratification by the parties to the COP to generate effects and come into force. This 
means that they are not subjected to lengthy ratification processes at the national level. In 
light of the debate for more efficient and effective policy-making at the international level for 
environmental matters, the COPs may easily be one of the most flexible forms of decision-
making available at the international level. 
 
This does not necessarily mean that there is widespread agreement as to what exactly the 
competences of any given COP are, or as to the legal nature of decisions it adopts. In the case 
of the UNFCCC for instance, the adoption of the so-called Cancun Agreements has raised 
essential questions regarding the legal status of COP decisions. Also, in light of growing 
concerns over the legitimacy of these COP decisions, it is essential to clearly identify the legal 
basis for the decision-making processes of the COPs and the potential legal effect of such 
decisions.
212
  
 
Furthermore, the COPs consistently respect the practice to adopt decisions by means of 
consensus: decisions are not voted upon. Nonetheless, COPs adopt specific voting rules as 
part of their Rules of Procedure (RoP). These RoP have allowed the COPs to deal creatively 
with the consensus rule. The effects of these derogations from the more traditional means of 
consensualist decision-making at the international level have remained by and large unnoticed 
by the scientific community.  
 
In this chapter, the normative powers of the COPs are investigated, after which conclusions 
are drawn on the legal value of COP decisions from a formal perspective. To that end, the 
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practice of 10 global MEAs is examined.
213
 Under (II), the sui generis character of the COP 
model is established by looking at the development of the COP model as a hybrid between a 
traditional intergovernmental organisation (IGO) and diplomatic conferences. Under (III), the 
consequences of this hybrid status for the decision-making power and competences of the 
COPs are investigated. Furthermore, COPs adopt specific voting rules as part of their Rules of 
Procedure. These voting rules and the effect of their adoption to the legal status of COP 
decisions are examined in (IV). Finally, in (V), all of these elements are combined to draw 
conclusions on the binding nature of COP decisions.  
 
II. Development of the COP system 
 
As has been established supra, most MEAs in force today have been concluded since the 
early ‘70s. The MEAs themselves have also undergone several transitions, such as the gradual 
introduction of the COP system. Before the development of the COP system, the options for 
an international treaty wanting to root itself institutionally were limited. An international 
treaty could either (1) establish a new Inter-Governmental Organisation (IGO) or use existing 
IGOs or other international organisations as its institutional structures, or (2) it did not 
establish any institutional structures at all.
214
  
 
In the first case (1) an IGO in the traditional sense of the meaning with its own legal 
personality is newly established, or an existing IGO is used as the host organisation for the 
international convention. Examples of this format may, inter alia, be found in the 
International Whaling Commission
215
, the International Commission for the Northwest 
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1673 UNTS 57 (Basel Convention). 
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 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 1946, 161 UNTS 72. “The International Whaling 
Commission was set up under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling which was signed in 
Washington on 2 December 1946. The purpose of the Convention is to provide for the proper conservation of 
whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry. The main duty of the IWC 
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Atlantic Fisheries
216
 and the IMO
217
. The creation of such an IGO usually also involved hiring 
permanent staff and providing permanent premises, which made the undertaking financially 
less attractive to governments looking to suppress their costs. Moreover, establishing such 
IGOs also meant giving up political influence to a large administration: the early seventies in 
general saw a decreasing willingness to develop new IGOs, since they brought about 
administrations that were considered to be unwieldy, expensive and largely ineffective.
218
 
Using pre-existing IGOs could be considered a solution to that issue, yet had the distinct 
disadvantage of involving states within the IGO framework that were not necessarily parties 
to the MEA concerned.
219
 Furthermore, as has been described in Chapter 1, developing states 
demanded a more equitable distribution of international meetings between the north and the 
south.
220
 Pre-existing IGOs usually meet only in their headquarters at pre-set intervals, which 
before 1972 had without exception all been established in the north. Therefore, traditional 
                                                                                                                                                                      
funds whale research, publishes the results of scientific research and promotes studies into related matters such 
as the humaneness of the killing operations.” See http://iwcoffice.org/index.htm. See also Caron, D. D., “The 
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 International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1949, 2053 UNTS 276. The International 
Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, or ICNAF, was organized that year and mandated to use 
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preserving fish stocks. The Convention became redundant after the third United Nations Convention of the Law 
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Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO) after conclusion of the Convention on Future Multilateral 
Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 1979, 157 UNTS 157. See also M. Fitzmaurice, “Consent to be 
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490-492.  
217
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The 1954 Convention was the first international convention to attempt to prevent pollution of the sea by oil from 
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Convention for the prevention of pollution from ships (1973) and its Protocol (1978), 1340 UNTS 61 (MARPOL 
Convention). 
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 See amongst others: Hurrell, H. and Kingsbury, B., “The International Politics of the Environment: an 
introduction”, in X., The International Politics of the Environment: Actors, Interests, and Institutions, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1992, at 34-35; Palmer, G., “New Ways to make International Environmental Law”, 
American Journal of International Law, 1992, 86, 259-283, at 282; World Commission on Environment and 
Development, “Our common future” (Brundtland report), 1987, Doc A/42/427, available at http://www.un-
documents.net/wced-ocf.htm. See also supra, Chapter 1, on the Jackson Report. The best example of this 
evolution may perhaps be found in the creation of UNEP, which was explicitly intended to be “not an 
administration, but a brain”: see supra, Chapter 1.  
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 See also McDonald, J. W., The Shifting Grounds of Conflict and Peace building: Stories and Lessons, 
Lanham, Lexington Books, 2008. 
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IGOs were not an attractive option for the international community when considering 
institutional arrangements for the governing of environmental affairs in the early 1970s.  
 
In the second option (2) the international conventions did not provision any institutional 
arrangements at all. The Washington Convention on nature Protection and Wildlife 
Preservation in the Western Hemisphere can serve as a prime example.
221
 Such conventions 
established no institutional structures that could have been considered to have the competence 
to update the existing regime to match new scientific knowledge on the subject or newly 
emerging political consensus. These conventions can therefore be considered as the outcomes 
of one-time diplomatic conferences. Since it is commonly understood that “[t]he success of an 
MEA depends to a significant degree on its ability to catalyze the expansion, tightening, 
speeding-up or other adjustment of the Parties’ commitments [...]”222, conventions in this 
category usually lost their practical relevance within the first few years after their conclusion 
and subsequent entry into force.  
 
For all of these reasons, governments were unwilling to apply these possible solutions to the 
environmental field. The system of the COPs, developed by UNEP in the early 1970s and first 
applied to the Ramsar Convention, can therefore be seen as a flexible medium between the 
two traditional solutions, or, as Brunnée describes it, “a hybrid between issue-specific 
diplomatic conferences and the permanent plenary bodies of international organisations”223.  
 
Looking at the subsequent evolution of the COP model, later MEAs have given their COPs 
broad competences, in line with the expectation that the COP would become the central (or 
“supreme”224) law-making structure of the MEA. For instance, under the 1971 Ramsar 
Convention the COP was originally given advisory powers only. While most of the 
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 Washington Convention on nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the Western Hemisphere, 1940, 
161 UNTS 193. Another example is the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources, 1968, 1001 UNTS 3, as referred to by Churchill, R. R. and Ulfstein, G., “Autonomous institutional 
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 Brunnée, J., “COPing with consent: law-making under multilateral environmental agreements”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2002, 15, 1-52, at 8. 
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 Brunnée, J., “COPing with consent: law-making under multilateral environmental agreements”, Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 2002, 15, 1-52, at 16.  
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 UNFCCC, article 7 para 2: “The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall 
keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the 
Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the 
effective implementation of the Convention […]” (emphasis added).  
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competences that are now considered to be part of the regular COP competences were present 
in a more or less elaborated form in the original version of the convention, the COP was not 
established as a permanent structure (“[convene] as the necessity arises”), nor did it have the 
competence to actually take decisions; it had an “advisory character” and was competent to 
“discuss” and “make recommendations” only.225  
 
One year later, under the auspices of the IMO, the London Dumping Convention established a 
permanent COP with much more elaborate competences.
226
 The first full-powered COP 
however was established one year later in 1973. CITES established its COP with the 
competence to establish subsidiary organs as it sees fit. This convention was later amended to 
include the competence for the COP to adopt financial regulations. Later-established COPs 
were all based upon the model of the CITES COP, including these broad competences. 
 
III. Competences of the COP 
 
UNEP has identified that, in general terms, COPs have been established to: (1) review treaty 
implementation based on reports submitted by governments; (2) consider new information 
received from governments, NGOs and individuals in order to make recommendations to the 
Parties on implementation; (3) make decisions necessary to promote the effective 
implementation of the convention; (4) revise the treaty if necessary; and (5) act as a forum for 
discussion on matters of importance.
227
 Other distinctions are of course also possible when 
analysing the competence of the COPs, such as a division in (1) internal competences of the 
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COP, (2) external competences of the COP, (3) the development of the normative content of 
the MEA and (4) supervision of compliance.
228
  
 
These are classifications post hoc, based on the effective decisions adopted by the COPs. For 
the purpose of this chapter however, which looks at the decision-making powers of the COPs 
from a formal perspective, distinction will be made between (a) specifically mandated 
competences and (b) competences stemming from other legal bases.  
 
A. Specifically mandated competences 
 
The different competences of the COP are usually set out in the MEAs themselves, in line 
with the traditional application of the doctrine of attribution
229
 as codified in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT)
230
, of which the MEAs as international 
multilateral treaties are subjects. It would be beyond the ambition of this chapter to list the 
competences of the COPs of all or even a selection of MEAs here. As highlighted supra, the 
CITES COP has been used as the blueprint for all later established COPs. The competences of 
other COPs are similar to this model, supplemented with treaty-specific provisions and 
competences.
231
 Therefore, this chapter uses the competences of the CITES COP as a basis 
for analysis. In order to fully bring the evolution of broadening competences of the COPs to 
the fore, the competences of the CITES COP are then compared to those of the UNFCCC as 
established in 1992.  
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1. CITES 
 
The CITES Convention determines the competences of the COP in its article XI.
232
 Paragraph 
1 makes arrangements for the organisation of the first meeting of the COP, while paragraphs 2 
and 4 establish the competence of the COP to alter the timing of subsequent COP meetings. 
Paragraph 5 provides the competence for the COP to adopt specific Rules of Procedure.
233
 
Paragraphs 6 and 7 respectively deal with participation of UN bodies and observers to the 
COP meetings. The crux of the competences of the COP however is laid out in paragraph 3 of 
article XI, where the COP is designated as the central authority for the review of 
implementation of the convention. In this respect the COP is given the competence to make 
all provisions necessary to enable the secretariat to fulfil its duties; adopt financial provisions; 
adopt amendments to the annexes to the Convention; consider reports received by the parties 
or the secretariat; review the effectiveness of the treaty provisions; and make 
recommendations for improving their overall effectiveness.  
 
2. UNFCCC 
 
The Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC also has an explicit list of competences 
emanating from the convention itself. This list is however much more elaborate than the 
competence of the COP of the aforementioned CITES Convention. Specifically, article 7 of 
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 CITES, article XI (headed “Conference of the Parties) determines as follows: “1. The Secretariat shall call a 
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the UNFCCC provides an overview of the competences its COP will assume.
234
 The COP has 
the authority to, inter alia, keep the implementation of the Convention under review and 
adopt all decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention, 
consider and adopt measures to enhance implementation, establish subsidiary bodies as it sees 
fit, mobilize financial support, and establish and govern the external relations of the 
Convention, such as relations with other international bodies or organisations.  
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 Article 7 of the UNFCCC determines as follows: “Conference of the Parties. 1. A Conference of the Parties is 
hereby established. 2. The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under 
regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of 
the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective 
implementation of the Convention. To this end, it shall: (a) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties 
and the institutional arrangements under the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the 
experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge; (b) 
Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the Parties to address climate change 
and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and 
their respective commitments under the Convention; (c) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the 
coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the 
differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under 
the Convention; (d) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective and provisions of the Convention, the 
development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies, to be agreed on by the Conference of the 
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Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the provisions of the Convention, 
the implementation of the Convention by the Parties, the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to the 
Convention, in particular environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the 
extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved; (f) Consider and adopt 
regular reports on the implementation of the Convention and ensure their publication; (g) Make 
recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of the Convention; (h) Seek to mobilize 
financial resources in accordance with Article 4, paragraphs 3, 4 and 5, and Article 11; (i) Establish such 
subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation of the Convention; (j) Review reports 
submitted by its subsidiary bodies and provide guidance to them; (k) Agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules 
of procedure and financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies; (l) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, 
the services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent international organisations and 
intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and (m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the 
achievement of the objective of the Convention as well as all other functions assigned to it under the Convention. 
3. The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of procedure as well as those of the 
subsidiary bodies established by the Convention, which shall include decision-making procedures for matters not 
already covered by decision-making procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures may include 
specified majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions. 4. The first session of the Conference of the 
Parties shall be convened by the interim secretariat referred to in Article 21 and shall take place not later than 
one year after the date of entry into force of the Convention. Thereafter, ordinary sessions of the Conference of 
the Parties shall be held every year unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties. 5. Extraordinary 
sessions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the 
Conference, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being 
communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties. 6. The United 
Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member 
thereof or observers thereto not Party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the 
Parties as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, 
which is qualified in matters covered by the Convention, and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be 
represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one 
third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of 
procedure adopted by the Conference of the Parties.” 
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Furthermore, like CITES, the UNFCCC COP may establish Rules of Procedure (RoP), 
change the term in which meetings of the COP are organised and establish rules for the 
representation of other UN organs and bodies. Apart from these competences the Convention 
also gives the COP the competence to establish a secretariat, give guidance to it and 
determine its functions
235
, provide guidance and keep under review all subsidiary bodies (such 
as the subsidiary body for scientific and technological advice
236
; the subsidiary body for 
implementation
237
; and the financial mechanism
238
.  
 
Lastly, the COP shall also keep under review all information communicated by the parties as 
established under article 12, and start a multilateral consultative process in order to solve 
questions of implementation.
239
 From this list it is clear that the competences of the UNFCCC 
COP are much more elaborate than those of the CITES COP. Moreover, the language in 
which the conventions allocate these competences is much stronger under the UNFCCC 
Convention.
240
 
 
Reference must also be made to the explicit competence most MEAs assign to their COP to 
adopt amendments to the convention. Naturally, these amendments need ratification before 
they can enter into force.
241
 The fact that the COPs are competent to adopt such decisions is 
not surprising, as the ability to update the legal framework of the MEAs to new realities 
(political, legal or scientific) is one of the cornerstone roles for the COPs and one of the main 
reasons why the COP system has been developed in the first place. CITES is no exception and 
provides for a specific competence for its COP in this regard.
242
 Also the UNFCCC provides 
this competence explicitly.
243
 Similarly, also other MEAs provide this competence: the CBD, 
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 UNFCCC, article 9. 
237
 UNFCCC, article 10.  
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 UNFCCC, article 11 para 3 and 4.  
239
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 See for instance the difference between “recommendations” under CITES and “decisions” under UNFCCC in 
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the Cartagena Protocol, the Ramsar Convention and the CMS all explicitly assign this 
competence to their respective COP or MOP.
244
  
 
B. Competences stemming from other legal bases 
 
On top of specifically mandated decisions, MEA texts often provide for an open mandate for 
these COP meetings by assigning the COPs an open-ended competence by means of a catch-
all provision in the convention texts. The UNFCCC for instance provides that its COP may 
“exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the objective of the 
Convention […]”.245 Other MEAs have treaty provisions such as: “Consider and undertake 
any additional action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this 
Convention in the light of experience gained in its operation”246; “Exercise such other 
functions as may be required for the implementation of this Protocol”247; “to adopt other 
recommendations, or resolutions, to promote the functioning of this Convention”248; or “[to] 
decide on any additional measure that should be taken to implement the objectives of this 
Convention”249.  
 
CITES is exceptional in that it does not provide this catch-all provision explicitly; the 
convention speaks only of the competence for the COP to “make recommendations for 
improving the effectiveness of the present Convention”250. However, under the cover of this 
provision, the COP has assumed the competence to, for instance, establish scientific 
committees, further the cooperation with other international organisations and promote 
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 See for instance CBD, article 29 para 2; CMS, article 10 and Ramsar, article 10bis. For the Cartagena 
Protocol, the COP of the CBD serves as the COP/MOP to the Protocol and has in broad terms the same 
competences. Article 6 para 4(f) of the Ozone Convention and article 11 para 4(h) of the Montreal Protocol are 
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the Bali Action Plan), review the adequacy of existing norms and clarify or implement existing treaty obligations 
(for example, the decisions concerning the compliance regime). See also Wiersema, A., “The new international 
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 CMS, article 7 para 5h. 
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 CITES, article 11 para 3e. 
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capacity-building measures between its parties, even though there is no article in the 
convention text explicitly granting these competences to the COP.
251
  
 
Similarly, article XI of CITES does not explicitly provide for a so-called enabling clause to 
establish subsidiary organs such as compliance mechanisms; however the COP has applied 
this competence nonetheless. As described elsewhere, more recent MEAs commonly have a 
legal basis for the development of compliance regimes, in the form of a clause in the text of 
the treaty itself, anticipating potential non-compliance by the contracting Parties. It is now 
common practice for MEAs to provide the COP with the explicit competence to install 
compliance mechanisms and for these compliance mechanisms to become more elaborate.
252
  
 
The distinction between IGOs on the one hand and multilateral treaties on the other hand is 
essential, together with the realisation that MEAs and their COPs are explicitly not 
established as IGOs. Multilateral treaties such as the MEAs fall within the scope of the 1969 
VCLT, which also means that law-making under these multilateral treaties is rooted in the 
consent-based law of treaties. IGOs on the other hand operate under international institutional 
law which uses additional mechanisms to ensure the correct and evolutional interpretation of 
the treaty and working of the organisation it establishes.  
 
C. Implied powers as a basis for normative action by the COP? 
 
It has been argued that COPs under MEAs are international organisations in the traditional 
sense.
253
 The UN Secretary-General has noted in this regard: “The Conference of the Parties 
has an independent legal character and is not a subsidiary of the General Assembly or any 
other body”.254 The United Nations Office of Legal Affairs determined that the UNFCCC had 
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 See for instance the list of decisions adopted at the CITES COPs, available at 
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 See for instance Sands, P., Principles of International Environmental Law: framework, standards and 
implementation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, at 92, who claims that these arrangements are to 
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 UN, “Designation of a permanent secretariat and arrangements for its functioning. Note by the Executive 
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institutional arrangement for the permanent secretariat”, General Assembly, Intergovernmental Negotiating 
Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change, Note by the Secretary-General, Doc 
A/AC.237/79/Add.1, 21 December 1994, at 7. 
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established an “organisation with legal personality” and it later added that UNFCCC bodies 
“have certain distinctive elements attributable to international organisations”.255 Churchill and 
Ulfstein have argued that the practice of COP decisions shows that COPs share many features 
with traditional IGOs. Indeed, according to them, COPs may even be equated with 
international organisations with regard to institutional and organisational matters.
256
 They 
have therefore argued that the COP model should be considered “autonomous”. They point, 
amongst others, to the fact that the VCLT is not directly applicable to COP decisions and 
decisions by subsidiary bodies, since these decisions are not “treaties” as defined by the 
Vienna Convention itself. Furthermore, the similarity of the functions of the COPs to 
governing bodies of IGOs and the ideas of effectiveness and dynamics upon which the COPs 
have been established, are also elements in their analysis. They therefore conclude that the 
COP system incorporates certain elements of the traditional IGOs and that treaty law must be 
supplemented
257
 with elements of international institutional law
258
, such as the implied 
powers theory
259
, when analysing the normative powers of the COPs.  
 
As established supra, MEAs usually provide the explicit competence for the COP to adopt 
decisions amending the convention texts. Interestingly in the case of the Ramsar Convention 
there was no explicit provision in the original version of the convention on the matter of 
amendments. At an extra-ordinary session in 1982 the COP adopted the so-called Paris 
Protocol, through which the Ramsar Convention was amended to include article 10 bis, which 
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 Edition), Leiden, Martinus Neihoff Publishers, 
2011.  
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international institutional law (2
nd
 Edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009; Kooijmans, P. H., 
Internationaal publiekrecht in vogelvlucht (8th Edition), Deventer, Kluwer, 2000; and Schermers, H. G. and 
Blokker, N. M., International institutional law: Unity within diversity (5
th
 Edition), Leiden, Martinus Neihoff 
Publishers, 2011. 
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details the amendment procedure for the convention.
260
 The fact that the COP did not have the 
explicit competence stemming from the convention to do so is essential in this regard: the 
COP considered it had this competence either as part of its implied powers or the 
competences it has based on article 6 of the Ramsar Convention and amended the convention 
in order to insert an enabling clause into the text of the Convention. Clearly, the COP already 
assumed this competence to begin with and the inserted provision does nothing more than 
confirming an already existing situation in an explicit way. This may be useful from the 
perspective of legal certainty and could certainly be explained as introducing clearer and more 
explicit requirements for the entry-into-force of amendments, but it does not add a new 
competence that the COP did not already have. It must therefore be concluded that COPs have 
the competence to amend their constitutive instruments (the MEAs) even if a specific 
provision in the convention granting this competence explicitly is absent. This is in line with 
general practice in international institutional law.
261
 
 
The idea of implied powers is particularly helpful in explaining the broad array of tasks COPs 
have been given by their MEAs and the Parties to the convention. However, identifying the 
legal basis upon which the COP decisions have been taken is to be distinguished from the 
assessment of the binding nature of these decisions.
262
 COP decision-making “[...] marks a 
distinct and different approach to institutional collaboration between states, being more 
informal and flexible, and often innovative in relation to norm creation and compliance”.263 
While COP decisions cannot be equated with treaties under the Vienna Convention, 
nevertheless under the law of treaties it is eventually the will of the parties which must 
ultimately be considered. Since the parties have explicitly not established IGOs, it is argued 
here that the law-making aspect of MEAs and the analysis of COP decisions are still best 
conceptualised within the boundaries of treaty law and the rules for consent that are 
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 Protocol to Amend the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat, 
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elaborated in the VCLT.
264
 While implied powers post factum help to explain the legal basis 
and ratio legis of a certain decision adopted by the COP, the decision-making process itself 
remains subject to the classic format of decision-making in public international law: state 
consent and consensualism.  
 
IV. Voting rules and majorities used by the COP 
 
The voting rules for decision-making by the COPs (which should be understood as the 
majorities necessary to adopt a COP decision) are determined in one of two ways: firstly (1), 
the MEA itself may determine specific voting rules. This is usually linked to a specific 
competence of the COP. Secondly (2), for all other decisions, i.e. in the cases the MEA does 
not determine specific rules to be followed, the COP may adopt the voting rules to be 
followed. These will typically be established in the general Rules of Procedure (RoP), adopted 
by a decision of the COP itself.  
 
In the first case (1), the voting rules are determined in the MEA itself. This is for instance the 
case for amendment procedures. According to older convention texts, COPs must adopt their 
decisions on amendments by minimum of a two-thirds majority.
265
 Newer MEAs determine 
that decisions on amendments must be taken by consensus, or, failing that, either a two-thirds 
majority
266
 or a three-quarters majority.
267
 For the quorum, reference in all cases is made to 
the parties “present and voting”, meaning that abstentions do not count towards the quorum 
nor are they counted as a counter-vote. 
 
In most cases however, the MEA itself does not provide specific voting rules or majorities 
necessary to adopt a certain decision. In this case (2), the general voting rules are laid out in 
the RoP as adopted by the COP. As established supra, adopting these RoP is in most cases an 
explicit competence of the COPs. In these Rules, the general voting arrangements for the COP 
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 See also Brunnée, J., “COPing with consent: law-making under multilateral environmental agreements”, 
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article X para 4. 
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are determined. The adoption of these RoP must be done by consensus in the cases of the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol
268
, the Ozone Convention and its Montreal Protocol
269
 and 
the CBD and its Cartagena Protocol
270
. The Ramsar Convention
271
 and CITES
272
 on the other 
hand do not provide for any specific majority for the adoption of their RoP. There is no 
express mentioning of the consensus rule, yet in practice consensus has been used for the 
adoption of the RoP in both cases. The CMS explicitly provides that its COP may adopt 
decisions by means of a two-thirds majority.
273
 However the RoP must also be adopted by 
consensus.
274
  
 
The RoP thus established by the COPs provide the effective voting rules adopted and used by 
the COPs and MOPs for the adoption of decisions, except in cases where the MEA explicitly 
provides for a different majority. In the case of the Ramsar Convention for instance, the RoP 
establishing the voting rules were adopted during the 10
th
 meeting of the COP, in 2008.
275
 
Rule 40 of these RoP determines that all efforts must be made to reach a decision by 
consensus; only in the cases where consensus proves impossible to reach, decisions may be 
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 Ramsar Convention, “Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance especially as waterfowl habitat”, adopted at COP 10, 
Changwon (Republic of Korea), 29 October 2008, available at http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/key_rules_cop_e.pdf.  
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taken by a simple majority vote.
276
 Consensus is thus the basis for all decisions by the Ramsar 
COP; as a last resort, parties of the COP may adopt a decision by simple majority voting. 
However, in practice, parties to the Ramsar COP do not vote on the adoption of decisions, 
which have so far always been adopted by consensus. Similarly, the CITES RoP determine in 
Rule 26, on “Majority”, that decisions on substantive matters must be adopted by a two-thirds 
majority. However as in the case of Ramsar, the CITES COP does not vote on decisions but 
rather adopts them by consensus.
277
 The two-thirds majority rule is only used in the case of 
voting on amendment procedures to the annexes to the Convention, to allow for more 
flexibility in updating the convention to reflect newly emerging political consensus and 
scientific knowledge, and which is based upon a specific MEA provision. Furthermore, the 
amendment needs ratification before entering into force.
278
 The Montreal Protocol applies the 
same RoP as the Ozone Convention, with the exception of rules 1 and 2, which determine the 
“purpose” and “definitions” of the RoP respectively. Decisions on substantive matters are to 
be adopted by a two-thirds majority.
279
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 Rule 40 of the RoP adopted by the COP of the Ramsar Convention: “1. The Parties shall make every effort to 
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 Ozone Convention, “Rules of procedure for meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Vienna 
Convention and Meetings of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol”, available at 
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In case of the UNFCCC, the COP adopted the RoP at the start of its first session.
280
 These 
rules are now being used by the COP and its subsidiary bodies. Rule 42 of the RoP however, 
which contains the provisions related to “voting”, is bracketed text and has never been 
formally adopted by the COP. Therefore, since there is no consensus to adopt the rule that 
departs from consensualist decision-making, all COP decisions must be assumed to need 
consensus in order to be adopted.
281
 Looking at the practice of the COP, this is indeed what 
happens. A similar conclusion must be reached in the case of the CBD and its Cartagena 
Protocol, which apply identical RoP and where rule 40 on voting has also not been adopted so 
far and remains between brackets.
282
 Also here, the COPs have developed a similar practice of 
adopting decisions by consensus.  
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This practice of the COPs of not voting but rather adopting their decisions by means of 
consensus links into the aforementioned predominance of consensualist decision-making 
under MEAs, as codified under the VCLT. The fact that the specific rules within the RoP 
derogating from consensualist decision-making do not get adopted is proof for the contention 
that consensus remains one of the basic features of decision-making under MEAs, and 
countries are unwilling to alter this.
283
 States believe that COP decisions should be adopted by 
consensus, since these decisions possibly have an enormous impact on their obligations under 
the convention.
284
  
 
Therefore, for each decision to be taken by the COP, consensus will be sought; voting as such 
does not take place in practice. In fact, countries unhappy with the reached compromise on a 
certain decision may (and often do) put pressure on the other countries before the adoption of 
the decision by threatening to ask for a formal vote in the plenary meeting, where consensus 
must be reached in order for the decision to be adopted. This is a powerful deterrent and 
usually results in the final texts being altered to meet the demands of the concerned party and 
to ensure consensus on their adoption. If this change would be unacceptable to the other 
parties of the COP, there is another solution which is also commonly being applied. In this 
case, the parties concerned may withdraw their demand for a formal vote in return for the 
guarantee that their concerns will be formally recorded in the minutes of the meeting. This 
last situation is what Wettestad calls a “flexible consensus”.285 
 
In some very exceptional cases however, even another solution has been applied. When only 
one party has objections to the adoption of a certain COP decision and the other parties to the 
COP are unwilling to alter the decision, then this decision can, in exceptional cases, still be 
assumed to have been adopted by consensus. Also in this case the position of the dissenting 
party will be formally recorded in the minutes of the meeting. The decision will then be 
considered to have been adopted by consensus minus one.  
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Such a situation has so far occurred only twice within the context of the MEAs: the case of 
non-compliance by Russian Federation under the Montreal Protocol, and the adoption of the 
Cancun Agreements under the UNFCCC. Both situations will be briefly elaborated here.  
 
A. The Russian Federation under the Montreal Protocol 
 
Famously the Russian Federation made a statement on behalf of nine countries
286
 during the 
sixth MOP of the Montreal Protocol to the Ozone Convention, in which it requested a five-
year grace period for the implementation of the Protocol.
287
 Since the MOP decided that the 
compliance committee (the Implementation Committee) would be the best-suited forum for 
the discussion, it redirected the Russian request. The Implementation Committee considered 
the request by the Russian Federation to be a case of self-triggering and treated it as a case of 
non-compliance with the Protocol. The Russian Federation and the other countries were 
requested to draft a plan-of-action in order to restore full compliance with the Protocol. In the 
ensuing discussions the Implementation Committee failed to reach consensus on the best 
response to the non-compliance. It nonetheless forwarded a recommendation to the MOP, 
which under the Montreal Protocol has the decision-making power in cases of non-
compliance.  
 
During the next (seventh) session of the MOP, the Russian Federation, not agreeing with the 
draft decision, demanded a formal vote on the decision in the plenary. However, the MOP 
ignored the Russian demand and adopted the decision by application of “consensus minus 
one”. In the report of the meeting, the secretariat explained that: “The practice followed in the 
Meeting of the Parties to the Montreal Protocol was that, when only one Party objected to a 
draft decision, that decision would be carried by consensus and the position of the dissenting 
Party would be clearly reflected in the report of the Meeting”288. The decision imposed trade 
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restrictions on the Russian Federation which subsequently accused the MOP of acting beyond 
its powers.
289
  
 
B. The adoption of the Cancun Agreements under the UNFCCC 
 
The second example was the adoption by the COP of the UNFCCC of the so-called Cancun 
Agreements during the 16
th
 session of the COP in Cancun. It is well-known that the 
negotiations on a successor to the Kyoto Protocol have not been going according to the pre-set 
time frame. The negotiations in the COP did not lead to a consensus outcome, which lead 
some parties to the Convention to negotiate ‘agreements’ or ‘accords’, outside of the COP 
context. Where the Copenhagen Accord negotiated during COP 15 was only ‘taken note of’ 
by the COP and is therefore not to be considered a COP decision in and of itself, the Cancun 
Agreements were adopted by means of a formal COP decision.
290
  
 
These Cancun Agreements include decisions under both the Convention and Protocol 
negotiating tracks and contain provisions on adaptation, REDD+, technology, mitigation and 
finance, and include some measures to be further elaborated by COP decisions. This includes 
the elaboration of the Adaptation Committee and the Green Climate Fund, and the adoption of 
guidelines in order to ensure that information provided is complete, comparable, transparent 
and accurate.
291
 However, during the plenary, while the substantive outcome was considered 
perhaps not perfect but close to be the best available outcome, Bolivia opposed to the 
adoption of the Agreements.
292
 Bolivia reiterated its opposition to the decision, repeating the 
lack of consensus as required under the RoP. The president of the COP/MOP replied that “[...] 
consensus requires that everyone is given the right to be heard and have their views given due 
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consideration [...]. Consensus does not mean that one country has the right of veto” and that 
the president “cannot disregard the position and requests of 193 parties”. Again in this case, 
the consensus minus one was used to disregard the Bolivian opposition and the COP formally 
adopted the decision containing the Cancun Agreement.
293
 
 
The difference between the flexible consensus and the consensus minus one is thus clearly 
established and depends upon the cooperation of the dissenting party concerned. In the case of 
flexible consensus, the dissenting party willingly withdraws its objections over the adoption 
of the decision by consensus. In the case of consensus minus one the dissenting party objects 
to the adoption. Given the predominance of consensualist decision-making in international 
law and the fact that the practice of the COPs is consensualist in nature, this idea of flexible 
consensus raises interesting questions, especially related to the legal value of these decisions.  
 
V. The legal value of COP decisions 
 
A. In general public international law 
 
International law and treaty law specifically has been constructed upon the idea of 
consensualism: a state is only bound by an international obligation insofar the state has 
accepted to be bound by it. This consent may be given in an explicit or implicit manner. The 
traditional types of consent for a state to be bound by an international norm are based upon 
articles 11 through 17 of the VCLT.
294
 These procedures establish the way by which a 
convention becomes legally binding upon states. Explicitly, article 26 of the VCLT provides: 
“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith” (emphasis added).  
 
Judge Jessup in his separate opinion in the South West Sahara Cases before the ICJ 
determined that states may be “legally bound by their undertakings in a variety of 
circumstances” and that states have a broad competence in this regard, since international law 
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 See also Fitzmaurice, M., “Consent to Be Bound - Anything New under the Sun?”, Nordic Journal of 
International Law, 2005, 483-508. 
108 
 
is not a formalistic system”.295 This view was later confirmed by Article 11 of the VCLT, 
determining that “[T]he consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by 
signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession, or by any other means if so agreed” (emphasis added), meaning that, if such 
possibility has been agreed upon, states can be bound by international obligations to which 
they have acceded tacitly, or in another way.
296
  
 
It has been put forth in legal doctrine that decisions of international organisations form part of 
what is commonly referred to as “soft law”.297 For instance, decisions adopted by the UN 
General Assembly are as such not part of the formal sources of international law as defined in 
article 38 para 1 of the Statute of the ICJ.
298
 Nonetheless, these decisions are considered to 
have a “quasi-legislative” effect.299 The same is true for COP decisions under MEAs: while 
not formally part of the sources of international law and while the MEAs themselves usually 
do not determine the legal nature of COP decisions
300
, in practice their effect is hard to 
distinguish from international hard law.
301
  
 
It has also been argued that consensualist decision-making can be considered to be a formal 
expression of the consent of states to be bound by a certain decision. In other words, the 
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 One of the clearest exceptions being the OSPAR Convention, which determines in its article 13 that: “A 
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have no binding force”. See also infra, Chapter 4. 
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 For an overview of the legal doctrine concerning soft law, hard law and the interplay between them, see 
Maes, F., Hedendaagse bronnen van internationaal publiekrecht, 2005 (on file with author), specifically 12-31.  
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formal consent of the states is replaced by consensualism.
302
 This is going too far. Decisions 
adopted applying consensualist decision-making may give a strong political signal to the 
international community and may lead to an easier and more wide-spread application of the 
rule.
303
 Nevertheless, consenualism alone is insufficient to create legally binding 
obligations.
304
 In some cases states might only consent to a certain decision because they are 
under the impression that it will not formally bind them, or simply because that is the practice 
in a given international setting.
305
 In order to generate legally binding effects, the decision 
must also be formally linked to a legally binding source of law, or, failing that, additional 
legal argumentation, such as the intentions of the parties
306
, is necessary.
307
 
 
B. Under the MEAs 
 
As established supra, being multilateral treaties, the VCLT is fully applicable to the MEAs. 
Distinction must be made in this respect between on the one hand the act of establishing a 
COP, and on the other hand decisions adopted by that COP. The first situation is subject to 
the law of treaties and state consent which is then confirmed by the ratification process that 
follows the conclusion of the convention. In the second situation, namely the decisions taken 
by the COP itself once it has started acting upon the legal authority is has been granted by the 
MEA, elements of the law of international organisations come into play.  
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304
 See for instance Cassese, A., International Law in a Divided World, 1986, Oxford, Clarendon Press, at 198, 
who concludes that “consensus […] has no bearing on the legal force of the decision reached”.  
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 Maes, F., Hedendaagse bronnen van internationaal publiekrecht, 2005, at 21-22 (on file with author).  
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 ICJ, Case concerning the Temple of Preah Vihear, Cambodia v. Thailand, 26 May 1961 and 15 June 1962, 
1962 ICJ Reports 6. At 31, the ICJ determines that: “Where [...] as is general the case in international law, which 
places the principal emphasis on the intentions of the parties, the law prescribes no particular form, parties are 
free to choose what form they please provided their intention clearly results from it”.  
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 Maes, F., Hedendaagse bronnen van internationaal publiekrecht, 2005, at 23 (on file with author).  
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While Churchill and Ulfstein correctly argue that the Vienna Convention is not directly 
applicable to COP decisions, since they are not “treaties” as such, the Law of Treaties is still 
the most suited framework to analyze these decisions and the normative powers of the 
COPs.
308
 Furthermore, the moment of consent is essential in international treaty law since it is 
the moment upon which international obligations come into being and give the obligation a 
legally binding character.  
 
“[...] most treaty-related questions [are] dominated by the core concept 
of consent. In the positivist branch of traditional theory, it has been 
accepted, more or less uncritically, that international law is essentially 
a set of rules for sovereign states that cannot be bound except by their 
consent [...]”.309 
 
The MEAs themselves, exceptions notwithstanding, do not explicitly determine the legal 
status of the decisions adopted by their supreme organ. Also the parties to the MEAs are 
uncertain as to the binding nature of such decisions. For instance, when under the Basel 
Convention the COP planned on adopting a decision fundamentally altering the existing 
obligations of the parties, namely by banning the export of hazardous waste from OECD 
countries to non-OECD countries, many countries voiced their concern over the effectiveness 
of the legal regime given the fact that there was lingering uncertainty over the binding or legal 
value for the parties of this COP decision and the obligations it contained. Subsequently, 
several parties requested the official amendment procedure to be followed for the adoption of 
this decision.
310
 The next COP meeting of the parties to the convention adopted a formal 
amendment, which will enter into force only for those parties that will have explicitly 
accepted it by means of ratification.
311
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 Brunnée, J., “COPing with consent: law-making under multilateral environmental agreements”, Leiden 
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arrangements in multilateral environmental agreements: a little-noticed phenomenon in international law”, 
American Journal of International Law, 2000, 94, 623-659, particularly at 633. 
309
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 Basel Convention, “Report of the Second Meeting of the Conference of Parties to the Basel Convention”, 
Decision II/12, Doc. UNEP/CHW.2/30, 25 March 1994, available at 
http://basel.int/meetings/frsetmain.php?meetingId=1.  
311
 At the time of writing, the amendment had not yet entered into force. Basel Convention, “Decisions adopted 
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A similar situation occurred within the context of the Montreal Protocol when its MOP 
wished to establish an interim multilateral fund and several countries called the legal value of 
the COP decision into question. Also in this case the issue was resolved by application of the 
amendment procedure of the Protocol.
312
 This happened specifically because the parties of the 
Montreal Protocol were uncertain as to the legal status of their decision.  
 
Under the Montreal Protocol, the MOP may adopt “adjustments” to the annexes of the 
Protocol, which enter into force for all parties to the Protocol without ratification, or 
“amendments”, which need ratification and enter into force only for those parties that have 
accepted them by means of ratification. Because parties feared a different understanding of 
the legal status of the COP decision establishing the financial fund if the decision would not 
be underpinned with a ratification procedure, the decision was adopted as an amendment to 
the Protocol. 
 
The binding nature of a COP decision eventually rests on the powers ascribed to the COP in 
the convention text. In order to have binding effect, a COP decision should reflect an 
expression of the Parties’ intent to be bound by any given decision. The legal basis for a COP 
decision to be legally binding may be (1) explicit, in which case the general consent of the 
states parties is not called into question since the binding nature of the decision is determined 
in the MEA itself (which has been subject to ratification), or (2) implicit, which leads to much 
more ambiguity and is contested as a legal basis. Additionally, distinction must be made 
between the binding nature of COP decisions and the legal enforceability of these 
decisions.
313
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1. The legal basis is explicit 
 
As described supra, some COPs take decisions other than by consensus of which the legal 
value is determined by the convention texts themselves.
314
 Since the conventions have been 
subject to ratification procedures and states have explicitly accepted to be bound by the text of 
the convention, the legal value of these decisions is as such uncontested. 
 
a. Amendments 
 
The procedure for amendments to an international convention is often specified in the 
convention text itself, and thus, over the course of the years, several ways of dealing with 
amendments have been developed. In some exceptional cases, if an amendment is approved 
by the required majority, then the amendment will be binding and applicable upon all member 
states of the organisation, even on those member states that voted against the adoption of the 
amendment.
315
 The League of Nations Covenant on the other hand went even further and 
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 See for instance the OSPAR Convention which works under the system of opt-out – a decision is binding 
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bound by it: Convention for the protection of the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic, 1992, 2354 
UNTS 70. Article 13 para 2 of the OSPAR Convention determines: “A decision shall be binding on the expiry of 
a period of two hundred days after its adoption for those Contracting Parties that voted for it and have not within 
that period notified the Executive Secretary in writing that they are unable to accept the decision, provided that at 
the expiry of that period three-quarters of the Contracting Parties have either voted for the decision and not 
withdrawn their acceptance or notified the Executive Secretary in writing that they are able to accept the 
decision. Such a decision shall become binding on any other Contracting Party which has notified the Executive 
Secretary in writing that it is able to accept the decision from the moment of that notification or after the expiry 
of a period of two hundred days after the adoption of the decision, whichever is later”. Article 13 para 5 
determines: “Recommendations shall have no binding force”.  
315
 Most notably the Charter of the United Nations, articles 108 and 109, and the World Health Organisation 
Constitution, article 73. Articles 108 and 109 of the UN Charter determine: “Article 108: Amendments to the 
present Charter shall come into force for all Members of the United Nations when they have been adopted by a 
vote of two thirds of the members of the General Assembly and ratified in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations, including all the permanent 
members of the Security Council. Article 109: A General Conference of the Members of the United Nations for 
the purpose of reviewing the present Charter may be held at a date and place to be fixed by a two-thirds vote of 
the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any nine members of the Security Council. Each Member 
of the United Nations shall have one vote in the conference. Any alteration of the present Charter recommended 
by a two-thirds vote of the conference shall take effect when ratified in accordance with their respective 
constitutional processes by two thirds of the Members of the United Nations including all the permanent 
members of the Security Council. If such a conference has not been held before the tenth annual session of the 
General Assembly following the coming into force of the present Charter, the proposal to call such a conference 
shall be placed on the agenda of that session of the General Assembly, and the conference shall be held if so 
decided by a majority vote of the members of the General Assembly and by a vote of any seven members of the 
Security Council”. The WHO Constitution determines in article 73: “Texts of proposed amendments to this 
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applied the rule that states that did not accept a given amendment to the Covenant, while not 
bound by the amendment, ceased to be member of the organisation.
316
  
 
Such a drastic approach is however not the general rule in international law. The most 
common situation is that there are no specific provisions in the convention as to what happens 
to the dissenting states, or, as in the case of the FAO for example, that the convention 
provides that amendments will only become binding upon those states that have accepted the 
amendment.
317
  
 
Such is indeed also the case for most of the MEAs. The CBD for instance has two extensive 
provisions relating to amendments. According to articles 29 and 30 CBD (which also apply to 
the Cartagena Protocol) amendments to the convention or the protocol only take legal effect 
for those states that have accepted the amendment. The CMS, CITES and Ramsar Convention 
all identically stipulate: “An amendment adopted shall enter into force for all Parties which 
have accepted it”.318 The Ozone Convention, its Montreal Protocol and the UNFCCC and its 
Kyoto Protocol all have similar provisions. The binding nature of such amendments is 
therefore uncontested: states are bound by them only if they have ratified the amendment.
319
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 Edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, at 
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 CMS, article 10 para 5; CITES, article 17 para 3; Ramsar, article 10bis para 6. 
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 This means in practice that the outcome of amendment procedures in which not all member states accept to be 
bound and do not ratify the amendment, may be that, as Klabbers puts it, “different members are bound by 
different versions of the constituent document: member A may be bound by the original version, while members 
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Therefore, states remain in total control of the binding character of these decisions, because of 
the need for ratification before the amendments take effect. Ratification is the procedure 
which offers the most protection to states from the view of consent and respect for their 
sovereignty. There is no question about the binding nature of decisions adopted by the COPs 
containing amendments: these COP decisions are not binding upon states unless they have 
ratified them.  
 
In this regard, the Montreal Protocol to the Ozone Convention constitutes a notable case. 
According to both the Convention and the Protocol, amendments only enter into force when 
two-thirds of all parties to the convention or protocol have ratified it.
320
 However, when in 
1990 the MOP of the Montreal Protocol adopted the so-called London Amendment, it was 
explicitly stipulated that 20 ratifications would be enough for the amendment to enter into 
force, instead of the 40 that would normally be required.
321
 This practice has since become the 
standard procedure under the Montreal Protocol: all subsequent amendments have reiterated 
this particular requirement, derogating from the Protocol.
322
  
                                                                                                                                                                      
B and C, having accepted the amendment, are bound by the constituent document as amended”. While conceding 
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UNEP/OzL.Pro.2/3, 29 June 1980. 
322
 As described supra, there have been a total of four amendments to the Montreal Protocol: “The London 
Amendment (1990) changed the ODS emission schedule by requiring the complete phaseout of CFCs, halons, 
and carbon tetrachloride by 2000 in developed countries, and by 2010 in developing countries. Methyl 
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This situation has been explained in several ways. A first explanation is based on article 41 of 
the VCLT, in which it is stipulated that parties may derogate from a multilateral convention 
and conclude an agreement inter partes as long as the convention text does not prohibit this, 
the enjoyment of the other parties to the convention is not affected by the agreement and it is 
not incompatible with the effective execution of the convention.
323
 This is also the 
explanation that the parties to the Montreal Protocol themselves have given to clarify their 
practice.
324
 That means that the three subsequent amendments must be seen as inter partes 
agreements between the parties ratifying these subsequent amendments.  
 
However, this justification has been called into question. The three subsequent amendments 
adopted by the MOP have used an identical derogation of the Protocol, which would argue 
against inter partes agreements since the change (the 20 ratifications rule) is being applied 
across the board rather than on a case-by-case basis.
325
 Also Brunnée seems to follow this line 
of thought, and even goes a step further. She has argued that the MOP has, through the MOP 
decision containing the amendment, amended the protocol’s amendment procedure.326 This 
should be seen through the lens of the catch-all competence the COP/MOP has to take all 
necessary measures for the execution of the Protocol. 
 
Both the rebuke and Brunnée’s addition are argued here to be faulty. Firstly, the change is not 
being applied across the board, but is being reiterated in each and every subsequent MOP 
                                                                                                                                                                      
the phase-out of methyl bromide in developed and developing countries in 2005 and 2015, respectively. The 
Beijing Amendment (1999) included tightened controls on the production and trade of HCFCs. 
Bromochloromethane was also added to the list of controlled substances with phase-out targeted for 2004”. 
(emphasis added) Environmental Protection Agency, “Amendments to the Montreal Protocol”, available at 
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decision containing an amendment.
327
 The three subsequent amendments (Copenhagen, 
Montreal and Beijing) reiterate the derogation of the Protocol, which argues against the text of 
the London Protocol being an amendment to the amendment procedure as established by the 
Protocol. After all, if the London Amendment were amending the Protocol, why then should 
the introduced change need to be repeated in each subsequent amendment?  
 
Secondly, the amendments under the Montreal Protocol are stacked, meaning that countries 
may only ascend to any given amendment after they have ratified the former amendments, 
starting with the London Amendment.
328
 This further underlines the specificity of the 20 
ratifications rule.  
 
Lastly, Brunée’s explanation would in effect mean that the amendment procedure exists in 
two different versions: (i) the original version of the Montreal Protocol, requiring 40 
ratifications, valid for those countries that did not ratify the amendments and (ii) the version 
as adopted in the London Amendment, valid for those countries that have ratified the London 
Amendment. That does not appear to be likely and at the very least does not simplify the 
situation.
329
  
 
Another solution could be to consider the amendment procedures in light of article 31 para 
3(a) of the VCLT and of the subsequent practice of the MOP.
330
 It could be argued that in the 
case of the Montreal Protocol, the practice of derogating from the protocol’s amendment 
procedure must be considered to be part of the rules of treaty interpretation, for which the 
MOP does have the exclusive competence, and also that these rules are binding as an integral 
part of the convention. The downside of this explanation is that the MOP, while competent to 
interpret convention provisions, would have interpreted the provision of the Protocol contrary 
to its original meaning (namely: reading “20” where the text states “40”). While not a unique 
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situation in international law
331
, this also does not provide the soundest legal basis for framing 
the MOP’s practice. Therefore, it is argued that the inter partes explanation, imperfect as it is, 
remains the best framework to deal with the practice of the MOP under the Montreal Protocol. 
 
b. Amendments to annexes 
 
Also in the case of amendments to annexes, the consensus rule may in some cases be deviated 
from. This is for instance the case under the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol, where the 
parties to the convention are presumed to accept to be bound by the amendments of the 
annexes unless they specifically notify the depository of their non-acceptance of the 
amendment (this is a so-called opt-out).
332
 In this case the amendment will enter into force 
and bind those countries that have tacitly accepted it: the consent of the parties is presumed 
unless they explicitly opt-out of the agreed annex.
333
 This falls within the ambit of the “other 
means” to give consent referred to by article 11 of the VCLT, as the consent of the parties has 
been given tacitly.
334
  
 
An example of this practice may be found in the Montreal Protocol to the Ozone Convention, 
where the decisions to change the annexes to the Protocol (“adjustments”) must be taken by 
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consensus, or, failing that, two-thirds majority vote.
335
 The Protocol explicitly determines that 
such adjustments are binding upon all member states, meaning that the decision is binding 
upon states even if they object to the adoption of the adjustment.
336
 The major advantage of 
this procedure is that changes to the regime can be decided upon in a timely and efficient way, 
without ratification procedures and avoiding non-parallel commitments for parties to the same 
convention. The limit of such decisions is, in theory, that they may only adopt changes to the 
existing regime rather than establish new obligations for the parties, which would by their 
nature fall under the amendment procedure for the Protocol. At the same time, minor changes 
to an annex may have far-reaching consequences for the states parties and fundamentally alter 
the obligations of parties to the Protocols, for instance by banning a certain ozone-depleting 
substance. This may have a huge economic impact on one or more countries. As Bodansky 
has pointed out, this may give rise to questions of legitimacy. However he concludes that this 
practice can still be presumed to fall under the original consent of the states when they, 
through ratification, accepted to be bound by the MEA establishing a regime of possible 
adjustments through COP decisions adopted by majority voting.
337
  
 
A similar yet distinct situation may be found in the Cartagena Protocol to the CBD, which 
establishes a prior informed consent procedure for transboundary movement of living 
modified organisms.
338
 Article 7 para 4 of the Protocol determines that:  
 
“[T]he advance informed agreement procedure shall not apply to the 
intentional transboundary movement of living modified organisms 
identified in a decision of the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as being not likely to have 
adverse effects on the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity, taking also into account risks to human health”.  
 
This means that a MOP decision may alter (limit, in this case) the scope of the application of 
the protocol, much in line with the practice of the Montreal Protocol. However, the situation 
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is distinct from the Montreal Protocol since there is no explicit reference to the binding nature 
of this decision and because of the fact that the decision must be adopted by consensus and 
cannot be considered binding upon objecting states, since the rule on voting in the RoP has so 
far not been adopted.
339
 
 
c. Similar questions before the WTO 
 
Interestingly the binding nature of decisions adopted by the supreme plenary meeting of the 
member states based on an explicit competence is also contested in other contexts than under 
the MEAs. For instance under the WTO, the legal nature and binding character of normative 
activities by the Ministerial Conference is contested. This formed the crux of the recent 
“Clove Cigarettes” case before the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO.340  
 
- The Clove Cigarettes Case 
 
In this case, the United States banned the import of clove cigarettes from Indonesia. Indonesia 
objected and argued that this ban was a direct violation of the TBT Agreement and brought 
the case before the panel. According to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World 
Trade Organisation
341
, the Ministerial Conference, the highest plenary meeting of the WTO, is 
exclusively competent to adopt interpretative decisions of the WTO agreements.
342
 Article 2 
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 WTO, “United States – Clove Cigarettes Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes”, 
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http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/406abr_e.pdf; WTO, “United States – Measures Affecting the 
Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes. Report of the Panel”, 2 September 2011, Doc WT/DS406/R, available 
at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtopanels/us-clovecigarettes(panel).pdf. For an overview of the case 
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Discrimination in U.S. Flavored Cigarette Ban”, American Society for International Law Insight, 2012, 16 (15), 
available online at http://www.asil.org/insights120430.cfm.  
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 Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation, 1994, 1867 UNTS 154; 33 ILM 1144 
(1994) (WTO Agreement).  
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 Article IX para 2 of the WTO Agreement determines: “The Ministerial Conference and the General Council 
shall have the exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of this Agreement and of the Multilateral Trade 
Agreements. In the case of an interpretation of a Multilateral Trade Agreement in Annex 1, they shall exercise 
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para 12 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT)
343
 establishes that a 
“reasonable interval” must be allowed between the publication and entry into force of 
technical regulations, such as an import ban.
344
 A Doha Ministerial Decision adopted in 2001 
had determined that “[...] the phrase ‘reasonable interval’ shall be understood to mean 
normally a period of not less than 6 months, except when this would be ineffective in 
fulfilling the legitimate objectives pursued”.345  
 
In this particular case however the United States had allowed only 90 days for the ban on 
clove cigarettes to take effect after publication. Indonesia argued that the interpretation of the 
reasonable period should be considered as legally binding on WTO members, given that the 
Ministerial Decision is an interpretative decision under article IX para 2 of the WTO 
Agreement. The United States on the other hand argued that the Ministerial Decision cannot 
be seen as an interpretation of the WTO Agreement within the meaning of article IX para 2 of 
the WTO Agreement. According to the United States, the Doha Ministerial Decision may, at 
most, be considered as a "supplementary means of interpretation" under article 32 of the 
VCLT. The United States thus argued that the Doha Ministerial Decision cannot be 
considered as a binding interpretation of article 2 para 12 of the TBT Agreement, and neither 
the TBT Committee decision nor the Doha Ministerial decision binds the WTO membership.  
 
- Findings of the Panel 
 
The WTO panel followed Indonesia’s argument that the Ministerial Decision was to be 
considered an interpretative decision. The panel found that the Ministerial Conference has the 
exclusive authority to adopt interpretations of the WTO agreements. Since the Ministerial 
Decision was adopted by consensus, the Panel determined, all member states had had the 
opportunity to clarify the meaning of the provisions within the WTO agreements, in this case 
article 2 para 12 of the TBT Agreement. Moreover, the Panel concluded that the intention of 
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the Ministerial Decision was clearly to establish a legally binding rule, since it had adopted 
the decision containing particular wording:  
 
“This view is reinforced by the actual wording of paragraph 5.2 of the 
Doha Ministerial Decision which provides an interpretation of the 
phrase ‘reasonable interval’ using the term ‘shall be understood to 
mean ...’. The use of ‘shall’ and not, for example, of ‘should’ or ‘may’ 
appears to suggest that the intention of the Ministerial Conference, and 
thus the highest level organ of the WTO where all Members meet, was 
that paragraph 5.2 is binding”.346 
 
Furthermore, in interpreting the TBT Agreement, the Panel considered that the Ministerial 
Decision should be seen as a “subsequent agreement” in accordance with article 31 para 3(a) 
of the VCLT. The Panel thus found that the Ministerial Decision fulfilled the two basic 
requirements for it to be legally binding: it was adopted by consensus (consent) and the 
language of the decision showed the binding intent of the parties (intent).  
 
- Findings of the Appellate Body 
 
The Appellate Body on the other hand followed the reasoning of the US and determined that 
the Ministerial Declaration cannot be considered to be an interpretative decision, because 
interpretative decisions require a specific recommendation by the Council following the 
language of article IX para 2 of the WTO Agreement. Since the procedural formalities for an 
interpretative decision have not been followed in this case, the Doha Ministerial Decision 
cannot be labelled as an interpretative decision. However, the Appellate Body upheld the 
decision of the Panel when it considered that the Ministerial Decision should be considered as 
a subsequent agreement under article 31 para 3(a) of the VCLT, since the decision was 
adopted by consensus and the wording of the decision clearly outlined the intentions of the 
parties.
347
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 WTO, “United States – Clove Cigarettes Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes”, 
Report of the Appellate Body, 4 April 2012, Doc WT/DS406/AB/R, available at 
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Furthermore, the Appellate Body considered the differences in legal effect of interpretative 
decisions on the one hand and subsequent agreements under the VCLT on the other. It 
considered that:  
 
“[...] Multilateral interpretations under Article IX:2 of the WTO 
Agreement provide a means by which Members — acting through the 
highest organs of the WTO — may adopt binding interpretations that 
clarify WTO law for all Members. Such interpretations are binding on 
all Members, including in respect of all disputes in which these 
interpretations are relevant. [...] On the other hand, Article 31(3)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention is a rule of treaty interpretation, pursuant to 
which a treaty interpreter uses a subsequent agreement between the 
parties on the interpretation of a treaty provision as an interpretative 
tool to determine the meaning of that treaty provision. Pursuant to 
Article 3.2 of the DSU, panels and the Appellate Body are required to 
apply the customary rules of interpretation of public international 
law—including the rule embodied in Article 31(3)(a) of the  Vienna 
Convention—to clarify the existing provisions of the covered 
agreements. Interpretations developed by panels and the Appellate 
Body in the course of dispute settlement proceedings are binding only 
on the parties to a particular dispute”.348  
 
The situation under the WTO may be different compared to the situation under MEAs, but the 
underlying questions of the legal effect and possible binding nature of a decision adopted by 
consensus in a plenary body is clearly similar.  
 
2. The legal basis is implicit 
 
In most cases however, the legal basis for a COP decision is implicit. While later MEAs 
provide their COPs with broader competences, the COPs have also gradually interpreted their 
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competences more liberally. This also means that the legal consequences (in this case: the 
binding nature) of these decisions are much more ambiguous and potentially contested.  
 
Since the MEAs themselves do not give explicit guidance as to the legal consequences of 
COP decisions, the object and purpose of these decisions must be taken into account. Indeed, 
apart from the consent of the parties, the intention of the parties in a given COP decision is an 
essential element when determining the legally binding character of this decision.
349
 
Decisions providing the parties with advice, recommendations and guidelines are per 
definition not binding. Reference in this regard can also be made to the parallel application of 
this practice under compliance committees or procedures, where decisions based upon these 
procedures are in many cases considered to be not binding upon the parties concerned. This 
holds especially true given the facilitative, non-confrontational and voluntary nature of many 
of these non-compliance procedures.
350
 The Kyoto Protocol can serve as a prime example of 
the ambiguity of the binding nature of the COP decisions in the case where the MEA itself 
does not conclusively establish this.  
 
a. Flexible mechanisms (articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
 
Articles 6, 12 and 17 of the Kyoto Protocol call upon the MOP to adopt guidelines, rules and 
procedures for the practical implementation of the so-called flexible mechanisms under the 
Protocol; however, they do not specifically determine the binding or non-binding nature of the 
COP decisions adopted for the execution of these articles.
351
 Article 12 furthermore 
determines that the CDM flexible mechanism will be “subject to the authority and guidance of 
the Conference of the Parties”.  
 
These flexible mechanisms are essential for the application of the Protocol, and their 
workings have potentially important consequences for the parties to the Protocol. 
Nonetheless, their practical elaboration has been left to the COP/MOP. The question whether 
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or not the COP decisions elaborating these flexible mechanisms are binding on the parties is 
therefore crucial.  
 
Brunnée has argued that the specific language of article 17 of the Protocol (“principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines”) does not warrant an express authority for the COP/MOP to 
take binding decisions, meaning that the decisions may be binding – but that they are not 
necessarily so.
352
 The language of the article thus speaks against the binding nature of 
decisions adopted.  
 
It is argued here however that even though from a purely formal perspective Brunnée’s 
argument is correct, the rules relating to the flexible mechanisms must be seen as intended to 
be binding. Parties that do not breach these rules will not be held in breach of the articles of 
the Protocol themselves. These rules are thus integral part of the legally binding framework of 
the international regime to combat climate change as established by the UNFCCC and the 
Kyoto Protocol. In fact, if anything, the term “rules” seems to suggest that, at least in those 
cases, the COP decisions are intended to be binding.
353
 Furthermore, the parties to the 
Protocol themselves seem to regard them as binding.  
 
b. Compliance Committee (article 18 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
 
The fact that article 18 of the Protocol distinguishes between binding and non-binding 
consequences is an argument for Brunnée to conclude that parties did not envisage COP 
decisions based on this article to be binding.
354
  
 
This last reasoning may be called into question: article 18 only distinguishes between binding 
and non-binding consequences of the decisions taken by the subsidiary body competent to 
deal with cases of non-compliance, to be established by the COP. In other words, it could be 
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argued that in case the COP envisions the compliance mechanism to resort binding 
consequences, then the establishment of such a compliance body, committee or procedures 
must be done by means of an amendment, which is subject to ratification by the parties to the 
Protocol. In this regard it has been argued that the states clearly delimited their consent to be 
bound and adoption of procedures or mechanisms with potentially legally binding 
consequences on the parties must be done through application of the amendment procedure.
355
 
This discussion however does not prejudice the binding nature of the decisions adopted by the 
COP and is not further pursued here.  
 
C. Limits to the normative powers of the COP 
 
The question could then be posed if there are no limits at all to what the COP may decide; 
after all, as long as the decision adopted intends to establish binding effects and the parties 
accept this binding nature of the decision, then one could easily be lead to conclude that as 
long as the parties agree to it, the decision-making powers of the COPs are unlimited. This is, 
of course, not the case, at least from a theoretical perspective.  
 
Traditionally, distinction is made between COP decisions that have internal effects alone and 
decisions that create external effects also.
356
 Decisions creating internal effects only are, for 
instance, decisions relating to the establishment of subsidiary bodies to the COP, the adoption 
of Rules of Procedure, budgetary matters and the adoption of rules regarding, for instance, 
staff management. Since these decisions are taken by the COP, the highest legal authority of 
the convention and since they do not further affect (i.e.: limit or extend) the rights or 
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obligations of the parties to the convention, the binding nature of these decisions are as such 
not contested.  
 
The binding nature of COP decisions generating external effects on the other hand is not a 
given. Under the MEA, the COP has been given the authority to take measures to implement 
the convention, not to establish new obligations. Even within the context of implied powers, 
the limit to the decision-making power of the COP is that COP decisions cannot 
fundamentally alter the parties’ obligations or create new obligations. Indeed, COP decisions 
may advance the legal framework of a regime by interpreting existing norms, establishing 
subsidiary bodies and adopting procedures to implement the treaty obligations. COP decisions 
are taken to interpret and advance the implementation of the treaties. However, they may not 
create new obligations for the parties, since the parties have not formally consented to such 
decision. New obligations for the parties would have to be adopted in the form of an 
amendment and subsequent ratification procedure, which is what has happened in the 
aforementioned cases of the Basel Convention and the Montreal Protocol (see supra).  
 
That being said, in practice this position is difficult to uphold. The COP operates in a gray 
zone between its explicitly established competences and the necessities of the MEA regime. 
Especially under the treaty provisions awarding the COPs an open-ended competence to 
“exercise such other functions as are required for the achievement of the objective of the 
Convention”357, one could argue that if the COP so decides, then new obligations in the light 
of newly emerging political consensus or scientific knowledge may be required for the 
achievement of the objective of the convention. These decisions would then fall within the 
original ambit of the MEA and, consequently, under the general consent states have given the 
COP to adopt binding decisions when ratifying the convention. Especially in the case of the 
Montreal protocol, where the listing of one or more specific ozone depleting substances to one 
or another annex can generate enormous consequences, the idea that no new obligations can 
be created by the COP seems to be theoretical.  
 
This is not to say that the COPs may in effect decide anything; from a formal legal 
perspective this is not the case. The competences of the COPs are limited by the will of the 
parties as established by the MEA. However COPs have considerable leeway interpreting the 
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convention text in this respect. This is especially true given the fact that most MEAs use the 
practice to adopt their COP decisions by consensus. As established supra, the specific 
language used in a given COP decision adopted by consensus may in such cases be decisive 
for the legal effects of the decision.  
 
In the voting practice of the COPs as described supra, states that do not agree to a certain 
COP decision may have their objections noted in the minutes of the COP meeting. This also 
means that these states cannot be held to be bound by the COP decision to which they have 
protested.
358
 Naturally, such objection only leads to the state not being bound in cases where 
the legal nature of the COP decision against which the state objects has not been explicitly 
provided for by the MEA. In this regard the consensus minus one procedure as described 
supra marks the boundaries of what COPs can do while preserving the unity of the regime. 
After all, the dissenting state (the minus one) can not formally be considered to be bound by 
the decision. Therefore, establishing new obligations though this procedure is a legally risky 
undertaking because it undermines the unity of the regime and it should be avoided at all 
costs.  
 
In the case where the MEA remains silent about the binding nature of decisions adopted, 
states unwilling to accept a certain COP decision might argue that they do not consider 
themselves bound by the COP decision on the ground that the COP does not have the legal 
competence to go beyond the obligations that have been negotiated in the base conventions. 
This is the critique of the Russian Federation under the Montreal Protocol and Bolivia on the 
Cancun Agreements under the UNFCCC negotiation track. Since the decision is considered to 
be out of the mandate of the COP, these countries argue that the amendment procedure to the 
convention should be followed.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
In terms of development of international environmental law, the COPs have gradually taken 
up a central role in the decision-making process at the international level. They are legally 
autonomous and are as such not open to top-down steering – for instance through an 
environmental institution.  
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It is clear that MEAs and their COPs act in the grey zone between traditional IGOs and 
international institutional law on the one hand and the international law of treaties in which 
consent must be construed much more carefully on the other hand. The fact that COPs are 
established as not being IGOs however means that the normative competences of the COPs 
must still be regarded within the framework of international treaty law. Decision-making 
processes under the MEAs are therefore subject to the traditional concept of consent by states. 
Also, despite the evolutions within specific MEA regimes and the wish of many 
commentators notwithstanding, consensus remains the cornerstone of international law-
making.  
 
Whether the COP has explicitly been made competent by the MEA itself or the competences 
of the COP are the consequence of the further development of the legal regime, is as such 
inconsequential to the binding nature of the decisions adopted in the COP. Also the voting 
rules as such have been found not to determine the legal status of a given COP decision. The 
question is rather if, and on what basis, states have consented to be bound by a given decision, 
and if the decision intends to have binding effects on the states. The legal status of a COP 
decision thus depends upon the language and content of the decision adopted, together with 
the procedure by which the decision has been adopted and the expectations of the parties 
regarding the binding consequences of a given COP decision.  
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Chapter 3: Compliance Mechanisms in MEAs: an effective way to improve compliance? 
 
“I sometimes wish that people would put a little more emphasis 
upon the observance of the law  
than they do upon its enforcement” 
Calvin Coolidge 
 
I. Introduction359 
 
As established supra, over 500 multilateral environmental agreements are in force. These 
MEAs are multilateral treaties and as such they are subject to the 1969 VCLT. However, the 
institutional arrangements established under the MEAs are increasingly elaborate and it has 
been argued that they venture into the field of international institutional law. Nearly all MEAs 
negotiated since the early 1970s establish a plenary meeting of the parties to the treaty. These 
meetings take place either as COPs or MOPs in the case of protocols to the framework 
conventions. MOPs are generally organised back-to-back with the COPs of the framework 
conventions, a solution that has been proposed by many authors to lift at least part of the 
negotiation burden from the developing and even smaller developed countries.
360
 MOPs are 
also used in environmental agreements adopted under the auspices of the United Nations 
Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE).
361
  
 
The impressive number of decisions adopted by the COPs and MOPs as enumerated supra do 
not show to what extent all of these decisions and recommendations have been complied 
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with.
362
 Growing concern over the effective implementation of international obligation made 
that, after 2001, attention at the international level shifted from the creation of new 
environmental regulations to the implementation of and compliance with the already existing 
ones. The ministerial conference in Malmö officially recognised that the multitude of MEAs, 
each with their own decision-making procedures and insufficient compliance should be 
considered as the most important bottleneck for the application of international environmental 
law.
363
 Decision 21/27 of the UNEP Governing Council of 9 February 2001 called for the 
elaboration of non-binding guidelines on compliance with and enforcement of MEAs. An 
expert group under the auspices of UNEP was requested to draft the “Guidelines on 
Compliance and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, which were 
officially approved during the 7
th
 Special Session of the GC/GMEF on 15 February 2002 in 
Cartagena.
364
 The guidelines aim to support governments, MEA secretariats, international and 
regional organisations, NGOs, private actors and stakeholders in their search for improved 
compliance. UNEP is assigned an important coordinating role to collaborate with other 
organisations to ensure application of the Guidelines. The importance of the accurate and full 
implementation of environmental treaties has since been repeated on numerous occasions, a.o. 
by the ministers for the environment during the UNECE Conference in Kiev in 2003
365
, and 
by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) meeting in September 2005.
366
 
 
In this chapter, the different compliance mechanisms found in MEAs are discussed and it is 
researched how effective they are to improve overall compliance with the international 
obligations emanating from the MEAs. To this end, the practice of 22 MEAs and their 
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respective subsidiary bodies and procedures dealing with compliance issues is examined. 
Their practice is compared to the classic dispute settlement mechanisms in public 
international law and conclusions are drawn on the effectiveness of the compliance 
mechanisms established by the MEAs.
367
 For the scope of this chapter, the term “MEA” must 
be understood to also include regional environmental agreements adopted under the auspices 
of the UNECE.
368
 Firstly, the terms ‘compliance’, ‘implementation’ and ‘enforcement’ will be 
defined (II) and the different causes of non-compliance and the possible consequences and 
responses by the compliance mechanisms are examined (III). The evolution of compliance 
mechanisms under the MEAs is investigated under (IV). A selection of the obligations 
resulting from the compliance mechanisms are examined (V), namely the obligation to 
provide information, performance review and verification of information. A round-up of the 
characteristics of the current compliance mechanisms is made in (VI) by means of a 
comparative analysis; the practical application of the different mechanisms and procedures is 
put to the test under (VII). Finally, these compliance procedures are put in contrast to the 
classical dispute settlement resolution in international law (VIII).  
 
Apart from the discussed compliance mechanisms there are multiple other means to either 
stimulate or enforce treaty compliance.
369
 These means, e.g. trade-related measures or the 
invoking of state-responsibility, are not within the scope of this chapter.  
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 See for instance: Cassese, A., International Law 2
nd
 edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, 
specifically 278–313; Wolfrum, R., Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of International 
Environmental Law, Recueil des cours de l’académie de droit international 272, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 
1998, 36–109; Birnie, P. W., Boyle, A. E. and Redgwell, C., International Law and the Environment (Third 
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II. Definition of compliance and compliance mechanisms in international environmental 
law 
 
The UNEP Guidelines define compliance as “the fulfilment by contracting parties of their 
obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and any amendments to the 
multilateral environmental agreement”. Implementation refers to: “inter alia, all relevant laws, 
regulations, policies and other measures and initiatives that contracting parties adopt and/or 
take to meet their obligations under a multilateral environmental agreement and its 
amendments if any”. Enforcement means “the range of procedures and actions employed by a 
State, its competent authorities and agencies to ensure that organisations or persons, 
potentially failing to comply with environmental law or regulations implementing multilateral 
environmental agreements, can be brought or returned into compliance and/or punished 
through civil, administrative or criminal action”.370 The same definitions are used by the 
UNECE in their Guidelines, as adopted by the ministers for the environment in Kiev (May 
2003).
371
 This is not surprising, since the UNECE guidelines build upon the UNEP 
Guidelines.  
 
The UNEP Guidelines and the UNECE Guidelines both recognise the legal autonomy of each 
and every environmental convention.
372
 MEAs have a unique and independent legal status, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Edition), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 214–237. Birnie et al. link state responsibility with 
environmental damage. However this model is not well suited to enhance and enforce compliance with 
international environmental law or the MEAs. 
370
 UNEP, “Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, Doc 
UNEP/SS.VII/4, February 2002 (UNEP Guidelines). For alternative definitions: see, for instance, Underdal, A., 
The politics of international environmental management, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Press, 1998; Brown 
Weiss, E. and Jacobson, H. K. (eds.), Engaging countries: strengthening compliance with international 
environmental accords, Global Environmental Accord Series Cambridge, MIT press, 1998; for a general 
empirical study, see Breitmeier, H., Young, O. R. and Zürn, M., Analyzing international environmental regimes. 
From case study to database, Cambridge, MIT Press, 2006.  
371
 UNECE, “Declaration by the Environment Ministers of the region of the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Europe”, Doc ECE/CEP/94/Rev.1, 23 May 2003, para 17. The guidelines themselves may be 
found here: UNECE, “Guidelines for strengthening compliance with and implementation of multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs) in the ECE Region”, Doc ECE/CEP/107, 23 May 2003 (UNECE 
Guidelines). 
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 UNEP Guidelines, para 5 “The Guidelines acknowledge that compliance mechanisms and procedures should 
take account of the particular characteristics of the agreement in question”; UNECE Guidelines, para 1: “The 
purpose of these Guidelines is […], recognizing that each agreement is negotiated in a unique way and enjoys its 
own independent legal status”. 
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making it impossible to construct a uniform compliance mechanism for all of the 
environmental treaties without overcoming distinct legal challenges.
373
  
 
Compliance mechanisms may entail the following elements:  
 
“1. A requirement for information reviewing national performance of 
MEA obligations (‘performance review information’); 2. 
Institutionalized multilateral procedures to consider apparent instances 
of non–compliance (‘multilateral non-compliance procedures’); 3. 
Multilateral measures adopted to respond to non-compliance (‘non-
compliance response measures’); and 4. Dispute settlement 
procedures”.374  
 
Despite the fact that the classical dispute settlement procedure is also a form of 
implementation and compliance control, it is argued that this judicial dispute settlement needs 
to be seen as separate from the (more) political dispute settlement.
375
 
 
A compliance mechanism under an MEA can therefore be defined as a body of procedures, 
ranging from the gathering of information, consideration of the information provided, the 
causes and degree of non-compliance and the decision-making by the COP, MOP or a 
specifically designed and designated ‘Compliance Committee’ in regard to a party to the 
treaty that encounters difficulties in meeting the treaty requirements.
376
 The UNEP Guidelines 
define them more generically as follows: “Compliance mechanisms are the systems adopted 
under MEAs to promote compliance”.377 
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III. Cause and effect of non-compliance with MEAs: manage or enforce? 
 
Both doctrine and state practice agree that non-compliance with MEAs is mainly due to 
capacity issues, communication issues and obscure internal division of competences. Reasons 
for non-compliance could entail: 1. the authorities responsible for implementation are 
unaware of the existence of the treaty obligation; 2. lack of political momentum for the 
implementation of the treaty or unawareness of the need to implement; 3. limited technical, 
administrative and financial capacity, including insufficient preparation in the law-making 
process; 4. deficient coordination between the different national authorities involved; 5. lack 
of clarity of the data provided or the technical knowledge necessary to interpret and 
implement them is unavailable to the authorities; 6. lack of monitoring and revision of (the 
need of) implementation; 7. issues with the interpretation of legal concepts (a.o. as a result of 
translations) meaning that it becomes unclear which rules and instruments are to be applied in 
the implementation of the treaty; 8. incapacity to involve public opinion and a lack of social 
awareness and pressure; 9. insufficient budget; 10. changes in the economic circumstances; 
and 11. unforeseen and unpredictable costs that come with the implementation of the treaty 
obligation.
378
  
 
All countries are susceptible to all of the above elements, but the capacity problem is a 
structural issue in a majority of developing countries (see also infra). In many developing 
countries the financial, technical and/or governance capacity is lacking to correctly execute 
MEAs. But also economies in transition and developed countries may encounter compliance 
issues.
379
 A study by UNEP shows that in order to prevent non-compliance more attention 
should be given to the preparations of the negotiations of new MEAs, the effective 
participation in these negotiations, the nature of the obligations, the way to execute them (by 
means of new legislation, administrative arrangements, …) and to make a realistic estimate of 
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 See also UNECE Guidelines, para 5. 
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 See UNECE, “Implementation of UNECE Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, 
ECE/BELGRADE.CONF/2007/12, 1 October 2003, 3-9. Under the Rotterdam Convention, Belgium, Greece and 
Portugal were unable to transfer their implementation plans under article 7 of the Convention to the secretariat; 
France and Luxemburg were respectively 10 and 14 months late with their implementation plans. See UNEP, 
“Implementation plans transmitted to the Conference of the Parties”, Doc UNEP/POPS/COP.4/INF/25, 27 
February 2009. For a broader view on the burden placed on nations by the multitude of international meetings 
and obligations and their effect on the legitimacy of international law as a whole, see also Bodansky, D., “The 
legitimacy of international governance: a coming challenge to international environmental law?”, American 
Journal of International Law, 1999, 93, 596-624.  
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both costs and capacity to implement.
380
 In May 2006 UNEP launched a handbook on 
negotiating MEAs
381
 and in June 2006 a “Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of 
MEA’s”382 intended as a tool to help use the Guidelines. Early in 2006 UNEP created a 
platform where experts, governmental officials, MEAs and citizens could discuss improving 
compliance with MEAs. This is the so-called Colombo Process, named after the Sri Lankan 
capital where the first meeting of the group took place.
383
  
 
Non-compliance with an MEA can have one or more of several possible consequences. The 
bigger the financial disadvantage for a party resulting from the non-compliance of other 
parties, the bigger the incentive to pursue actions and possibly even sanctions may be. In 
general, two distinct compliance theories are being applied; the debate between adherents of 
the facilitative approach (or managerial school of thought) versus the punitive (or 
enforcement) school of thought is a traditional debate on how the international community 
should deal with non-compliance with international obligations. With regards to international 
environmental law, Chayes and Chayes
384
, and Downs et al.
385
 respectively have advocated 
the two schools of thought.  
 
Chayes and Chayes argue that international agreements generally are highly complied with – 
much in line with the well-known observation by Henkin that “Almost all nations observe 
almost all principles of international law and all of their obligations almost all of the time”386. 
Institution building is of the essence, as is good management, in order to reach this status and, 
in general, to good overall treaty compliance. Facilitative measures as promoted by the 
managerial school are therefore meant to help defaulting contracting Parties to reach full 
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compliance with the MEA as soon as possible, as these countries are considered willing yet 
unable to comply.  
 
Examples of facilitative measures are information exchange, advice and technical and/or 
financial assistance. Since these measures aim to provide assistance and stem from the idea 
that non-compliant states are in se of good will yet unable to reach full compliance, they 
attempt to manage cases of non-compliance rather than apply coercion and sanctions upon 
them, and are essentially non-confrontational in nature. The management school assumes that 
non-compliance can in most cases be traced back to unclear treaty provisions, capacity issues 
of states and social and economic changes beyond the control of the state involved. In other 
words, states do not have the intention not to comply with treaty obligations – which is 
exactly why this school of thought prefers a softer approach in dealing with non-compliance. 
The quintessential task of a compliance mechanism is to, in a timely fashion, determine a 
situation of non-compliance and respond to this with measures that will enable the party 
involved to, as soon as possible, reach full compliance with the treaty obligation.
387
  
 
Downs et al. on the other hand believe otherwise. They start from the idea that international 
institutions are largely ineffective, because successful regulation demands a central authority 
with the power to coerce non-compliant parties, a rare situation in international relations.
388
 In 
addition, the degree of non-compliance and the quality of collaboration should also be taken 
into account.
389
 Enforcement measures therefore are primarily punitive in nature and seek to 
dissuade contracting Parties, considered able yet unwilling to comply, to evade compliance. 
As such, on-site inspections or fact-finding missions, judicial proceedings (such as dispute 
settlement procedures), official warnings and financial penalties are considered viable ways to 
ensure that a party does not evade inconvenient commitments based on opportunism. 
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Enforcement measures in case of non-compliance can also be preventive in nature if the cost 
of the sanction is higher than the cost for a party to reach compliance with the treaty 
obligation. On the other hand these measures can incite the sanctioned party to terminate its 
membership to the treaty, which could disturb existing balances in the treaty regime.
390
  
 
The two approaches differ greatly from each other in point of departure and the way in which 
they look at states and interstate relations. Seeing the broad array of responsive measures to 
cases of non-compliance, going from official warnings, trade sanctions and compensations, to 
financial aid mechanisms, respite and technical assistance, one could question which of these 
mechanisms provides the best results in terms of actual compliance. Unfortunately, there is no 
unequivocal answer to that question, and it would be overly ambitious to try and settle the 
matter here. What is clear though is that strong punitive measures alone do not constitute a 
strong agreement.
391
 On the contrary, empirical research appears to side with the managerial 
approach.  
 
Research by Breitmeier et al. has shown that managerial measures are effective in 86% of the 
reviewed cases whereas enforcement measures are effective in 55% of the cases.
392
 The study 
also found that overall compliance with the existing MEAs is surprisingly high. In a large 
majority of the cases, compliance is complete or even exceeds the treaty requirements, 
especially with high-profile states such as the United States.
393
 Looking at the compliance 
mechanisms that accompany the MEAs, it is clearly the managerial approach which is by far 
the most commonly used instrument, and what is more, it also appears to be the most 
successful. Above this, perhaps unsurprisingly, states themselves seem to believe that the 
managerial approach is the better helping hand when they are faced with compliance 
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problems.
394
 Furthermore, capacity building and notices of violation prove to be the most 
effective means to address and solve cases of non-compliance.
395
  
 
At first sight these findings seem to firmly endorse the managerial school of thought, with a 
clear advantage for facilitative measures as the preferred solution to cases of non-compliance. 
However, practice and the numerical data stemming from the MEA secretariats themselves 
show that the best results in terms of treaty compliance are achieved with a mix of both 
facilitative and punitive measures and that having only one of the two available greatly 
decreases overall compliance. Above this, not only the responsive measures provided by the 
compliance mechanism make good compliance. The best results in ways of compliance are 
achieved with a standing committee, rather than an ad-hoc body, looking into cases of non-
compliance in a non-confrontational (or broad) manner. Clearer treaty obligations also make 
for better compliance, as does the presence of important states serving as pioneers.
396
  
 
In light of the ongoing debate on common but differentiated responsibilities, it is striking to 
note that in the cases where some groups of countries (such as the developing countries in the 
case of the Montreal Protocol, or the non-Annex-I countries under the Kyoto Protocol) are 
granted respite, e.g. in terms of the deadline by which a certain target must be met, overall 
compliance falls dramatically.
397
 This could be seen as a confirmation of the theory that non-
compliance is mostly due to lack of resources. The Montreal Protocol is also usually cited as 
an example where a soft approach has been known to work effectively
398
, despite the fact that 
its obligations are measurable, i.e. a quantifiable reduction of the production and consumption 
of ozone depleting substances in order to reach a quasi-zero production and consumption.
399
 
The success of the Protocol is also in many ways dependent upon the availability of other 
substances that provided the perfect substitution for a number of ozone depleting 
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substances.
400
 This possibility to substitute is not always available; most certainly it is not 
available under the Kyoto Protocol. Because of a lack of substitutes on the short or even 
middle-long term, the urgency of the need to diminish the emission of greenhouse gasses and 
the economic benefits a party could gain from the use of the flexible mechanisms, the Kyoto 
Protocol approaches compliance issues with a combination of both the management and 
enforcement school, which means that punishment is linked to failing to reach fixed emission 
reduction targets, which is an obligation limited to developed countries.  
 
IV. Evolution of compliance and compliance mechanisms 
 
As noted before, MEAs are subject to the 1969 VCLT
401
, and the cardinal rule of treaty law 
expressed in article 26, pacta sunt servanda (literally: “agreements must be served”), is fully 
applicable to these multilateral environmental treaties.
402
 Non-compliance with the 
obligations set forth in an MEA is therefore a breach of this rule and may lead to state 
responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under international law.
403
 Indeed, the 
binding quality of an international treaty should as such be dissociated with compliance and 
enforcement procedures: a treaty is binding and should be performed in good faith by its own 
nature, not because a compliance mechanism is available to deal with enforcement issues. In 
other words: “The law is not binding because it is enforced: it is enforced because it is already 
binding”.404 At the same time, as noted supra in Chapter 2, MEAs have been in evolution 
since the early 1970s. Before that, an international treaty (1) either established no permanent 
institutional structures at all, which in many cases lead to an ineffective regime, or (2) to the 
establishment of permanent IGOs, which in many cases meant the creation of an unwieldy 
administration.
405
 The system of the COPs can therefore be seen as a medium between these 
two classic solutions.  
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Where early treaties of the former century relied mainly on the principles of reciprocity, due 
diligence and political self-control, without reference to developed compliance mechanisms, 
more recent MEAs (mostly after 1992) commonly have a legal basis for the development of 
compliance regimes, in the form of a clause in the text of the treaty itself, anticipating 
potential non-compliance by the contracting Parties. For those (usually older) MEAs who lack 
such a specific clause, a compliance mechanism may be created based on a decision of the 
COP or MOP, based on the implied powers theory.
406
 It is now common practice for MEAs to 
provide the COP with the explicit competence to install compliance mechanisms, and for 
these compliance mechanisms to become more elaborate. Most MEAs contain a so-called 
enabling clause, which usually serves a double purpose: apart from establishing the 
competence of the COP (or other institutional arrangement) to adopt compliance procedures 
and/or mechanisms, it also establishes an obligation to use this competence and adopt specific 
compliance procedures, sometimes within an explicit time-frame. For example, art 34 of the 
Cartagena Protocol provides that: “The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of 
the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first meeting, consider and approve cooperative 
procedures and institutional mechanisms to promote compliance with the provisions of this 
Protocol and to address cases of non-compliance [...]”. While such clauses constitute a legally 
binding mandate for the COP, their effect has been fragmentary: the COP/MOP for the 
Cartagena Protocol has established a Compliance Committee at its first COP/MOP
407
; the 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture
408
 (PGR) on the 
other hand, which has a similar treaty provision, has had four COPs without reaching 
agreement on the compliance mechanism that should be established. The Montreal Protocol 
did also not succeed at its first COP meeting and reached agreement only on an interim basis 
at its second COP. An enabling clause makes the competence and duty of the COP to 
establish compliance mechanisms explicit and clear and should be seen as a declaration of 
intent by the negotiating parties to address compliance issues through the establishment of a 
compliance procedure.  
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It should be noted that the compliance mechanisms approved so far in the different MEAs 
differ very much in terms of measures that can be taken in cases of non-compliance, with a 
clear majority of regimes allowing only for facilitative measures and no (or only very limited) 
enforcement measures.
409
 Victor has argued that an evolution is taking place: in this rationale, 
the Kyoto Protocol with its detailed and potentially strict compliance mechanism and 
punishments is to be seen as the evolutionary next step towards stricter enforcement and 
enforcement procedures.
410
 The decision-making power resides not longer solely with the 
COP/MOP, yet with a standing enforcement committee, which is no longer a purely 
subsidiary body to the COP with advisory or recommendatory powers, but is able and legally 
competent to take binding decisions vis-à-vis non-compliant treaty parties. Also in older 
regimes, e.g. the Montreal Protocol dating from 1987, Victor argues, enforcement is 
becoming gradually stricter. Despite the guiding principle of cooperation and the search for an 
“amicable solution”411, he claims that there has been a gradual hardening in the way persistent 
non-compliance is being addressed, including more resort to punitive measures rather than 
facilitation.  
 
The Montreal protocol’s possible non-compliance counter-measures consist of “appropriate 
assistance”, “cautions” and “suspension”.412 This may seem like a healthy mix of facilitation 
and enforcement; however, in real terms, in the 20 years that the compliance mechanism has 
been in force, “no (...) party was deprived of assistance nor were any steps taken to suspend 
rights and privileges (...)”413. Indeed, from the early years of the coming into force of the 
protocol, when many contracting Parties had severe difficulties meeting the reporting 
requirements of the treaty, the compliance committees have always been tolerant towards 
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cases of non-compliance and there are no signs that this attitude is changing. Another 
argument against a gradual hardening of positions is the fact that two compliance mechanisms 
that are overall facilitative in nature have been developed after the Kyoto protocol.
414
 The 
Basel Convention provides mostly facilitative measures, and “the authority of the compliance 
mechanism of the Basel convention largely rests with the cooperation and consent of the very 
Party which is not in compliance with the obligation”415. Similarly, the compliance 
mechanism under the Cartagena Protocol, dating from 2004, is designed to help states reach 
compliance in cases of non-compliance, rather than punish them. It is therefore submitted that 
there is no unambiguous trend towards more punitive and confrontational application of the 
existing compliance mechanisms, but rather that the Kyoto Protocol’s compliance regime 
takes a unique position in the spectrum of possible non-compliance responses.
416
  
 
Despite the fact that international environmental law is not evolving towards the application 
of more enforcement and punitive measures, it is clear that international environmental 
treaties are evolving towards more detailed compliance mechanisms, as an addition to 
traditional international law. There are multiple and diverse reasons behind this shift toward 
more and more detailed compliance mechanisms. Firstly, the creation of more detailed 
compliance mechanisms coincides with a growing sense of urgency in international 
environmental affairs. The degrading environment (and the growing public awareness of it) 
puts pressure on states from various angles. This creates an incentive with policy-makers and 
negotiators to tackle non-compliance issues in a more visible and detailed way. Compliance 
mechanisms are one way to answer to the call for more stringent environmental regimes.  
 
Secondly, non-compliance can produce significant pay-offs, meaning that economical 
incentives can easily create free-rider behaviour, and therefore, a system of tighter compliance 
                                                     
414
 Brunnee, J., “Enforcement mechanisms in international law and international environmental law”, in 
Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P. T. and Wolfrum, R. (eds.), Ensuring compliance with multilateral environmental 
agreements. A dialogue between practitioners and academia, Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006, at 21. 
415
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 For instance, the cases of Greece and Croatia under the Kyoto Protocol. And even here, the stringent 
character of the outcome of the cases may be called into question: in the case of Croatia, an exceptional tailor-
made deal was made to assign the country extra assigned amount units (AAUs), based on “the unique and 
exceptional nature of Croatia’s situation”. See Protocol on Certain Arrangements concerning a Possible Once-off 
Transfer of Assigned Amount Units Issued under the Kyoto Protocol to Croatia, as well as the related 
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control is in order. Where due diligence used to suffice as an incentive to comply with 
international obligations, today the economic importance of international agreements, 
including the environmental ones, is too all-encompassing to leave much to chance. The 
dispute settlement system of the WTO is a well-known example of a compliance mechanism 
that is considered successful because of its effective economic retaliation in case of non-
compliance. Similarly, CITES provides an economically persuasive measure. The 
convention’s aim is to ensure that international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants 
does not threaten their survival. In cases of persistent non-compliance, the offending Party can 
be suspended from trade in CITES specimens, a sanction that has been imposed on a number 
of Parties as a measure of last resort.
417
 This is done by a recommendation by the Standing 
Committee to all member states of the convention not to trade with the non-compliant state 
until the situation of non-compliance has been resolved. Therefore it could be argued that the 
compliance committee itself does in fact not have the competence to apply this sanction; it 
rather gives non-binding trade recommendations to the other parties of the convention. More 
detailed compliance mechanisms provide a form of insurance for compliant parties that the 
sometimes expensive measures they have enacted will not go to waste and that possible free-
riding will be addressed.  
 
Finally, it is clear from assessments of state practice that the traditional means to address non-
compliance (withdrawal, suspension, termination, arbitration, and judicial means) are not 
commonly used. They are legal and confrontational in nature and the majority of the cases of 
non-compliance with MEAs are rooted in capacity or political problems rather than legal 
ones. Therefore states in general are not inclined to act against their fellow treaty Parties. 
After all, no state has a perfect record and could expect retaliation. This is very visible in 
compliance mechanisms that provide the possibility of party-to-party trigger, meaning that 
one Party can initiate a non-compliance procedure against another Party. With the 
aforementioned Montreal Protocol for instance no Party ever submitted any complaint 
regarding non-compliance against another Party, even though party-to-party trigger of the 
compliance mechanisms is legally possible and many Parties have encountered serious 
problems reaching full compliance with the Protocol’s obligations.418  
                                                     
417
 UNEP, “Measures in cases of repeated non-compliance”, Doc UNEP/CBD/BS/COP-MOP/3/2/Add.1, 10 
January 2006. 
418
 Sarma, K. M., “Compliance with the multilateral environmental agreements to protect the ozone layer”, in 
Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P. T. and Wolfrum, R. (eds.), Ensuring compliance with multilateral environmental 
144 
 
The compliance mechanism of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary 
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
419
 (Basel Convention), as another 
example, operates under the principle to “promote cooperation between all parties”420 and 
thus is expressly non-confrontational in nature. Rather than emphasising individual cases of 
non-compliance, the Basel compliance mechanism focuses on general review, meaning in 
practice that compliance difficulties are dealt with abstractly.
421
 The same approach with the 
use of non-confrontational remedies is used under the Cartagena Protocol.  
 
V. Common elements found in compliance mechanisms 
 
The multitude of MEAs also means that there are considerable differences in the 
implementation procedures and compliance regimes of the MEAs. For instance, the CBD 
COP has established a Working Group on the Review of Implementation
422
; Ramsar has 
established the Oversight Panel to monitor and report on its Communication, Education, 
Participation and Awareness Programme
423
; CMS does not have any implementation or 
compliance body – instead the COP itself is responsible for reviewing implementation and 
compliance of the member states. The Cartagena Protocol has a standing Compliance 
Committee at its disposal, pursuant to a COP/MOP decision based on the enabling clause of 
the Protocol.
424
 Lastly, the CITES COP has established a compliance procedure in which the 
COP itself and the so-called Standing Committee are assigned specific tasks to ensure and 
enhance compliance with the convention.
425
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Both the CITES and the Cartagena Protocol’s compliance bodies are standing bodies, with the 
explicit mandate to review the implementation of the convention in a non-confrontational 
manner. If non-compliance measures are taken they must be aimed at the long-term 
implementation of the convention, for instance, by helping non-compliant parties. This is in 
both cases a clear manifestation of a facilitative approach in cases of non-compliance with the 
conventions. The conventions thus have mechanisms to deal with non-compliance which 
could be described as being in different states of development: from no specific compliance 
mechanism at all (CBD and CMS) over a soft and partial mechanism (Ramsar) to a complete, 
standing and autonomous compliance mechanism (CITES and Cartagena). At the same time, 
the purpose of the compliance mechanisms and the way that these bodies deal with cases of 
non-compliance is similar: it is non-confrontational and facilitative in nature. Similarly, the 
compliance mechanisms all deal with questions about implementation using the same 
techniques: firstly, information is gathered (A), after which this information is reviewed and 
assessed by the competent organs (B). Finally a decision on responsive measures is made (C). 
 
A. Reporting obligations on the execution of environmental treaties  
 
Performance review is an essential element in the compliance procedures of most MEAs. In 
general terms, parties to MEAs are obliged to provide the competent treaty body with 
information on the implementation of and compliance with the treaty as the first (and in some 
cases, only) step in the process of performance review (this is the so-called ‘self-reporting’). 
Similarly, collaborative efforts at the international level are dependent upon parties’ trust in 
other parties’ commitments and efforts to reach compliance with all provisions of the 
international treaty. Transparency is a first step towards reaching this mutual trust and an 
important incentive for compliance.
426
  
 
Environmental treaties concretise the obligation for states to provide information by defining 
the cases in which information has to be provided and by establishing procedures to do so. 
The information provided is then communicated to states with specific interests in the case or 
the treaty body competent to collect the information. There are multiple types of obligations 
to provide information, such as: 1. providing information to a state that might potentially be 
harmed, either directly or through a competent authority, in case of accidents or emergency 
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situations that could cause loss or pollution in that specific state
427
; 2. the exchange of 
scientific data and information on the environment and an assessment of the consequences of 
environmental pollution; 3. information concerning environmental impact assessments; 4. 
information on the execution of treaty obligations to the competent treaty-body. The latter 
usually entails the obligation to periodically submit monitoring data and the legal and 
administrative proof that treaty obligations are being complied with. These may include “a 
summary of laws, policies and other measures that a party has enacted to implement a 
multilateral environmental agreement, along with statistical data related to performance”428. 
Also, trade figures or data on the use, storage and management of certain substances may be 
included. This allows other treaty parties and the treaty secretariat to assess the execution of 
the treaty. This is the so-called ‘performance review information’ procedure that can be found 
in practically all environmental treaties and is based on self-assessment and reporting by the 
treaty signatories.
429
 Reporting obligations on the CBD and its Cartagena Protocol are 
organised through the COP and the COP/MOP respectively.
430
 CITES, the Basel Convention, 
the Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (Stockholm Convention) and the Montreal 
Protocol oblige parties to the treaty to provide extra information on international transactions 
through statistics on import and export.
431
 The Convention on Prior Informed Consent
432
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meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the 
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 CITES, article VIII para 7: “Each Party shall prepare periodic reports on its implementation of the present 
Convention and shall transmit to the Secretariat: (a) an annual report containing a summary of the information 
specified in sub-paragraph (b) of paragraph 6 of this Article; and (b) a biennial report on legislative, regulatory 
and administrative measures taken to enforce the provisions of the present Convention”; Basel Convention, 
article 13 para 3: “The Parties, consistent with national laws and regulations, shall transmit, through the 
Secretariat, to the Conference of the Parties established under Article 15, before the end of each calendar year, a 
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(Rotterdam Convention) is exceptional in this respect in that it does not stipulate any 
reporting obligations.
433
 The International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 
by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter
434
 (London Convention) demands that dumping 
permits are officially communicated, including what was dumped, where and when, and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
movements of hazardous wastes or other wastes in which they have been involved, including: (i) The amount of 
hazardous wastes and other wastes exported, their category, characteristics, destination, any transit country and 
disposal method as stated on the response to notification; (ii) The amount of hazardous wastes and other wastes 
imported, their category, characteristics, origin, and disposal methods; (iii) Disposals which did not proceed as 
intended; (iv) Efforts to achieve a reduction of the amount of hazardous wastes or other wastes subject to 
transboundary movement; (c) Information on the measures adopted by them in implementation of this 
Convention; (d) Information on available qualified statistics which have been compiled by them on the effects on 
human health and the environment of the generation, transportation and disposal of hazardous wastes or other 
wastes; (e) Information concerning bilateral, multilateral and regional agreements and arrangements entered into 
pursuant to Article 11 of this Convention; (f) Information on accidents occurring during the transboundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous wastes and other wastes and on the measures undertaken to deal with them; 
(g) Information on disposal options operated within the area of their national jurisdiction; (h) Information on 
measures undertaken for development of technologies for the reduction and/or elimination of production of 
hazardous wastes and other wastes; and (i) Such other matters as the Conference of the Parties shall deem 
relevant.”; Stockholm Convention, article 15: “1. Each Party shall report to the Conference of the Parties on the 
measures it has taken to implement the provisions of this Convention and on the effectiveness of such measures 
in meeting the objectives of the Convention. 2. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat: (a) Statistical data on 
its total quantities of production, import and export of each of the chemicals listed in Annex A and Annex B or a 
reasonable estimate of such data; and (b) To the extent practicable, a list of the States from which it has imported 
each such substance and the States to which it has exported each such substance. 3. Such reporting shall be at 
periodic intervals and in a format to be decided by the Conference of the Parties at its first meeting”; Montreal 
Protocol, article 7: “Reporting of data: 1. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat, within three months of 
becoming a Party, statistical data on its production, imports and exports of each of the controlled substances in 
Annex A for the year 1986, or the best possible estimates of such data where actual data are not available. 2. 
Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat statistical data on its production, imports and exports of each of the 
controlled substances in Annex B and Annexes I and II of Group C for the year 1989; in Annex E, for the year 
1991, or the best possible estimates of such data where actual data are not available, not later than three months 
after the date when the provisions set out in the Protocol with regard to the substances in Annexes B, C and E 
respectively enter into force for that Party. 3. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat statistical data on its 
annual production (as defined in paragraph 5 of Article 1) of each of the controlled substances listed in Annexes 
A, B, C and E and, separately, for each substance, Amounts used for feedstocks,Amounts destroyed by 
technologies approved by the Parties, and Imports from and exports to Parties and non-Parties respectively, for 
the year during which provisions concerning the substances in Annexes A, B, C and E respectively entered into 
force for that Party and for each year thereafter. Each Party shall provide to the Secretariat statistical data on the 
annual amount of the controlled substance listed in Annex E used for quarantine and pre-shipment applications. 
Data shall be forwarded not later than nine months after the end of the year to which the data relate. 3 bis. Each 
Party shall provide to the Secretariat separate statistical data of its annual imports and exports of each of the 
controlled substances listed in Group II of Annex A and Group I of Annex C that have been recycled. 4. For 
Parties operating under the provisions of paragraph 8 (a) of Article 2, the requirements in paragraphs 1, 2, 3 and 
3 bis of this Article in respect of statistical data on imports and exports shall be satisfied if the regional economic 
integration organisation concerned provides data on imports and exports between the organisation and States that 
are not members of that organisation”. See also UNEP, “Compliance mechanisms under selected multilateral 
environmental agreements”, Nairobi, 2007, at 40-41, 58, 68 and 74. 
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1972, 1046 UNTS 120.  
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methods used.
435
 The CMS obliges its parties to inform the other parties of the status of the 
protected species in their jurisdiction.
436
 Annex-I parties to the UNFCCC are obliged to 
provide yearly inventories on the emission of greenhouse gasses and the storage of these 
gasses in sinks.
437
 Additionally, the convention requires these countries to give a detailed 
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1995), the Agreement on the Conservation of Small Cetaceans of the Baltic and North Seas (ASCOBANS) (New 
York, 1992), and the Agreement on the Conservation of Cetaceans in the Black Sea Mediterranean Sea and 
Contigous Atlantic Area (ACCOBAMS) (Monaco, 1996). For an overview of these agreements and others, such 
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 UNFCCC, article 12 determines in relevant parts: “Communication of information related to implementation. 
1. In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall communicate to the Conference of the Parties, 
through the secretariat, the following elements of information: (a) A national inventory of anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, to 
the extent its capacities permit, using comparable methodologies to be promoted and agreed upon by the 
Conference of the Parties; (b) A general description of steps taken or envisaged by the Party to implement the 
Convention; and (c) Any other information that the Party considers relevant to the achievement of the objective 
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further considered by the Conference of the Parties. […] 8. Any group of Parties may, subject to guidelines 
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overview of their policies and the package of measures they will adopt in order to achieve 
emission reductions and storage of greenhouse gasses in sinks.
438
 All parties (both annex-I 
and non-annex-I parties) are required to formulate programmes and measures to limit climate 
change (article 4.1).
439
 The Kyoto Protocol puts most strain on Annex-I parties because of the 
quantified emission reduction of greenhouse gasses and the strict timeframe in which these 
reductions have to be achieved. These countries must establish national systems for the 
estimation of anthropogenic emissions per source and sink, based on a standardised 
method.
440
 They must submit yearly inventories of their emissions
441
 and hold registers that 
                                                                                                                                                                      
adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and to prior notification to the Conference of the Parties, make a joint 
communication in fulfilment of their obligations under this Article, provided that such a communication includes 
information on the fulfilment by each of these Parties of its individual obligations under the Convention. 9. 
Information received by the secretariat that is designated by a Party as confidential, in accordance with criteria to 
be established by the Conference of the Parties, shall be aggregated by the secretariat to protect its 
confidentiality before being made available to any of the bodies involved in the communication and review of 
information. 10. Subject to paragraph 9 above, and without prejudice to the ability of any Party to make public 
its communication at any time, the secretariat shall make communications by Parties under this Article publicly 
available at the time they are submitted to the Conference of the Parties”. 
438
 UNFCCC, article 4 para 2 determines, in relevant parts: “The developed country Parties and other Parties 
included in Annex I commit themselves specifically as provided for in the following: […] (b) In order to 
promote progress to this end, each of these Parties shall communicate, within six months of the entry into force 
of the Convention for it and periodically thereafter, and in accordance with Article 12, detailed information on its 
policies and measures referred to in subparagraph (a) above, as well as on its resulting projected anthropogenic 
emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol for the 
period referred to in subparagraph (a), with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels these 
anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. 
This information will be reviewed by the Conference of the Parties, at its first session and periodically thereafter, 
in accordance with Article 7[…] (e) Each of these Parties shall: (i) coordinate as appropriate with other such 
Parties, relevant economic and administrative instruments developed to achieve the objective of the Convention; 
and (ii) identify and periodically review its own policies and practices which encourage activities that lead to 
greater levels of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol than 
would otherwise occur; (f) The Conference of the Parties shall review, not later than 31 December 1998, 
available information with a view to taking decisions regarding such amendments to the lists in Annexes I and II 
as may be appropriate, with the approval of the Party concerned […]”. 
439
 These are the so-called PAMs: see http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom_/items/1095.php. 
UNFCCC, article 4 para 1 determines in relevant parts: “All Parties, taking into account their common but 
differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and 
circumstances, shall: (a) Develop, periodically update, publish and make available to the Conference of the 
Parties, in accordance with Article 12, national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals 
by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be 
agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties; (b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national 
and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change by addressing 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol, and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change;[...] and (j) communicate to 
the Conference of the Parties information related to implementation, in accordance with Article 12”.  
440
 Kyoto Protocol, “Guidelines for national systems under Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol”, 
Decision 19/CMP.1, 30 March 2006; Kyoto Protocol, “Good practice guidance and adjustments under Article 5, 
paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 20/CMP.1, 30 March 2006; Kyoto Protocol, “Issues relating to 
adjustments under Article 5, paragraph 2, of the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 21/CMP.1, 30 March 2006. 
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 Kyoto Protocol, “Guidance relating to registry systems under Article 7, paragraph 4, of the Kyoto Protocol”, 
Decision 12/CMP.1 (“international transaction log”), 30 March 2006; Kyoto Protocol, “Standard electronic 
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can verify the transactions of emission trading and mechanisms from projects (JI and 
CDM).
442
  
 
Within UNECE, the Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-
making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
443
 (Aarhus Convention) and its Kiev 
Protocol
444
, the Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary 
Context
445
  (Espoo Convention) and its SEA Protocol
446
, the Convention on Long-range Air 
Pollution (LRTAP)
447
 and the Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial 
Accidents
448
 (TEIA Treaty) all oblige their parties to adhere to specific reporting obligations 
on the implementation of these conventions and protocols. In some cases, questionnaires are 
also used as a tool for information gathering in order to assess compliance. Questionnaires are 
also used as a tool for information gathering in order to assess compliance.
449
 The 
implementation reports of the parties can be published on the website of the treaty.
450
 Under 
                                                                                                                                                                      
format for reporting Kyoto Protocol units”, Decision 14/CMP.1, 30 March 2006; Kyoto Protocol, “Guidelines 
for the preparation of information required under Article 7, Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 15/CMP.1, 30 March 
2006.  
442
 See in general: Kyoto Protocol, “Report of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol on its first session, held in Montreal from 28 November to 10 December 2005. Action 
taken by the Conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol at its first 
session”, Doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/5/8/Add.1-4, 30 March 2006. 
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information on emission of pollutants. 
445
 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, 1991, 1989 UNTS 309.  
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 The 2003 Kiev Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment entered into force in 2010 after Estonia 
became the 16
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 country to ratify the protocol. 
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 Convention on Long-range Transboundary Air Pollution, 1979, and its additional protocols: the Protocol to 
Abate Acidification, Eutrophication and Ground-level Ozone (1999); the Protocol on Persistent Organic 
Pollutants (POPs) (1998); the Protocol on Heavy Metals (1998); the Protocol on Further Reduction of Sulphur 
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 Convention on Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents,1992, 2105 UNTS 457.  
449
 The Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 
1992) uses specific questionnaires: UNECE, “Implementation of UNECE Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements”, Doc ECE/BELGRADE.CONF/2007/12, 1 October 2003, at 10. For the Espoo Convention: see 
http://www.unece.org/env/documents/2008/eia/decision.IV.1.e.pdf.  
450
 For instance see the Aarhus Convention: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/mop3/mop3.docII.htm#NIRs 
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the London Protocol
451
 parties have an extensive information obligation to the MOP and the 
treaty secretariat.
452
 For nations with economies in transition, this information is gathered 
through voluntary ‘UNECE Environmental Performance Reviews’ at the request of the nation 
involved and after a decision of the UNECE Committee on Environmental Policy.
453
    
 
A limited number of treaties also allow third parties, such as NGOs and governmental 
organisations, to report on non-compliance by a party to the treaty. CITES for instance allows 
the international NGO ‘Traffic Network’454 to inform the secretariat of illegal trade in 
protected fauna and flora. This information may also be reported by the World Customs 
Organisation (WCO) and Interpol.
455
 The compliance mechanism of the Aarhus Convention 
and the Water Protocol allows the general public and NGOs to report on the inadequate 
execution of the treaty. This is the so-called ‘third-party monitoring’.  
 
B. Verification of the information 
 
The information and data submitted by the state parties is collected and bundled by the 
convention secretariats. These secretariats usually do not have any competence to assess the 
information or, in broader terms, to review compliance. Their task in this respect is limited to 
objectifying the data and to make the level of implementation of the convention by the 
different member states comparable and objective, in order to enable the competent 
convention organ to draw comparisons. How the aforementioned data are being used, the non-
                                                     
451
 Protocol on Water and Health (London, 1999) to the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes (Helsinki, 1992). 
452
 London Protocol, article 7 reads, in relevant parts: “Review and assessment of progress. 1. The Parties shall 
each collect and evaluate data on: (a) Their progress towards the achievement of the targets referred to in article 
6,paragraph 2; (b) Indicators that are designed to show how far that progress has contributed towards preventing, 
controlling or reducing water-related disease. 2. The Parties shall each publish periodically the results of this 
collection and evaluation of data. The frequency of such publication shall be established by the Meeting of the 
Parties.” 
453
 See http://www.unece.org/env/cep/welcome.html; for the procedure, see: 
http://www.unece.org/env/epr/process.htm. 
454
 The secretariat is helped in performing its task by IUCN and WWF (World Wildlife Fund) through a 
combined monitoring programme TRAFFIC. TRAFFIC aims to ensure that the trade in wild plants and animals 
does not constitute a threat to the conservation of nature. Additionally, it tracks illegal trade in protected fauna 
and flora. See http://www.traffic.org.  
455
 UNEP, “Compliance Mechanisms Under selected Multilateral Agreements”, Nairobi, UNEP, 2007, at 41. 
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compliance response measures that can be taken based upon it and the organ competent to 
make this decision differs from treaty to treaty.
456
  
 
Compliance review is usually the competence of the highest treaty authorities, the COP or 
MOP. In cases of non-compliance the emphasis will be on supportive measures (facilitation), 
i.e. measures that will help treaty parties with the execution of the treaty, such as information 
exchange, support in monitoring, verification of the information provided, organising 
workshops and simplifying access to financial aid, through the Global Environment Facility
457
 
(GEF) or a fund specifically created for this purpose.  
 
The preparatory assessment (‘compliance assessment’) can be done by organs that report to 
the COP or MOP. Some treaty secretariats have neither the competence nor the intention to 
monitor and assess the correctness of the provided information (such as the CBD
458
 and the 
UN Convention to Combat Desertification
459
); others do, after which recommendations to the 
COP or MOP can be made. The reporting obligations are subject to discussion between the 
treaty secretariat and state parties and eventual publication in annual reviews or on the 
convention website (naming and shaming).
460
 The assessment of the provided information 
(‘review of implementation’) can be exerted by the treaty secretariat (Montreal Protocol, 
Espoo Convention), by a Commission (OSPAR
461
), a Standing Committee (CITES
462
, 
                                                     
456
 See Wolfrum, R., Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of International Environmental Law, 
Recueil des cours de l’académie de droit international 272, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998, at 48-52; UNEP, 
“Compliance Mechanisms Under selected Multilateral Agreements”, Nairobi, UNEP, 2007, at 106. 
457
 GEF was established in November 1991 in a combined effort by the UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank. “An 
independent financial organisation, the GEF provides grants to developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition for projects related to biodiversity, climate change, international waters, land 
degradation, the ozone layer, and persistent organic pollutants. These projects benefit the global environment, 
linking local, national, and global environmental challenges and promoting sustainable livelihoods. Established 
in 1991, the GEF is today the largest funder of projects to improve the global environment. The GEF has 
allocated $9.2 billion, supplemented by more than $40 billion in co-financing, for more than 2,700 projects in 
more than 165 developing countries and countries with economies in transition. Through its Small Grants 
Programme (SGP), the GEF has also made more than 12,000 small grants directly to nongovernmental and 
community organisations, totalling $495 million.” See http://www.gefweb.org.  
458
 Made explicit in CBD, “Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Review of Implementation of 
the Convention on the Work of Its Second Meeting”, UNEP/CBD/COP/9/4, 26 July 2007, at para 61. 
459
 United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought 
and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa, 1992, 1954 UNTS 3. 
460
 See for instance http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom_/items/1095.php.  
461
 OSPAR is the mechanism by which fifteen Governments of the western coasts and catchments of Europe, 
together with the European Community, cooperate to protect the marine environment of the North-East Atlantic. 
The OSPAR commission was established by the Paris Treaty in 1992. The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) is 
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Ramsar), an ad hoc Working Group (CBD
463
) or an expert panel (UNFCCC
464
, Kyoto 
Protocol). Both the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol have created a subsidiary organ for the 
execution of the treaty.
465
 This organ is composed of government representatives of the 
parties. Its task consists mainly of assessing and monitoring certain information provided by 
the parties
466
, while the COP and COP/MOP retain a general monitoring capacity.
467
  
 
The possibility to verify the provided information is the broadest in the Kyoto Protocol. The 
expert review teams under the Protocol have the task to technically test all information from 
the national inventories of the Annex I countries in order to verify the execution of all aspects 
of the Protocol and report to the COP/MOP.
468
 The supervision of emission reductions 
obtained through CDM projects under article 12 is controlled by the CDM Executive Board 
(CDMEB), based on the information the involved Annex-I country and the accredited 
operational entities have provided.
469
 The JI Supervisory Committee (JISC) supervises the 
verification of emission reduction units and is responsible for the accreditation of the 
independent authorities that do technical audits of the JI-projects.
470
 Both the CDMEB en 
JISC consist of 10 members selected by the COP/MOP based on geographical distribution.
471
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
another example. HELCOM is the governing body of the Helsinki Convention: Convention on the Protection of 
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area, 1992, Official Journal L 073, 16 March 1994, 20-45. 
462
 CITES, “Guide to CITES compliance procedures”, COP Resolution 14/3, 15 June 2007, para 12.  
463
 CBD, “Strategic Plan:  future evaluation of progress”, CBD COP Decision VII/30, 20 February 2004, at para 
23; see also http://www.cbd.int/wgri.  
464
 See http://unfccc.int/national_reports/annex_i_natcom_/items/1095.php.  
465
 Through UNFCCC, article 10 and Kyoto Protocol, article 15 respectively. 
466
 For instance, information provided by the parties in line with UNFCCC, article 12, para 1 and 2. 
467
 UNFCCC, article 7 and Kyoto Protocol, article 13 respectively. 
468
 Kyoto Protocol, “Guidelines for review under Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 22/CMP.1, 30 
March 2006; Kyoto Protocol, “Terms of service for lead reviewers”, Decision 23/CMP.1, 30 March 2006; Kyoto 
Protocol, “Issues relating to the implementation of Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol-1”, Decision 24/CMP.1, 30 
March 2006; Kyoto Protocol, “Issues relating to the implementation of Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol-2”, 
Decision 25/CMP.1, 30 March 2006; see also Berntsen, T., Fuglestvedt, J. and Stordal, F., “Reporting and 
Verification of Emissions and Removals of Greenhouse Gases”, in Stokke, O. S., Hovi, J. and Ulfstein, G. (eds), 
Implementing the Climate Regime. International Compliance, London, Earthscan, 2005, 85-120. 
469
 Kyoto Protocol, “Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in Article 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 3/CMP.1, 30 March 2006; Kyoto Protocol, “Guidance relating to the clean 
development mechanism”, Decision 4/CMP.1, 30 March 2006.  
470
 Kyoto Protocol, “Guidelines for the implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 9/CMP.1, 
30 March 2006.  
471
 The same geographical distribution is used in the Compliance Committee: 1 member of the 5 UN regional 
groups; 2 annex-I member states; 2 non-annex-I member states and 1 member for the AOSIS (Alliance of Small 
Island States). See Kyoto Protocol, “Modalities and procedures for a clean development mechanism as defined in 
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These members are elected for a period of 2 years and act in their personal capacity and not in 
the capacity of the representative of a party to the treaty, which is common practice in the 
COP/MOP. Both organs report to the COP/MOP.  
 
During the review on compliance with treaty obligations of the TEIA Treaty by countries 
from Eastern-Europe, the Caucasus and Central-Asia (EECCA) and South-East Europe 
(SEE), fact-finding missions are commonly used.
472
 These missions are established at the 
request of the country involved in case it wishes to see certain treaty obligations clarified. In 
case of a positive evaluation the country can participate in the execution of the programme 
and receive support for the execution of the process. Finally, certain MEAs provide for ‘third-
party verification’, which means that certain MEAs give the possibility to third parties, 
experts for example, to verify the accuracy of the information provided.
473
 
 
C. Institutional compliance mechanisms and response measures 
 
The Montreal Protocol was the first MEA to progress from the classic forms of compliance 
control by establishing a Compliance Committee in 1992.
474
 Several other MEAs followed, 
such as the Basel Convention
475
, the Cartagena Protocol
476
, the Kyoto Protocol
477
 and the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 3/CMP.1, 30 March 2006 and Kyoto Protocol, “Guidelines for the 
implementation of Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 9/CMP.1, 30 March 2006.  
472
 See http://www.unece.org/en/teia/assistprog/PreparatoryPhase.htm.  
473
 “The secretariat of the Framework Convention on Climate Change, for example, conducts a technical check 
of the national communications of developed country parties. A group of experts, whose members are selected 
from a list of experts nominated by parties and intergovernmental organisations, then carries out an in-depth 
review, which may include an in-country visit conducted with the prior consent of the party being reviewed”. 
UNEP, “Key concepts, procedures and mechanisms of legally binding multilateral agreements that may be 
relevant to furthering compliance under the future mercury instrument”, Intergovernmental negotiating 
committee to prepare a global legally binding instrument in mercury, Doc UNEP(DTIE)/Hg/INC.1/11, 15 March 
2010, at 31. See also UNFCCC, “Review of first communications from the Parties included in Annex I to the 
Convention”, Decision 2/CP.1,  doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, 6 June 1995. 
474
 In 1998 at COP 10, the non-compliance procedure was modified: see UNEP, “Report of the tenth meeting of 
the parties to the Montreal protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer”, Annex IV, Doc OzL.Pro.10/9, 3 
December 1998, Annex II.  
475
 UNEP, “Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the control of transboundary 
movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal”, doc UNEP/CHW.6/40, 10 February 2003, specifically 
decision VI/12, “Establishment of a mechanism for promoting implementation and compliance”. 
476
 Cartagena Protocol, “Establishment of procedures and mechanisms on compliance under the Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety”, MOP Decision UNEP/CBD/BS-I/7, 27 February 2004. 
477
 Kyoto Protocol, “Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 
27/CMP.1, doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 30 March 2006. 
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London Protocol
478
. For the Rotterdam
479
 and Stockholm Convention
480
 a compliance 
mechanism is still being negotiated. UNECE treaties also provide for control mechanisms, 
called either Implementation Committee (LRTAP Protocols
481
, Espoo
482
) of Working Group 
on Implementation (TEIA
483
) or Compliance Committee (Aarhus
484
, London Protocol
485
). 
These are institutionalised compliance mechanisms that not only monitor the information 
provided, but also use this information to assess the level of implementation of the treaty 
obligations by the parties and also formulate suggestions to the treaty parties involved to 
reach compliance.  
 
The measures that the compliance committee can suggest, either to the parties or the COP, 
MOP or COP/MOP, differ from committee to committee. These measures may be categorised 
as ‘carrots and sticks’ and can entail the following: fitting aid in the form of financial or 
technical assistance, capacity building (workshops, training, ...), making a recommendation or 
give a warning, draw up a compliance action plan, the execution of which may be a condition 
for any financial/technical assistance. In the case of financial assistance cases are often 
referred to existing funds, either in the MEA context (e.g. the Multilateral Fund under the 
Ozone Convention) or others, such as the GEF. Suspension of the rights and privileges 
resulting from the treaty (Montreal, Aarhus, Water Protocol and Kyoto) is a distinctly punitive 
                                                     
478
 London Convention, “Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms pursuant to Article 11 of the 1996 Protocol to 
the London Convention 1972”, Decision LC 29/17, 9 November 2007, Annex 7, in which the compliance 
committee is dubbed the ‘compliance group’.   
479
 UNEP, “Procedures and mechanisms on compliance with the Rotterdam Convention”, Decision RC-4/7, doc  
UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.4/24, 31 October 2008.  
480
 UNEP, “Non-compliance: Procedures and institutional mechanisms for determining non-compliance with the 
provisions of the Convention and for the treatment of Parties found to be in non-compliance”, 
UNEP/POPS/COP.4/34, 17 December 2008, particularly Annex to decision SC-3/20 and Appendix to decision 
SC-3/20. 
481
 See for the Sulphur protocol and the POP protocol: UNECE, “Report of the fifteenth session of the executive 
body”, doc ECE/EB.AIR/53, 7 January 1998, Annex III. Also, see UNECE, “The Implementation Committee, its 
structure and functions and procedures of review of compliance”, Decision 1997/2, Annex IV and UNECE, 
“Compliance monitoring for the VOC Protocol”, Decision 1997/3. See also 
http://www.unece.org/env/lrtap/ic/welcome.htm.  
482
 UNECE, “Review of Compliance”, Decision II/4 (and amended by Decision III/2), doc ECE/MP.EIA/4, 13 
September 2004, also available at http://www.unece.org/env/eia/decisions/EIAdecisionIII2.htm . 
483
 UNECE, “Decision 2000/2 on the implementation of the Convention”, doc ECE/CP.TEIA/2.  
484
 UNECE, “Structure and Functions of the Compliance Committee and Procedures for the Review of 
Compliance”, doc ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, 2 April 2004. 
485
 UNECE, “Decision I/2 Review of Compliance”, doc ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3 and EUR/06/5069385/1/Add.3, 3 
July 2007.  
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measure. This may result in trade restrictions (Montreal Protocol
486
) of the (temporary) 
exclusion from the trade in emission rights (Kyoto Protocol
487
). Another example is CITES, 
where suspension of rights has been applied in several cases, albeit indirectly.
 488
 With the 
exception of the Kyoto Protocol, punitive measures can only be taken by the COP, MOP or 
COP/MOP. The Protocol also contains additional punitive measures, such as the restoration 
rate.
489
 The compliance mechanism of the Aarhus Convention is unique in that also civilians 
may raise a case of non-compliance with the treaty obligations by a party.
490
 Also the Water 
and Health Protocol provide this possibility.  
 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, the Facilitative Branch can take the following measures: (1) 
facilitation of technical and financial assistance, including technology transfer and capacity 
building, towards any party and in particular towards developing countries; (2) advice and 
facilitation to parties regarding the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and (3) 
recommendations to parties concerned, taking into account the economic and social 
development and poverty eradication of the developing countries. The Enforcement Branch 
                                                     
486
 The Montreal Protocol installs a ban on the import of controlled substances by members to the protocol from 
non-members. Article 4 reads, in relevant part: “[...] each party shall ban the import of the controlled substances 
in Annex A from any State not party to this Protocol”. Trade restrictions imply that a non-compliant party to the 
protocol is temporarily considered as a non-party to the protocol, in general terms or for the trade in one or more 
specific substances, effectively excluding that party from exporting any of the controlled substances under the 
protocol. 
487
 The “eligibility requirements” for participation in the flexibility mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol focus 
on the obligations of Annex-I parties concerning information sharing and reporting obligations under article 5 
para 1 (national systems), 5 para 2 and 7 para 1 (emission inventory) and 7 para 4 (national registers) of the 
Kyoto Protocol. A yearly review by an Expert Review Team identifies cases of non-compliance and decides 
upon the possible suspension of the right to participate in the flexible mechanisms by the Annex-I parties. This 
suspension of rights remains in effect until the non-compliant party has provided the compliance committee with 
a so-called ‘compliance action plan’, in which the party proves that progress towards compliance is being made 
and full compliance can be reached. Similarly, non-compliance with the emission reduction targets set out under 
article 3.1 of the Protocol can lead to suspension of rights of the non-compliant party. The right to trade in 
emission rights is suspended and a compliance action plan must be adopted, ensuring better compliance with the 
targets in the next commitment period. This measure also prevents free rider behaviour, by making it impossible 
for a party to sell a maximum of emission rights before resigning from the Protocol to avoid the restoration rate 
for the next commitment period. 
488
 See the CITES list of Countries currently subject to a recommendation to suspend trade, available at 
http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/trade_suspension.shtml.  
489
 A ‘restoration rate’ means that 1.3 times the amount of emission rights by which the target for a non-
compliant party was exceeded at the end of the first commitment period (2008-2012), will be deducted from the 
maximum allowable emission in the second commitment period (after 2012).  That means that not only the 
exceeded amount must be compensated, but that amount is increased by 30%. This may be seen as a punitive 
measure. The compliance action plan in this case must also provide an analysis of the causes of non-compliance 
and a list of actions the non-compliant party intends to undertake on order to avoid non-compliance in the future. 
These actions should focus on internal policy measures and should be taken in the first three years of the next 
commitment period. The plan must also contain a timetable for the implementation of these measures. 
490
 See for instance Aarhus Convention, article 9.  
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may take the following measures: (1) declaration of non-compliance and the obligation of  the 
party concerned (Annex-I) to develop a compliance action plan in case of non-compliance 
with  article 5 or 7 of the Kyoto Protocol and related progress reports, (2) suspension of the 
eligibility of a party concerned (Annex-I) if it does not meet one or more of the eligibility 
requirements to make use of the flexible mechanisms (art. 6 (JI), art. 12 (CDM) and art. 17 
(emission trading), taking into account the relevant provisions of those articles and (3), in case 
of exceeding the assigned amounts of a party under article 3.1. and Annex B in the first 
commitment period, the Enforcement Branch shall apply the restoration rate (1.3) for the 
second commitment period, shall suspend the eligibility of that party to participate in 
emission trading (transfers under art. 17) and shall require that party to develop a compliance 
action plan and annual progress reports on implementation of the compliance action plan. 
 
The Montreal Protocol MOP can take following measures: (1) appropriate assistance (which 
means technology transfer, help parties with their data collection, assistance to meet the 
reporting obligations), (2) issuing cautions and (3) suspension, in accordance with the 
applicable rules of international law concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty,  of 
rights and privileges under the protocol, whether or not subject to time limits, including those 
concerned with industrial rationalisation, production, consumption, trade, transfer of 
technology, financial mechanism and institutional arrangements. 
 
In the case of the CBD, enforcement takes into account the capacity of the Party in non-
compliance. The Compliance committee may decide to (1) assist or provide advice, (2) 
recommend to the COP/MOP financial and technical assistance, technology transfer, training 
and other capacity building measures, (3) request or assist the Party to develop a compliance 
action plan and (4) invite the Party to submit progress reports. The COP serving as the MOP 
upon recommendation of compliance committee may (1) provide financial & technical 
assistance, technology transfer and capacity building, (2) issue a caution, (3) publish cases of 
the non-compliance, and (4) take measures to be decided by the COP/MOP in case of 
repeated non-compliance.  
 
The compliance committee for the Basel Convention may provide a Party, after coordination 
with that Party, with advice, non-binding recommendations, and information relating to inter 
alia: (1) establishing and/or strengthening its domestic/regional regulatory regimes, (2) 
facilitation of assistance in particular to developing countries and countries with economies in 
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transition including on how to access financial and technical support, including technology 
transfer and capacity building, and (3) elaborating as appropriate and with cooperation of the 
Party faced with the compliance problems, voluntary compliance action plans, and review 
their implementation. A voluntary compliance action plan may include benchmarks, 
objectives and indicators of the plan as well as an indicative timeline for its implementation. 
Furthermore, the Committee may recommend to the COP that it considers: (1) further support 
under the convention for the Party concerned including prioritisation of technical assistance 
and capacity-building and access to financial resources; or (2) issuing a cautionary statement 
and providing advice regarding future compliance in order to help Parties to implement the 
provisions of the Basel convention and to promote cooperation between all Parties. 
 
VI. Characteristics of compliance mechanisms 
 
MEA compliance mechanisms show both common and very distinct characteristics. The most 
important common feature is that compliance mechanisms are non-adversary in nature and 
therefore non-confrontational, meaning that they are not intended to stigmatise a non-
compliant treaty party. The primary aim is to help a treaty party to reach full compliance as 
soon as possible, based on the available possibilities. Compliance mechanisms also aim for 
universality, which means that, in principle, a party to the treaty involved in a non-compliance 
procedure can not withdraw from it.
491
 There is no opting-out, with the exception of a 
temporary opt-out in the compliance mechanisms of the Aarhus Treaty and Water Protocol. 
Reporting by the public in the case of a non-compliance procedure can only be refused by the 
party concerned for a period of 4 years and under the condition that this treaty party has 
informed the depositary of the treaty in writing at the latest 12 months after the entry into 
force of the treaty for this party or the accepting of the compliance mechanism.
492
  
 
In some cases, the differentiated obligations of the parties lead to a differentiated approach of 
non-compliance, such as in the Kyoto Protocol that makes distinction between developed and 
developing nations, and in which only the former can be the object of a procedure before the 
                                                     
491
 That bring interesting questions to the fore in the case of the Canadian withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, 
less than one month before the ending of the first commitment period. See (a.o.) BBC, “Canada to withdraw 
from Kyoto Protocol”, 13 December 2011, available at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-16151310.  
492
 UNECE, “Report of the first meeting of the parties”, addendum, doc ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8, 2 April 2004, para 
18; UNECE, “Report of the First Meeting of the Parties - Decision on review of compliance”, doc 
ECE/MP.WH/2/Add.3, 3 July 2007. 
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enforcement branch of the Kyoto Protocol. As elaborated before, recent compliance 
mechanisms have a legal basis in the environmental treaty of protocol, in which the parties 
clearly state that a compliance mechanism must be developed.
493
 The London Protocol 
stipulated a deadline, namely 2 years after the entry into force of the Protocol, meaning before 
24 March 2008. For the Kyoto Protocol and Cartagena Protocol the deadline was fixed on the 
first COP/MOP meeting. Other treaties do not provide for a deadline (Montreal, Basel, 
Aarhus and Rotterdam). Even other treaties do not have a specific enabling clause, and base 
their compliance mechanism on a COP/MOP decision. COPs and MOPs have the competence 
to establish any subsidiary body considered necessary for the implementation of the treaty 
(e.g. LRTAP
494
, Basel
495
 en Espoo
496
).  
 
Older environmental conventions use existing organs, such as the Standing Committee, the 
COP or MOP. Institutionalised compliance mechanisms on the other hand use a newly created 
organ, either the compliance committee or the executive committee, of which the membership 
fluctuates: 8 members (Aarhus, LRTAP, Espoo), 9 (Water and Health Protocol), 10 
(Montreal, TEIA), 15 (Basel, Cartagena, London Protocol) or 20 members (Kyoto). The 
compliance committee of the Kyoto Protocol has two chambers: a facilitative branch and an 
enforcement branch, each consisting of 10 members based on geographical distribution (2 
members for each of the 5 regional groups of the UN) plus two representatives for developed 
countries (Annex-I), two representatives for developing nations (non-Annex-I) and one for the 
small island states (OASIS). With the exception of the LRTAP and Espoo conventions the 
compliance committees of other MEAs are also based on a geographical equal representation 
(Montreal, Aarhus) or on the basis of the 5 regional UN groups (Basel, Cartagena, London 
Protocol). Given the fact that the compliance committee of the Kyoto Protocol is the only 
committee with the capacity to take punitive measures against a party – and only annex-I 
countries, the voting procedure is not without importance. Even though decisions in the 
compliance committee are usually taken by consensus, decisions can be taken by voting in the 
case consensus cannot be found. The quorum is three quarters (3/4) of the members present 
                                                     
493
 Montreal Protocol, article 8; Kyoto Protocol, article 18; Aarhus Convention, article 15; Rotterdam 
Convention, article 17; Stockholm Convention, article 17; Cartagena Protocol, article 34; Water and Health 
Protocol, article 15; London Protocol, article 11; Aarhus Protocol on POPs, article 11 and Aarhus Protocol to the 
LRTAP Convention, article 9. 
494
 LRTAP Convention, article 10 para 2.  
495
 Basel Convention, article 15 para 5(e). 
496
 Espoo Convention, article 11 para 2.  
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and voting.
497
 For the enforcement branch, a double majority is added – meaning that a 
majority of both the Annex-I and non-Annex-I members must be reached. The voting 
procedure in the other compliance committees is consensual and in the case no consensus can 
be found the report must reflect the vision of every member separately (Basel, Aarhus).  
 
Also the capacity of the members can differ, ranging from state representatives (Montreal, 
LRTAP, Espoo, TEIA) over a hybrid capacity, meaning that the personal capacity has not 
been specified (Basel
498
, London Protocol
499
), to members seating in a personal capacity 
(Kyoto Protocol, Cartagena, Aarhus, Water Protocol) based on expertise. Members of the 
Aarhus Committee and the Water Protocol can be nominated by the treaty members and 
environmental NGOs with observer status. The Kyoto Protocol poses the question to 
privileges and immunities regarding members seating in personal capacity, especially if they 
can take punitive measures that do not need confirmation by the COP or MOP, or in the case 
they cannot be overruled. The problem is most apparent when the members of the 
enforcement branch, who are not UN officials, judges nor state representatives, impose a 
punitive measure and the state concerned does not agree with the judgement and starts a 
procedure against the individual members of the chamber.  It is established that these persons 
are not immune to persecution and also that a headquarters agreement, from which their 
privileges and immunities emanate, do not always guarantee full protection against personal 
persecution. This matter has been on the agenda of legal experts of the treaty parties of the 
Kyoto Protocol for several years now.
500
 
 
There are several ways by which a case of non-compliance can be brought under the attention 
of the committee (‘triggering’). All compliance mechanisms provide for the possibility that a 
party that believes it is in a state of non-compliance can trigger the compliance mechanism 
                                                     
497
 Other majority rules are also possible, like a 2/3 majority, however, the majority of compliance mechanisms 
do not provide any info at all or provide for consensus decisions – see for instance LRTAP. 
498
 “Members of the Committee will serve objectively and in the best interest of the Convention. They shall have 
expertise relating to the subject matter of the Convention in areas including scientific, technical, socio-economic 
and/or legal fields”. UNEP, “Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the control of 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal”, doc UNEP/CHW.6/40, 10 February 2003, 
decision VI/12, para 5.  
499
  “Members shall serve objectively and in the interest of promoting compliance with the Protocol”. London 
Protocol, article 3 para 3.  
500
 See UNFCCC, “Privileges and immunities for individuals serving on bodies by the organisations: review of 
the legal regime and practice of organisation in the United Nations system”, doc FCCC/TP/2007/02, 30 July 
2007.  
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(‘self-triggering’). Above that, also other parties can trigger the compliance mechanism 
(‘party-to-party trigger’501) (LRTAP, Montreal, Cartagena, Kyoto, Basel, Water Protocol, 
London, Espoo, Aarhus) and the secretariat (Basel, Aarhus, Water Protocol) or the MOP (LP). 
In some compliance mechanisms the triggering party must prove an affected interest (London 
Protocol
502
), an involvement (Cartagena
503
), a direct involvement (Basel
504
) or provide 
supporting information without having to prove involvement or interest (Montreal, LRTAP, 
Kyoto
505
, Aarhus, Espoo, Water Protocol). The compliance committee of the Kyoto Protocol 
can also be triggered by reports of the expert review teams. The compliance committee of the 
Aarhus Convention and the Water Protocol may also be triggered by citizens.  
 
Confidentiality of the data on non-compliance is not always guaranteed. It is confidential with 
Montreal, LRTAP, Basel, Cartagena and Espoo. Kyoto, Aarhus and the Water Protocol on the 
other hand employ a system of public disclosure, in which confidentiality of the data provided 
can only be guaranteed in exceptional cases. The London Protocol does not mention the 
confidentiality of data. Decisions of compliance committees are always public, except in the 
case where data provided by a private person could result in a fine or persecution by the state 
involved (Aarhus, Water Protocol). In the case of Basel convention for instance, the 
compliance committee may give advice and any additional facilitative measure it deems 
necessary to help the non-compliant party reach full compliance as soon as possible. Should 
the compliance issues persist, then the committee may advice the COP to take additional 
measures. On the other hand, the CITES and Kyoto Protocol standing committees take 
decisions themselves without COP or COP/MOP involvement. In the case of the Kyoto 
                                                     
501
 On the ‘party to party trigger’ as an ‘actio popularis’ in the interest of all treaty parties, see Sand, P. H., 
“Transnational Environmental Disputes”, in Bardonnet, D. (ed.), The Peaceful Settlement of International 
Disputes in Europe: Future Prospects, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990, at 132-133.  
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 London Convention, “Compliance Procedures and Mechanisms pursuant to Article 11 of the 1996 Protocol to 
the London Convention 1972”, Decision LC 29/17, 9 November 2007, Annex 7: “4.1.3. a Party that has 
reservations about another Party’s compliance with the obligations under the Protocol when it has an interest that 
is affected or likely to be affected by the possible non-compliance. […]”. 
503
 CBD, “Establishment of procedures and mechanisms on compliance under the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety”, MOP Decision BS-I/7, 27 February 2004: “IV.1.(b) Any Party, which is affected or likely affected 
with respect to another Party”. 
504
 UNEP, “Final report of the sixth conference of the parties to the Basel convention”, COP Decision VI/12 on 
the establishment of a mechanism for promoting implementation and compliance, Doc UNEP CHW.6/40, 10 
February 2003: “9. (b) A Party that has concerns or is affected by a failure to comply with and/or implement the 
Convention’s obligations by another Party with whom it is directly involved under the Convention. […]”. 
505
 Kyoto Protocol, “Procedures and mechanisms relating to compliance under the Kyoto Protocol”, Decision 
27/CMP.1, doc FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, 30 March 2006: “VI.1.(b) Any Party with respect to another 
Party, supported by corroborating information”. 
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Protocol, judgements of the enforcement branch of the Kyoto Protocol can be appealed at the 
COP/MOP, but the COP/MOP does not have the competence to make a new decision. The 
decision of the enforcement branch can thus be overridden by the COP/MOP by a 3/4rd 
majority vote, or, if such majority cannot be found, the decisions stands. It cannot be 
amended: it is overridden or left standing. In the decision is overridden by the COP/MOP, the 
case will be presented again to the enforcement branch for a new round of consultations. 
Against the new judgement no appeal is possible. The decision of the compliance committee 
of the Kyoto Protocol is autonomous, contrary to other MEAs. For that matter, compliance 
mechanisms with other MEAs do not have an appeal procedure against a recommendation or 
decision of the committee.  
 
One final element is that compliance mechanisms, without exception, are only competent to 
deal with cases of (potential) non-compliance by States that are parties to the MEA that has 
established them. Non-parties cannot be helped or punished by the MEA compliance 
mechanisms. While this may seem logic itself, it also has important repercussions for the 
effectiveness of international environmental regimes. Some states, most notably the United 
States of America, refuse to ratify certain international instruments, such as the CBD or the 
Kyoto Protocol. They respond to international pressure to ratify these instruments with the 
argument that they will adopt national legislation to the same or even more stringent effect 
than the MEA, instead of becoming a Party to the international convention. However, this also 
means that these countries escape all international control such as that provided by the 
compliance mechanisms established by the MEAs. 
 
VII. Compliance mechanisms in practice 
 
As mentioned before, the Montreal protocol’s possible non-compliance counter-measures 
consist of “appropriate assistance”, “cautions” and “suspension”.506 However, “no (...) party 
was deprived of assistance nor were any steps taken to suspend rights and privileges (...)”507. 
The non-compliance procedure was established at the fourth meeting of the MOP, in 1992. 
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 UNEP, “Report of the Fourth Meeting of the Parties of the Montreal Protocol”, Annex V, Doc 
UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/5, 25 November 1992. For an overview of the discussions at MOP 4, see 
http://ozone.unep.org/Meeting_Documents/mop/04mop/MOP_4.shtml, at 28.  
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 Sarma, K. M., “Compliance with the multilateral environmental agreements to protect the ozone layer”, in 
Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P. T. and Wolfrum, R. (eds.), Ensuring compliance with multilateral environmental 
agreements. A dialogue between practitioners and academia, Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2006, at 35. 
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Since then, there has been one review process of the procedure: a working group composed of 
legal and non-compliance experts, established at MOP 9, determined that the compliance 
mechanism of the protocol functioned satisfactory and needed only marginal amendments in 
order to clarify certain aspects of the procedure. The amendments changed certain aspects of 
the composition of the Implementation Committee and introduced an early-warning procedure 
where the secretariat could send a reminder to potential non-compliant parties before the 
compliance procedure has been triggered.
508
 Especially this last element again proves that the 
compliance procedures are aimed at the non-confrontational resolution of cases of non-
compliance, and the amendment affirms that view. The compliance procedure has been in use 
for twenty years and it has been applied numerous times; in this period we have found 112 
decisions adopted by the MOP at the advice of the Implementation Committee.
509
 The 
decisions range from the finding of non-compliance alongside measures to help the non-
compliant party remedy the situation, to the adoption of plans of action in cases of repeated or 
prolonged non-compliance. It is clear that the non-confrontational and facilitative measures 
have been used most often, especially after 1999 when the grace period for developing 
countries expired and these countries were now also fully accountable for the execution of the 
protocol.
510
 To date, no developing country has ever been subjected to the harshest measure 
the procedure allows, namely a suspension of rights and privileges under the protocol. 
 
The Implementation Committee of the 1979 LRTAP Convention, which originally established 
its procedures in 1997
511
, has so far reviewed submissions brought against 12 countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, Spain 
(twice) and Sweden), 7 of which were found to be in non-compliance. Since the cases are 
non-contentious and non-confrontational, the decisions in these cases have been facilitative in 
                                                     
508
 See UNEP, “Review of the Non-Compliance Procedure”, Decision IX/35, doc UNEP/OzL.Pro.9/12, 25 
September 1997, establishing the review process; the results of the review were discussed at MOP 10 and the 
procedure amended: UNEP, “Review of the Non-compliance Procedure”, decision X/10, doc 
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 Treves, T., Pineschi, L., Tanzi, A., Pitea, C., Ragni, C. and Jacur, F. R. (eds), Non-compliance Procedures 
and Mechanisms of International Environmental Agreements, TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2009, at 11-32. 
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 UNECE, “Report of the fifteenth session of the executive body”, doc ECE/EB.AIR/53, 7 January 1998; 
“Implementation Committee, its Structure and Functions and Procedures for Review of Compliance”, Decision 
1997/2. The procedures were amended in 2001, and in 2006 a new comprehensive overview of the procedure 
was set out in doc ECE/EB.AIR/2006/2, 3 October 2006, under the same title as the 1997 text.  
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nature, helping all 7 countries to eventually reach full compliance. It is clear that the 
installation of the Implementation Committee has had a positive impact on compliance with 
the reporting obligations.
512
 
 
The Kyoto Protocol has an elaborate compliance mechanism (see also supra) and specific 
procedures to be followed.
513
 The facilitative branch has so far received 15 submissions
514
, all 
coming from South-Africa (in its capacity as chairman of the Group of 77 and China).
515
 
These submissions were aimed at potential non-compliance with article 3.1 of the Protocol by 
(alphabetically) Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, 
Liechtenstein, Luxemburg, Poland, Portugal, Russian Federation, Slovenia and Ukraine. Only 
in the cases brought against Slovenia
516
 and Latvia
517
 have there been explicit decisions by the 
facilitative branch: the proceedings against both countries were formally concluded since the 
facilitative branch found both countries had provided their national communications and 
progress reports on time. The status of the other 13 cases is unclear at this point, since the 
facilitative branch was unable to reach consensus or a ¾ majority on their proceeding. No 
decision was taken regarding these cases, which must therefore be considered to remain 
pending. The enforcement branch of the Kyoto Protocol has only considered four cases 
(against Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia and Greece). The case against Greece began after 
submission by the expert review teams, who concluded that Greece had violated article 5.1 of 
the Protocol. Since this article deals with the eligibility requirements for the flexible 
mechanisms (see also supra), it was decided that Greece would not be eligible to take part in 
the flexible mechanisms until the non-compliance has been resolved.
518
 The case against 
Canada was dropped on 15 June 2008 after an initial hearing in which Canada defended its 
                                                     
512
 Kuokkanen, T., “Practice of the Implementation Committee under the Convention on Long-Range 
transboundary Air Pollution”, in Beyerlin, U., Stoll, P. T. and Wolfrum, R. (eds.), Ensuring compliance with 
multilateral environmental agreements. A dialogue between practitioners and academia, Leiden and Boston, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2006, at 47.  
513
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policy regarding the national registry.
519
 Bulgaria was briefly suspended from participating in 
the flexible mechanisms. After its original compliance action plan to address the causes of the 
non-compliance was reviewed, altered and eventually approved by the enforcement branch, 
Bulgaria’s eligibility to participate in the flexible mechanisms was restored.520 Croatia was 
found in breach of article 3.7 and 3.8 of the Protocol and was suspended from participating in 
the flexible mechanism.
521
 Croatia subsequently lodged an appeal with the COP/MOP in 
Cancun, where consensus on the appropriate response was not reached. The case has therefore 
been put on the provisional agenda for consideration at the next COP/MOP.
522
 
 
The 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of wastes 
and other latter does not have a specific compliance mechanism. However, with the entry into 
force of the London Protocol on 26 March 2006, a set of Compliance Procedures and 
Mechanisms were adopted in November 2007 pursuant to article 11 of the Protocol.
523
 The 
committee in charge of compliance monitoring (the so-called ‘compliance group’) published 
figures on its website indicating that on average, 60% of the parties provide sufficient reports 
and information to the committee. In the last couple of years however, that figure has dropped 
sharply and is now around 20%.
524
 It is also important to note that the London Protocol has 
only 30 contracting parties. 
 
The 1989 Basel Convention, even though it has elaborated a non-compliance procedure, has 
had no specific non-compliance cases so far; also the Cartagena Protocol compliance 
committee has not received any non-compliance cases, possibly because only parties may 
                                                     
519
 See the information note provided by the secretariat of the Kyoto Protocol, available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/compliance/application/pdf/informal_information_note_by_the_secretariat
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 UNFCCC, doc CC-2010-1-17/Bulgaria/EB, 4 February 2011.  
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 See on the IMO Website the graph of 13 April 2010, giving an overview of reporting returns received by the 
secretariat, available at:  http://www5.imo.org/SharePoint/blastDataHelper.asp/data_id%3D28129/OVERVIEW-
dumpingpercentages.pdf.  
166 
 
trigger a case, and not the secretariat.
525
 Similarly, the Water Protocol has established 
procedures, yet has had no case submitted to it so far. The 1998 Rotterdam Convention on 
Prior Informed Consent, the 2001 Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 
the 2001 International Treaty on Plant and Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture have 
not adopted any specific procedures yet, even though they are under consideration.  
 
VIII. Compliance mechanisms and classic dispute settlement 
 
The specificity of the different MEAs is reflected in the variety of compliance mechanisms in 
MEAs and distinguishes itself from the classic dispute settlement procedures such as 
arbitration or bringing the case before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). These 
procedures have uniform procedures, an independent court – either through ad hoc arbitration 
or permanent (ICJ), a mandate to administer justice based on the facts and demands presented 
by the parties, and a guarantee that individual judges are independent. Against the ruling of an 
arbitration committee or the ICJ there is no right of appeal that can lead to a revoking of the 
first ruling. There is no court of law in the case of compliance mechanisms in MEAs. Only in 
recently established compliance committees the independent status of the members is 
emphasised and (in some cases) legal expertise demanded. Also recent is the practice to 
neutralise an appeal procedure against a judgement from the compliance committee before a 
pre-eminently political organ, the COP or MOP. Therefore, MEA compliance mechanisms are 
not in se dispute settlement procedures aiming to reach an independent judicial verdict by 
legal analysis and interpretation of facts.
526
 Apparently, states do not require such procedure 
in this context. 
 
Compliance mechanisms may therefore be seen as the answer by the international community 
to the finding that classic dispute settlement procedures and legal solutions such as tribunals 
and international courts are not commonly used and are not a very effective way to ensure 
compliance in the context of multilateral treaties. At the same time, from a purely theoretic 
perspective it could be argued that specific compliance mechanisms take away cases of non-
compliance from the legal authority of international courts and arbiters. Instead, they install a 
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system of politically charged assessment and response measures as a remedy to cases of non-
compliance. It can therefore be concluded that Parties are unwilling to openly confront non-
compliant states and that the compliance mechanisms try to circumvent this unwillingness by 
providing alternative non-confrontational means to persuade Parties into compliance, through 
technical and financial assistance, aid with reporting requirements, advice, technology 
transfers and capacity building.  
 
“All parties need assurance that their efforts will be supported by 
appropriate, sustained efforts from all other parties. A well-designed 
compliance system can provide such assurance by enhancing trust and 
confidence that each party is doing its fair share to achieve the 
agreement’s objectives”.527 
 
Certain MEAs provide for a classic dispute settlement procedure next to specific compliance 
procedures
528
, with a wide range of possible measures, including political solutions through 
negotiations and mediation, and judicial solutions through arbitration or the ICJ, even though 
this last judicial solution has never been used.
529
 In this context, “dispute settlement” could be 
defined as all procedures established for resolving disagreements between two or more parties 
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 Birnie, P. W., Boyle, A. E. and Redgwell, C., International Law and the Environment (Third Edition), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, 257-259. The only exception is the 2010 Pulp Mills Case between 
Uruguay and Argentina concerning the construction of 2 pulp mills on the borders of the Uruguay River. The 
statute and daily management of the river was regulated in a regional treaty, which cannot be regarded as an 
MEA as such.   
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to the convention. These procedures are not as such linked with the compliance mechanism: 
most MEAs explicitly provide that procedures under compliance mechanisms are without 
prejudice to dispute settlement procedures. The Cartagena Protocol for instance provides that: 
“They [compliance procedures] shall be separate from, and without prejudice to, the dispute 
settlement procedures and mechanisms established by Article 27 of the Convention”530. This 
means that compliance mechanisms do not limit in any way dispute settlement procedures, 
and that, potentially, overlap between the two recourses exists. However, the effectiveness of 
compliance mechanisms is higher in multilateral treaties, where classic reciprocity is lower; 
similarly, dispute settlement is more commonly used in situations where reciprocity is high, 
such as in trade relations.  
 
The ratification of an MEA does not automatically grant the competence to settle a dispute 
that stems from the interpretation or application of the MEA to any court or arbiter. Accepting 
the competence of a court of law is an act that must be done through an additional, explicit 
and written declaration – maintaining the voluntary character of the ensuing proceedings.531 
The separate and temporary chamber for environmental cases of the ICJ, established in 1993, 
did not treat a single case in 13 years, which eventually caused the chamber to be closed down 
again, by not appointing any new judges in 2006. This chamber did not have tangible 
advantages for the parties in an environmental dispute: the environmental expertise of the 
judges was not guaranteed, the costs and procedures were identical to a classic case before the 
ICJ and, lastly, defining an ‘environmental’ case proved problematic. Special tribunals are 
only useful in the case they oversee the application of a separate body of law, such as the ones 
in the European Treaty for Human Rights, UNCLOS of the WTO-agreements.
532
 Added to 
this is the fact that a case before an international tribunal is confronting in character and that 
most of the compliance issues with environmental obligations are mostly due to capacity 
issues rather than an issue that can only be solved through the legal interpretation of a 
provision in the text of the treaty.  
                                                     
530
 Cartagena Protocol, article 34. 
531
  Wolfrum, R., Means of Ensuring Compliance with and Enforcement of International Environmental Law, 
Recueil des cours de l’académie de droit international 272, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1998, at 97; UNEP, 
“Compliance mechanisms under selected multilateral environmental agreements”, Nairobi, 2007, at 119-121. 4 
of the MEAs under review do not contain any provision regarding dispute settlement (Ramsare, World Heritage 
Convention, Whaling Convention and the London Dumping Convention). None of the MEAs under review 
contain provisions for mandatory arbitration (i.e. the obligation to subject a case to arbitration). 
532
 Birnie, P. W., Boyle, A. E. and Redgwell, C., International Law and the Environment (Third Edition), 
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, at 255-257. 
169 
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
Compliance mechanisms are structures created to enhance the effectiveness, good working 
and implementation of the international convention that establishes them. They also provide 
fixed and well-defined procedures to be followed in cases of suspected non-compliance, 
which enhances the legal certainty and due process of the proceedings for the State involved, 
and answers to questions of legitimacy. 
 
International environmental law is, as such, not evolving towards the application of more 
enforcement and punitive measures. However, international obligations stemming from 
environmental treaties are becoming clearer and more precise. Additionally, the strictness of a 
compliance mechanism is dependent on the economic benefits of possible non-compliance. 
Even though the goals of the mechanisms may be identical, the practical implementation 
varies and no two compliance mechanisms in MEAs are identical. They differ from each other 
on the question of whom or which organ has the competence to trigger a case of non-
compliance, the composition and power of decision of the compliance committee and the 
actions that can be taken in case of non-compliance. The difference in actions that can be 
taken is to some extent characteristic of the treaty or protocol under scrutiny, yet there are a 
number of horizontal elements that are unrelated to the specific qualities of the treaty. A 
compliance mechanism preferably consists of a fixed committee with independent experts 
who are part of the committee based on their personal capacities. The committee best operates 
independently from the COPs and MOPs and should be permitted to take measures without 
intervention from the parties, such as advisory decisions; technical assistance; formal 
declarations of non-compliance and compulsory compliance action plans or progress reports. 
Punitive measures such as the suspension of the rights and privileges emanating from the 
treaty are best kept as a part of the competences of the COPs or MOPs. The procedure should 
be open and transparent in which invoking confidentiality of the provided data should remain 
exceptional. Not only the parties themselves but also the secretariats and NGOs with expertise 
in the environmental field involved should have the competence to start a procedure of non-
compliance. Most of these NGOs are observers to these treaties and have shown their 
expertise and capability. Experience with the Kyoto Protocol furthermore shows that 
proceedings against a non-compliant Party should be done by the authorized convention 
bodies only, must respect the individual capacity of each State and must be supported by 
enough corroborating evidence. If any of these elements are not respected at any point during 
170 
 
the non-compliance procedure, countries will challenge its outcome, whatever that outcome 
may be.  
 
Non-compliance with the obligations set forth in an MEA is a breach of the rule of pacta sunt 
servanda and may lead to state responsibility for an internationally wrongful act under 
international law.
533
 Compliance mechanisms therefore respond to an existing demand for 
collective action by Parties in the event of non-compliance by one Party with its international 
obligations.
 534
 They are set up to the extent that such international obligations are not subject 
to the principle of reciprocity and that the main traditional answers to non-compliance and 
dispute resolution are not a viable solution. Compliance mechanisms in MEAs are therefore to 
be considered a form of dispute prevention rather than dispute settlement. In this respect it 
must be noted that they have quickly become part of the political instruments that help 
execute or apply an international treaty. They are formal and legal arrangements separate 
from the more classic dispute settlement systems such as negotiations, conciliation, arbitration 
and the ICJ, all of which are available to the parties, yet are not being applied in the context of 
MEAs. The special dynamics in the decision-making process of MEAs mean that compliance 
issues are addressed much faster than regular dispute settlement could achieve. These 
compliance issues are being given a political solution through gentle political pressure, 
consultation and negotiations within the COPs or MOPs. In short, compliance mechanisms 
have taken their place next to the classic dispute settlement systems, not at their expense but 
as a political arrangement for the prevention of conflicts. They are considered a necessary part 
of any MEA in terms of effectiveness of the conventions. They offer a more effective way to 
ensure compliance with the obligations found in MEAs compared to the traditional means of 
conflict resolution. Finally, they contribute to the effective implementation of international 
obligations by states.  
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Part 2: The way forward: Scenarios for a more effective International Environmental 
Governance 
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Chapter 4: The clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: a way to enhance 
the effectiveness of international environmental governance? 
 
“Coming together is a beginning;  
keeping together is progress;  
working together is success.” 
Henry Ford 
 
I. Introduction535 
 
As has been described supra
536
, the proliferation of MEAs gathered momentum after the 1972 
Stockholm Conference, with a redoubled effort after the 1992 Rio conference. The number of 
MEAs in existence is huge and continues to increase.
537
 The multitude of MEAs also means 
an enormous and increasing number of meetings of the respective Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs) of the MEAs, their subsidiary bodies, technical and scientific committees and 
countless ad-hoc working groups. There are thus ever more MEAs with more subsidiary 
bodies that are meeting more regularly.
538
 This has been considered to be symptomatic for a 
fragmented system. It has also been noted that most developing nations and the smaller 
developed nations are facing increasing difficulties to keep participating in all of these 
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Effectiveness (The Environmental Dimension of IFSD)”, Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development 
Issues Brief 2, 14 June 2011.  
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meetings.
539
 This poses increasing challenges to the legitimacy and transparency of the 
international environmental law-making process as a whole.
540
  
 
Similarly and in direct correlation, the risk of further fragmentation of the environmental 
governance system is rising. The proliferation of MEAs, both from a thematic and 
institutional point of view, means there is a rising danger of overlap, double work and conflict 
between these MEAs. This explains the greater demand for coordination between the different 
environmental regimes. There has been a growing realisation of the thematic overlap and the 
possibility for collaboration between MEAs. The clustering of MEAs, which has been the 
most visible answer of the international community to these demands, is considered to be one 
of the possible ways to deal with these concerns.  
 
The international community has not been oblivious to the risks of a fragmented international 
environmental legal scene. Since the 1970s various attempts have been made to provide a 
more holistic approach in dealing with environmental challenges and the legal instruments 
that form the international answer to them. Indeed, this was one of the reasons behind the 
creation of UNEP in the first place, even though this was never explicitly provided for in the 
mandate of the organisation.
541
 
 
Agenda 21, which was one of the outcome documents of the UNCED in 1992, emphasized 
the importance of “cooperation of international organisations”, “concerted activities” and, in 
short, a more holistic approach towards the governance of environmental issues.
542
 Even 
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 UN, “Agenda 21”, 1992, New York, available at 
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through the cooperation of relevant international organisations and industry, where appropriate, should: (a) 
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regulatory and non-regulatory measures to identify, and minimize exposure to, toxic chemicals by replacing 
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though the particular paragraph referred to was intended for the promotion of the 
“environmentally sound management” of chemicals, this wording in Agenda 21 constitutes 
the idea behind the clustering of MEAs in its most embryonic form. In the wake of the 
adoption of the three Rio Conventions
543
 and with the prospect of additional protocols to be 
developed in the years to follow, it should not be surprising that UNCED became concerned 
with possible governance disruptions this further proliferation of MEAs could cause. This is 
also one of the reasons why the three global Rio conventions have been perceived to be ideal 
test cases for additional clustering efforts.
544
 
 
In another effort to deal with the issues generally attributed to a fragmented IEG and MEA 
landscape, in August 2001, a so-called Joint Liaison Group (JLG) was established between 
the three Rio Conventions. The Ramsar Convention has since been included in the Group. 
The idea was that this liaison group would be able to provide these conventions with a forum 
to enhance coordination and synergies between them and to exchange information. Similarly, 
a Liaison Group of Biodiversity-related Conventions (LGBC) was created in 2004 in order to 
enhance coherence and cooperation in the implementation efforts between the five global 
conventions from the biodiversity field: (1) CBD, (2) CITES, (3) CMS, (4) the Convention 
concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage (World Heritage 
Convention)
545
 and (5) the Ramsar Convention. The International Treaty on Plant Genetic 
                                                                                                                                                                      
them with less toxic substitutes and ultimately phasing out the chemicals that pose unreasonable and otherwise 
unmanageable risk to human health and the environment and those that are toxic, persistent and bio-
accumulative and whose use cannot be adequately controlled; (d) Increase efforts to identify national needs for 
standard setting and implementation in the context of the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius in order to minimize 
adverse effects of chemicals in food; (e) Develop national policies and adopt the necessary regulatory framework 
for prevention of accidents, preparedness and response, inter alia, through land-use planning, permit systems and 
reporting requirements on accidents, and work with the OECD/UNEP international directory of regional 
response centres and the APELL programme; (f) Promote establishment and strengthening, as appropriate, of 
national poison control centres to ensure prompt and adequate diagnosis and treatment of poisonings; (g) Reduce 
overdependence on the use of agricultural chemicals through alternative farming practices, integrated pest 
management and other appropriate means; (h) Require manufacturers, importers and others handling toxic 
chemicals to develop, with the cooperation of producers of such chemicals, where applicable, emergency 
response procedures and preparation of on-site and off-site emergency response plans; (i) Identify, assess, reduce 
and minimize, or eliminate as far as feasible by environmentally sound disposal practices, risks from storage of 
outdated chemicals”.  
543
 The Convention on Biological Diversity, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, and 
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and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa. 
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 See for instance: Young, W., “Rio Conventions Redux: An argument for Merging the Trio into a single 
convention on Environmental Management”, Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development, 2010, 4 (1), 
134-154. Young proposes to cluster the three Rio conventions into one Convention on Environmental 
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Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGR) was later included in this group. These Liaison 
Groups have met on average once every year since their establishment.
546
 Other means that 
have been used to enhance the coordination and cooperation between MEAs are the joint 
work programs between MEAs
547
, the REDD program
548
 and the joint programs initiated by 
UNEP and the World Conservation Monitoring Centre (WCMC).
549
  
 
“[...] Activities by such groups foster better links for environmental 
management through reports and suggestions such as the UNFCCC 
and CBD Joint Working Group on biodiversity and climate change 
that identified sets of actions to deal with conservation action, 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change and the environment 
management group working on synergistic implementation of MEAs” 
[...].
550
  
 
However, it has also become increasingly clear that the mandates of these groups are very 
limited and their resources thin-spread when it comes to providing an institutional answer to 
the demand for a more holistic approach to environmental concerns and the linkages between 
different MEAs and MEA clusters. This is especially true in light of the growing awareness of 
subject linkages between for example the CBD and the UNFCCC.  
 
This growing awareness of synergies has resulted in two findings. Firstly, it has shown that 
informal group meetings are insufficient to deal with these synergies. Joint programs and 
inter-agency initiatives clearly have their merit, yet in practice they have been mostly about 
helping developing countries with the implementation of national strategies, facilitation of the 
decision-making processes and providing scientific knowledge. They have done very little in 
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providing adequate policy responses to the growing field of ungoverned linkages between the 
existing MEAs. Secondly, these new-found synergies have given new impetus to the idea that 
further collaborative efforts between MEAs and the clustering of MEAs could provide a 
relatively easy answer to the demand for greater coordination and centralization in the 
environmental field.  
 
Since the adoption of Agenda 21, the idea of clustering MEAs has gathered momentum in the 
UNEP-induced debate on Global Environmental Governance, which was initiated early in 
2001. It has since been an integral part of the IEG reform process. The clustering of MEAs 
and certain of their implementation functions is being considered in light of enhancing the 
institutional framework for sustainable development governance. It is also one of the policy 
options that have since been reiterated numerous times in the IEG debate. The 2005 World 
Summit Outcome Document spoke of “system-wide coherence” in the environmental field, 
and enhanced coordination was but one of many instruments that would be applied to achieve 
that goal.
551
 Again in the Belgrade Process, the ongoing IEG reform process leading up to the 
2012 Rio+20 Summit, the clustering of MEAs is a prominent factor in the debate.
552
  
 
Additionally, the international community has gained important experience and arguably new 
insights in clustering since the clustering efforts with three chemical-related conventions 
reached cruising speed in 2010.
553
 It has already served as an inspiration for calls for 
clustering other treaties or clusters of treaties and the Rio-conventions.
554
 A careful analysis 
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of this process furthermore provides a wealth of information about the clustering process, its 
possibilities, pitfalls and limitations. This is important information when assessing the 
possibility to use clustering as a technique to improve the effectiveness of environmental 
governance and contribute to an improved IEG. Given the fact that the Belgrade Process is 
explicitly focusing on clustering as a way to deal with the growing fragmentation in 
international environmental law and the dispersion of MEAs, this analysis is all the more 
relevant. It is for these reasons that clustering is considered in this chapter. 
 
II. Definition 
 
While effective implementation of clustering efforts between MEAs is gathering momentum, 
it is not a new concept. As established before, arguably the concept has been around for more 
than a decade in the political fora concerned with environmental governance. Despite all this 
attention in the political sphere however it is surprisingly difficult to find a univocal definition 
of the concept. The scarce scholarly attention for clustering has found consensus in the 
definition by Von Moltke, namely “[...] a variety of institutional and organisational 
arrangements short of merger that will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of existing 
agreements without requiring elaborate changes in legal and administrative arrangements”.555  
 
This definition is both broad and limiting at the same time. From a political perspective, the 
definition provides a perfect demarcation, exemplified by the clustering processes that have 
developed over the last decade. For instance, the clustering efforts and synergies process 
between the chemicals-related conventions perfectly fits within the limits of the definition by 
Von Moltke. From a legal perspective however, this definition limits the scope of the 
clustering concept by specifically excluding legal changes and mergers of conventions 
(“without requiring elaborate changes in legal and administrative arrangements”).  
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It is argued that clustering can be more and go much further than a purely political process. 
The term “clustering” has so far been used mostly in a political sense, which means that 
clustering MEAs has been made dependent upon the political feasibility of the project. 
Looking at clustering from a legal perspective however, other elements than the political 
feasibility of the project are at play. Therefore, for the scope of this chapter, the definition of 
clustering by Von Moltke is applied only in those cases where clustering is pursued based 
upon the political feasibility of the process. This will be further referred to as political 
clustering. In those cases where legally more challenging choices such as amendments of the 
base conventions may be necessary and the clustering process is conducted averse to political 
sensitivities, the term legal clustering will be used.  
 
In the following parts these two concepts will be further detailed and applied. In (III) the 
definition of political clustering is refined and detailed, after which the definition will be put 
into practice by investigating the clustering efforts between three chemicals-related 
conventions under (IV); analysis of its practical implementation provides an overview of the 
possibilities, pitfalls and limitations of political clustering. Under (V), the linkages between 
the climate change regime and the biodiversity cluster of MEAs are investigated. After this, 
under (VI), the term legal clustering will be further defined. In (VII) this definition is then 
applied to the (fictitious) case of clustering five selected global biodiversity-related 
conventions. An analysis of the legal challenges and pitfalls of this process will be made and 
put to the test using three scenarios: (i) creating common long-term objectives and strategies, 
with the ability to organize joint COPs, (ii) organising a joint secretariat and uniform 
secretariat mandates for all five conventions under consideration, and (iii) creating a common 
compliance regime or mechanism for the MEAs involved. Finally, the possible role of UNEP 
within the clustering process (both political and legal) is considered under (VIII).  
 
III. Political clustering: definition 
 
Political clustering must be understood as a technique to improve the effectiveness of 
international environmental law and to achieve more effective governance structures. As 
described supra, it has been defined as “[...] a variety of institutional and organisational 
arrangements (1) short of merger (2) that will increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
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existing agreements (3) without requiring elaborate changes in legal and administrative 
arrangements (4)”.556 This definition contains several aspects that deserve further elaboration.  
 
Firstly (1), each MEA is legally autonomous, with the COP being its central decision-making 
body.
557
 Political clustering efforts must therefore, in the rationale of the definition, 
necessarily be COP-driven. The COPs are the highest legal power to govern their respective 
MEA and they are as such the main drivers of any clustering effort. Clustering is considered 
to be a bottom-up process, which is not suitable for top-down steering. Added to this is the 
fact that each MEA has created its own institutional arrangements, approaches and rationales. 
This will also directly affect clustering: the objectives and methods used may differ from one 
clustering effort to the next. Clustering is therefore not described as a singular act: it is a 
political process that may take years before reaping results and the results will always be 
customised to the MEAs involved in a particular clustering process.  
 
Secondly (2), the clustering of MEAs must not be equated to the merging of MEAs. Merging 
can be defined as the situation where two or more international conventions dissolve their 
institutional arrangements and form new such arrangements together. This may also 
encompass the adoption of a new convention. Merging is arguably the most extreme form of 
clustering. One notable example of this practice (and likely the only one of its kind) is the 
creation of the OSPAR Convention.
558
 However with political clustering the “autonomous 
institutional arrangements”559 of each MEA remain in place and the texts of the underlying 
conventions are not merged into one agreement as such.
560
  
 
Thirdly (3), the goal of clustering is ultimately to provide better governance. This means that 
clustering is expected to provide gains in efficiency and effectiveness in the governing of the 
MEAs involved in the clustering effort. It is therefore meant to be a work- and cost-effective 
means to the end of a more coordinated IEG.  
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Lastly (4), the definition determines that political clustering should not require elaborate 
changes to the institutional or legal framework of the MEAs involved. This is also linked to 
the above-described cost and time efficiency. Political clustering must therefore necessarily 
be limited to MEAs that are cumulatively linked in a thematic and geographical manner.
561
 
For instance, clustering the Montreal Protocol with the UNFCCC is not considered under 
political clustering because of the geographic spread of their respective secretariats (Nairobi 
and Bonn), even though both conventions are thematically linked around the atmosphere.  
 
The range of measures that can be taken while applying political clustering is very broad.
562
 
After all, political clustering can be applied as long as it does “not require elaborate changes 
in the legal and administrative arrangements” of the MEAs involved. Insofar as the clustering 
effort does not impair the original meaning of the treaty or one or more of its provisions the 
parties to the convention had intended, the legal limit of political clustering is the consent of 
the parties to the underlying conventions.
563
  
 
Most MEAs provide the explicit competence for their respective COP to adopt any measures 
required for the implementation of the convention. In the cases where this competence had not 
explicitly been provided for in the original text of the MEA itself, it has either been amended 
by the COP to include this competence or, in absence thereof, COPs have applied the 
competence nonetheless.
564
 The implied powers theorem
565
 is as such applicable to MEAs and 
their institutional arrangements. This means that the possibilities to apply political clustering 
are limited only by the interpretation and implementation the COP gives to the MEAs and the 
flexibility it applies when interpreting the convention texts. 
                                                     
561
 Geography is considered here given the fact that the seats of the secretariats of the different MEAs are spread 
out across the globe. Von Moltke contends that it is unfeasible to cluster the secretariats of MEAs if they are 
located in different places.  
562
 See, for some examples, Von Moltke, K., On clustering international environmental agreements, Winnipeg, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development, 2001. See also Oberthür, S., “Clustering of multilateral 
environmental agreements: potentials and limitations”, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law 
and Economics, 2002, 2, 317-340. 
563
 See articles 9, 11, 12 and 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See also supra, Chapter 2. 
564
 See supra, Chapter 2.  
565
 The basis for this theory can be found in the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in its 
Reparations for Injuries Advisory Opinion: ICJ, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations, Advisory Opinion (UNGA), 11 April 1949, 1949 ICJ Reports 174; this theory was later confirmed in 
the Effect of Awards Case, ICJ, Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative 
Tribunal, Advisory Opinion (UNGA), 13 July 1954, 1954 ICJ Reports 47. For an overview, see also Klabbers, J., 
An introduction to international institutional law (2
nd
 Edition), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, 
specifically at 66 and following. 
181 
 
As described supra
566
, the COPs have significant liberty to interpret and delimit the meaning 
of the convention texts. They also have the competence to take all necessary decisions for the 
implementation of the convention. Theoretically, the possible measures that may be adopted 
are limited only by political realities. As long as political agreement can be found within the 
COPs, then the member states may decide to cluster as many elements of the MEA regimes as 
they see fit. The only real legal boundaries to political clustering are the texts of the 
conventions expressing the member states’ legal will.567 Essentially, amendments to the 
conventions would fall under the exception of “elaborate changes” and are therefore not to be 
considered under political clustering. Oberthür even explicitly states that amendments would 
be disadvantageous to the clustering process.
568
 It is for these reasons that amendments of the 
conventions are considered to be the legal limit of political clustering efforts: political 
clustering is a form of clustering which does not require amending any of the conventions that 
are the subject of the clustering effort.  
 
In order to further define the idea of political clustering of MEAs, comprehensive overviews 
of how the theoretical concept of clustering translates in practice have been developed. This 
proves indeed a necessary exercise once the enormous breath of clustering and the amount of 
possible theoretical interpretations and practical implications are fully understood. Which 
MEAs should be involved in a given clustering process and how should this decision be 
made? Should focus be given to clustering the financial mechanisms of the MEAs, their 
compliance procedures or rather the administrative components of the MEA secretariats 
involved? Or should new supporting structures be created that would provide centralized 
services to the MEA secretariats? Additional clarification of the clustering concept proves 
necessary: what is it that political clustering attempts to do?  
 
For the practical application of political clustering, a double distinction must be made. Firstly, 
it must be decided which MEAs are suited for clustering. The criterion here can be either 
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thematic interrelatedness or geographic convenience. Secondly, it must be decided what 
elements of the selected MEAs will be clustered. Will the clustering effort limit itself to 
organisational elements of the MEA secretariats, or will certain functions (such as financial, 
administrative and/or legal support) of the MEA secretariats be clustered? 
 
A. Which MEAs should be clustered? 
 
1. Thematic approach 
 
It is generally accepted that there are roughly six categories of MEAs if the thematic approach 
is followed: (i) biodiversity, (ii) the atmosphere, (iii) land, (iv) chemicals and hazardous 
wastes, (v) regional seas, and (vi) pollution and waste management. Other sources use a 
similar division of the MEAs, with only minor variations in the rather arbitrary assignments of 
the MEAs to their respective cluster.
569
 Within this approach, the MEAs would be involved in 
clustering efforts based around these six categories.  
 
From a content point of view this categorization seems to make sense as a starting point for 
clustering efforts; however the downside would be that many secretariats would actually have 
to change their physical location and move, in some cases half over the world. For instance, 
the atmosphere cluster contains (a.o.) the UNFCCC, located in Bonn, and the Ozone regime 
which is hosted by UNEP in Nairobi. Physically clustering these conventions would make the 
clustering effort politically very difficult, as many of the host countries would not be willing 
to let the secretariat they host move away without a political fight. On top of that, a physical 
move brings about many administrative costs. Given the fact that the idea is to have a “cost- 
and effort effective means to improve IEG” it doesn’t fit well with the general understanding 
of what political clustering should achieve and the framework within which it should operate.  
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2. Geographic approach 
 
The geographic approach on the other hand does not have that issue: it centralizes the 
clustering efforts around physical closeness and institutional convenience and focuses on the 
existing centres for international negotiations. To name but a few: New York, Geneva, Bonn, 
Rome and Nairobi. Clustering would thus be made dependent on the coincidence of where, or 
under what organisation, current secretariats have their location. Positive effects would be that 
clustering according to this criterion would indeed be an effort-effective way to enhance the 
closeness and interplay between MEA secretariats, by, for example, housing them in the same 
building. At the very least it could provide cost benefits. On the downside however it would 
be the case that thematically unrelated MEAs would fall within the same cluster purely based 
on their location or secretariat host. For example, the Ozone regime (part of the thematic 
cluster around atmosphere), large parts of the chemicals regime (thematic cluster of chemicals 
and hazardous wastes) and the CBD and CMS (thematically linked to the biodiversity cluster) 
all have their secretariat provided for by UNEP, respectively in Nairobi, Geneva and Bonn. 
Clustering these autonomous and thematically unrelated MEAs would be a politically 
impossible task.  
 
B. Which elements of the MEAs should be clustered? 
 
1. Organisational elements 
 
The second distinction deals with the question which elements of the selected MEAs should 
be clustered. The most far-going possibility is the clustering of organisational elements of the 
MEAs, their COPs, subsidiary bodies and/or secretariats. Possible elements in the clustering 
efforts here could be holding COP meetings at the same location every year, arrange meetings 
back-to-back (which means that they are held one after another in the same location) or co-
locate the MEA secretariats.
570
 The efficiency gains that can be made by applying this form of 
clustering are obvious and it would put an end to the nomadic habit of having environmental 
meetings take place all over the world, which has been referred to as a “travelling circus”571, 
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and thus alleviate some of the growing negotiation burden on countries. However at the same 
time the dispersion of MEA meetings over different fora also has its advantages: the 
organisation of such a meeting does not place an unnecessary burden on the host country, 
meaning that also developing countries can be hosts to these meetings; and holding these 
meetings all over the world has an important awareness-raising function.
572
  
 
2. Functional elements 
 
Finally, the clustering of functional elements of MEAs must be clarified. MEAs all share and 
perform a series of similar functions: scientific assessment of the environmental domain 
regulated by the MEAs; compliance review and dispute settlement through assessment of 
country reports; and implementation support for member states to the treaty, for instance 
through capacity building measures or the transfer of financial support. Clustering these 
functions or setting one central mechanism to deal with these tasks again would provide 
increased efficiency and cost reduction. This could be done by creating blueprints of common 
rules, procedures and mechanisms – such as the UNEP Guidelines on compliance with and 
enforcement of multilateral environmental agreements.
573
  
 
C. Overview 
 
Below is a schematic overview of the possible theoretical scenarios for political clustering 
efforts with MEAs. It should be noted that identifying the kind of clustering technique used is 
relative and arguably arbitrary. Similarly, functional and organisational elements will always 
be mixed in a clustering effort. The table and the distinction is therefore a purely theoretical 
exercise rather than a reflection of practice.   
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 Oberthür, S., “Clustering of multilateral environmental agreements: potentials and limitations”, International 
Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2002, 2, 317-340. 
573
 UNEP, “Guidelines on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, Doc 
UNEP/SS.VII/4, February 2002. The more extreme form of this would be the creation of a World Environment 
Organisation that would harness these procedures, at least for newly created MEAs. The downside of both forms 
of clustering functions of MEAs is the fact that they cannot be imposed. As explained supra, it is up to the COP 
of each MEA to decide for itself, on an ad hoc and case-to-case basis, if it wishes to adopt certain available 
blueprints, practices or, indeed, membership to a possible WEO or adoption of its proposed formats. See also 
supra, chapters 2 and 3.  
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Table: Overview of the different theoretical scenarios in the political clustering of MEAs 
 
IV. Application of political clustering: the clustering process of the three chemicals-related 
conventions 
 
The furthest a political clustering effort has gone so far is the clustering of three chemicals-
related conventions: the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of 
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal
574
; the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed 
Consent for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade
575
; and the 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants
576
. Each of these three conventions 
will briefly be elaborated on, before analyzing the clustering process between them in more 
detail.
577
  
                                                     
574
 Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, 1989, 
1673 UNTS 57 (Basel Convention). 
575
 Convention on the Prior Informed Consent for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International 
Trade, 1998, 38 ILM 1734 (1998) (Rotterdam Convention).  
576
 Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, 2001, 2255 UNTS 119, 40 ILM 532 (2001) (Stockholm 
Convention). 
577
 This part draws upon information obtained from a Webinar followed by a Q&A with the Webinar presenters 
on 1 July 2011. The event was organised by the secretariat of the Stockholm Convention: “Webinars on 
Promoting synergies among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions”, available at 
MEA Clustering 
Which of the MEAs will be clustered? 
Thematic Approach 
(Content of MEAs) 
Geographic Approach 
(Location of 
secretariats) 
Which elements 
of the MEAs 
will be 
clustered? 
Organisational 
elements 
e.g.: the cluster of 
chemical-related 
conventions 
e.g.: the UNFCCC, 
UNCCD and the CMS, 
sharing the same 
secretariat facilities in 
Bonn 
Functional 
Elements 
e.g.: the ozone regime as 
organized by UNEP 
e.g.: the co-location of 
the CBD, Basel 
Convention and Ozone 
Regime under the 
auspices of UNEP 
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A. The Basel Convention 
 
Because of tightening environmental standards in industrialized countries, the late ‘80s saw a 
dramatic rise in the disposal costs for chemical and toxic wastes. Public outcry over the 
subsequent practice to ship and export these wastes to developing countries prompted the 
adoption of the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous 
Wastes and their Disposal, in 1989. The Basel Convention was created to protect people and 
the environment from the negative effects of the inappropriate management of hazardous 
wastes worldwide. It is the most comprehensive global treaty dealing with hazardous wastes 
from its generation, transport to disposal.  
 
The key objectives of the Basel Convention are threefold: (i) to minimize the generation of 
hazardous wastes in terms of quantity and toxicity, (ii) to dispose of them as close to the 
source of generation as possible, and (iii) to reduce the movement of hazardous wastes. 
Through the process of environmentally sound management (ESM)
578
, human health and the 
environment are protected by strictly controlling the generation, storage, transport, treatment, 
re-use, recycling, recovery and final disposal of hazardous wastes. Adverse effects resulting 
from these activities are minimized.  
 
The COP meets approximately once every two years.
579
 Apart from the secretariat which was 
provided for in the text of the Convention itself, the COP of the Basel Convention has set up 
                                                                                                                                                                      
http://chm.pops.int/Convention/Meetings/Webinars/tabid/1529/language/en-US/Default.aspx. See also 
Pallemaerts, M., Toxics and transnational law: international and European regulation of toxic substances as 
legal symbolism, Studies in International Law 2, Oxford, Hart, 2003.  
578
 The environmentally sound management means taking all practical steps to minimize the generation of 
hazardous wastes and strictly controlling its storage, transport, treatment, reuse, recycling, recovery and final 
disposal, the purpose of which is to protect human health and the environment. “The environmentally sound 
management (ESM) of hazardous chemicals and wastes has been on the international agenda for many years. 
Many multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs), intergovernmental organisations and international 
coordinating mechanisms have been set up over the past 20 years to deal with the risks hazardous chemicals and 
wastes pose to human health and the environment. Among them are the Stockholm, Basel and Rotterdam 
Conventions.” UN, “Synergies Success Stories on Enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, 
Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions”, New York, 2011, at 3, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/publications/sdt_toxichem/synergies_success_stories.pdf.  
579
 Previous COP meetings have been convened in 1992, 1994, 1995, 1998, 1999, 2002, 2006 and 2008. In 2011 
COP 10 has been organised. For an overview of the COP meetings of the Basel Convention and the decisions 
adopted there, see the Convention website at http://www.basel.int/meetings/cop/cop-0.html.  
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three subsidiary bodies
580
: (i) the so-called Expanded Bureau which provides operational 
advice and directions to the Secretariat in the period between COPs and which meets yearly, 
(ii) the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) which assists the COP with technical, policy 
and scientific advice, and (iii) a Compliance Committee which provides assistance to Parties 
with compliance issues. UNEP (through its offices in Geneva) is the host for the Convention 
secretariat. The Basel Convention entered into force in 1992 and has 176 Parties at the time of 
writing. 
 
B. The Rotterdam Convention 
 
The Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent for Certain Hazardous Chemicals 
and Pesticides in International Trade was adopted on 10 September 1998. The objectives of 
the Convention are  
 
“to promote shared responsibility and cooperative efforts among 
Parties in the international trade of certain hazardous chemicals in 
order to protect human health and the environment from potential 
harm and to contribute to the environmentally sound use of those 
hazardous chemicals, by facilitating information exchange about their 
characteristics, by providing for a national decision-making process 
on their import and export and by disseminating these decisions to 
Parties”.581  
 
The Convention provides Parties with a first line of defence against hazardous chemicals. It 
promotes international efforts to protect human health and the environment as well as enables 
countries to decide if they want to import hazardous chemicals and pesticides listed in the 
Convention. Essentially, the Convention installs a mandatory Prior Informed Consent (PIC) 
procedure, which builds upon the existing voluntary PIC procedure
582
 established by UNEP 
                                                     
580
 See Basel Convention, “Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Basel Convention on the control of 
transboundary movements of hazardous wastes and their disposal”, doc UNEP/CHW.6/40, 10 February 2003, 
specifically VI/12 and VI/36.  
581
 See also the Convention’s website at www.pic.com.  
582
 The “Prior Informed Consent” procedure entails that shipments to and from non-Parties made without consent 
are illegal unless there is a special agreement. Each Party is required to introduce appropriate national or 
domestic legislation to prevent and punish illegal traffic in hazardous and other wastes. Illegal traffic is criminal. 
“In 1989, the Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), by its decision 15/30, 
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and the FAO, for the transboundary movement of an annexed list of chemicals, including 
pesticides and industrial chemicals that have been banned or heavily restricted by Parties to 
the Convention. Over 40 chemicals have been added to this list.  
 
In Article 18 of the Convention, the Conference of the Parties is established as the governing 
body of the Convention, and which meets every two years.
583
 The COP has so far established 
only one subsidiary body: the Chemicals Review Committee (CRC), responsible for assisting 
and preparing COP decisions on the listing of new POPs. The secretariat is managed jointly 
by UNEP and the FAO.
584
 The Rotterdam Convention entered into force in 2004 and 
currently has 143 Parties. 
 
C. The Stockholm Convention 
 
The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants is a global convention dealing 
with carbon based chemicals that “remain intact in the environment for long periods, become 
widely distributed geographically, accumulate in the fatty tissue of humans and wildlife, and 
have adverse effects to human health or to the environment”.585  The Convention was adopted 
in 2001 and responded to these issues by requiring Parties to eliminate or reduce the release of 
POPs. It aims to protect human health and the environment from highly dangerous, long-
lasting chemicals by restricting and ultimately eliminating their production, use, trade, release 
and storage.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and the FAO Conference, by Resolution 6/89, incorporated the Prior Informed Consent (PIC) procedure for 
Pesticides and other Chemicals that are banned or severely restricted into the “Amended London Guidelines on 
the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade” and the “International Code of Conduct on 
the Distribution and Use of Pesticides” respectively. UNEP and FAO, in accordance with Decision 15/11 and 
Resolution 6/89, jointly execute the voluntary PIC Procedure”. See 
http://www.fao.org/unfao/bodies/conf/c97/w5918e.htm.  
583
 The previous COPs took place in 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2008. COP 5 took place in 2011. For an overview of 
the COP meetings and the decisions adopted there: 
http://www.pic.int/TheConvention/ConferenceOftheParties/MeetingsDocuments/COP5/tabid/1400/language/en-
US/Default.aspx.  
584
 Article 19 para 3 of the Rotterdam Convention determines: “The secretariat functions for this Convention 
shall be performed jointly by the Executive Director of UNEP and the Director-General of FAO, subject to such 
arrangements as shall be agreed between them and approved by the Conference of the Parties”. See also 
Decision RC-1/12 on the physical location of the secretariat, as found in annex I of Rotterdam Convention, 
“Report of the Conference of the Parties to the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure 
for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade on the work of its first meeting”, Doc 
UNEP/FAO/RC/COP.1/33, 22 October 2004.  
585
 See also the Convention’s website at chm.pops.int.  
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The Convention basically establishes a cascade of three regimes: Annex A to the Convention 
lists a number of POPs that are eliminated by the Parties, Annex B restricts the use of certain 
chemicals and Annex C deals with the unintentional production of certain chemicals. In order 
to help the COP with its reviewing task, two subsidiary bodies have been established by the 
COP: (i) the Persistent Organic Pollutants Review Committee (POPRC), which investigates 
and makes recommendations to the COP upon proposals to add chemicals to one of the 
annexes; and (ii) the Expert Group on Best Available Techniques and Best Environmental 
Practices (BAT/BEP), which aims to assist countries with the implementation of the 
Convention through the establishment of a clearing-house mechanism.  
 
As with the Basel Convention, the Geneva offices of UNEP host the Convention secretariat. 
The COP was established by article 19 of the Convention and convenes once every two 
years.
586
 The Stockholm Convention entered into force in 2004 and has a total of 173 Parties. 
 
D. Common elements 
 
These three MEAs share the common goal of protecting human health and the environment 
from hazardous chemicals and wastes, and aim to assist countries to safely manage chemicals 
at different stages of their life-cycle: the Stockholm Convention is focused on the production 
and use of certain chemicals
587
, the Rotterdam Convention on their trade
588
, and the Basel 
Convention on their disposal and transboundary movement
589
.  
 
The common threat that is being addressed by all three conventions is that of the persistent 
organic pollutants (POPs). Several of these chemicals are covered by more than two or even 
all these conventions, “[...] such as polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), aldrin or toxaphene. 
For the implementation of the three conventions, national frameworks, coordination 
                                                     
586
 COP meetings have taken place in 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009 and 2011. For an overview of the COP meetings 
and the decisions adopted there, see http://chm.pops.int/Convention/COP/AbouttheCOP/tabid/578/language/en-
US/Default.aspx.  
587
 The Stockholm Convention covers 15 pesticides. In addition, it regulates the use of 7 industrial chemicals and 
their (potential) by-products.  
588
 The Rotterdam Convention covers pesticides and industrial chemicals that have been banned or severely 
restricted for health or environmental reasons by Parties and which have been notified by Parties for inclusion in 
the PIC procedure.  
589
 The Basel Convention covers hazardous wastes that are explosive, flammable, reactive, poisonous, infectious, 
corrosive, toxic or eco-toxic.  
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mechanisms and enforcement structures need to be in place. Those frameworks and 
mechanisms provide an opportunity for coordinated implementation of the three 
conventions.”590  
 
This common goal and unity in function made it possible to adopt the so-called life-cycle 
approach. The idea of guiding the use of chemicals “cradle-to-grave” has long been promoted 
for chemicals management at the international level; indeed, the first call for integrated 
management was already done in Agenda 21.
591
 Ever since, the call for a cradle-to-grave 
approach has been reiterated numerous times.
592
 A closer cooperation between these MEAs 
would provide countries with assistance in dealing with chemicals and wastes from their 
discovery over their day-to-day uses to their disposal.  
 
E. Process 
 
The effective clustering process itself for the three chemicals conventions began in 2006, 
when the COPs of the three conventions adopted identical decisions establishing an Ad Hoc 
Joint Working Group (AHJWG) on enhancing cooperation and coordination among the three 
conventions.
593
 This AHJWG was composed of 15 members states to each of the conventions 
for a total of 45 (the meetings of the group were not open to observers) and met three times 
over the course of 2 years.
594
 The AHJWG agreed on a set of recommendations promoting 
synergies between the conventions and drafted a decision for consideration by the three 
COPs. Through Basel Decision IX/10, Rotterdam Decision RC-4/11 and Stockholm Decision 
SC-4/34, the three COPs adopted this decision and authorized enhanced cooperation and 
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 UN, “Synergies Success Stories on Enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and 
Stockholm conventions”, New York, 2011, at 3. 
591
 See specifically paragraph 49; see also supra, under I.  
592
 See for instance (non-exhaustive): Stockholm Convention, “Enhancing synergies within the chemicals and 
waste cluster”, Doc SC-1/18, 6 May 2006; Rotterdam Convention, “Enhancing synergies between the 
secretariats of the chemicals and waste conventions”, Doc RC-2/6, 30 September 2005; UNEP, “International 
Environmental Governance”, UNEP Doc SS.VII/1, 15 February 2002; UN, “World Summit Outcome”, UN 
General Assembly, Doc A/RES/60/1, 24 October 2005, available at 
http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html, specifically at paragraph 169. 
593
 Stockholm Convention, “Synergies”, Doc SC-2/15, 5 May 2006; Rotterdam Convention, “Cooperation and 
coordination between the Rotterdam, Basel and Stockholm Conventions”, Doc RC-3/8, 13 October 2006; Basel 
Convention, “International cooperation and synergies”, UNEP/CHW.8/3/Rev.1, 1 December 2006.  
594
 For an overview of the work and meeting documents of the AHJWG on enhancing cooperation and 
coordination among the three conventions, see http://ahjwg.chem.unep.ch/.  
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coordination.
595
 Furthermore, the Synergies Decisions held provisions for the establishment of 
a joint COP for the three conventions, which was to be held in coordination and conjunction 
with the 11
th
 Special Session of the UNEP Governing Council / Global Ministerial 
Environment Forum (GC/GMEF) in Bali, Indonesia, in February 2010. To that end, a so-
called Synergies Overview Team (SOT) was set up under the shared auspices of UNEP and 
FAO, which supported the day-to-day preparations for the Joint COP meeting and was 
responsible for the implementation of the Synergies Decisions.  
 
During their first meeting in Bali, Indonesia, the Joint COPs adopted the so-called Omnibus 
Decision which was subsequently taken up integrally by the three COPs of the chemicals 
conventions through decisions BC.Ex-1/1, RC.Ex-1/1 and SC.Ex-1/1 respectively.
596
 In 2011, 
the COPs of the three conventions adopted a new, identical decision on synergies in order to 
further increase the organisational synergies and implement new joint-activities, and to 
strengthen the Omnibus Decision where necessary.
597
 A new, simultaneous COP meeting by 
the three convention COPs is planned for 2013.  
 
F. Outcomes 
 
A wide range of measures has been adopted in the Omnibus Decision: from the coordinated 
use of regional offices and more programmatic cooperation in field, over synchronization of 
reporting obligations and common websites and public outreach and awareness-raising 
projects. In addition, a series of administrative and decision-making arrangements were 
adopted. The Omnibus Decision basically deals with six different themes: (1) joint activities, 
(2) joint managerial functions, (3) joint services, (4) joint audits, (5) synchronization of 
budget cycles and (6) review arrangements. 
 
                                                     
595
 UNEP, “Cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions”, Doc IX/10, 
RC-4/11 and SC-4/34, UNEP/CHW.9/39, 27 June 2008 (Synergies Decisions). While the numbering and date of 
adoption is different (because fit in the documentation numbering of each of the three conventions), the texts and 
content of the decisions are identical.  
596
 Joint Ex-Cops, “Omnibus Decision”, BC.Ex-1/1, RC.Ex-1/1 and SC.Ex-1/1. In the preamble, the Omnibus 
Decision determines: “[…] In consideration of the fact that, simultaneously with the adoption of the present 
decision, the conferences of the Parties to the Basel and Rotterdam conventions are adopting decisions that are in 
substance identical to the present decision, […]” 
597
 COP 5 of the Stockholm Convention, which took place from 25-29 April 2011, adopted decision SC-5/27 on 
“Enhancing Cooperation among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions”; the COP of the Rotterdam 
Convention convened between 20-24 June 2011 and adopted the same decision, in RC-5/25; also the Basel COP 
has adopted the same definition. 
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1. Joint Activities 
 
Parties and other stakeholders to the three conventions are to undertake cooperative and 
coordinated activities and to involve national and regional focal points for the implementation 
of the conventions and the Synergies Decision. To that effect, additional resources are 
requested to the parties of the three conventions. Parties, regional centres and other 
stakeholders are invited to exchange experiences on activities carried out to implement the 
synergies decisions and to report to the COPs of all three conventions. Apart from that, 
UNEP, UNDP, the FAO, WHO, the World Bank and the GEF are all requested to report on 
their efforts to promote programmatic cooperation and coordination at the national level. A 
work plan for the creation of a shared clearing house mechanism (CHM) for the three 
conventions was endorsed on a preliminary basis. The secretariats will continue to implement 
these joint activities; additionally, they will develop proposals for new cross-cutting joint 
activities. 
 
2. Joint Managerial Functions 
 
The Omnibus Decision creates a joint head function for the secretariats of the Basel, 
Stockholm and UNEP part of the Rotterdam Convention. The Executive Director of UNEP 
was expected to recruit this joint head for an initial period of two years. In April 2011 the new 
joint head took up his position. It must be noted that the joint head function for the secretariats 
has long been discussed in the diplomatic negotiations; many parties felt that a coordinating 
group would be better suited. Guarantees against the politicization of the function, the clear 
and limited timeframe of two years and the promised review of the cost-efficiency of the 
function in the end were deciding factors in favour of the establishment of the joint head 
function.  
 
3. Joint Services 
 
The Omnibus Decision establishes a series of joint services, namely: financial and 
administrative support services, joint legal services, joint IT services, joint information 
services and joint resource mobilization services. Furthermore, a proposal on common 
arrangements for staffing and financing was approved. The idea behind this is explicit and 
depends on the fulfilment of two conditions: (i) the joint services and joint head function are 
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to be cost-neutral with respect to the adopted operating budgets of the three Conventions, and 
(ii) the conventions expect to save costs on support services and to be able to move resources 
towards the implementation of the conventions.  
  
4. Joint Audits 
 
The United Nations Office for Internal Oversight Services was requested to audit the strategic 
management of the MEAs under UNEP auspices, and the UNEP Executive Director will 
presented a report on this audit to the COPs in 2013.  
 
5. Synchronization of Budget Cycles 
 
The secretariats are requested to continue to synchronize the budget cycles of the three 
conventions. 
 
6. Review arrangements 
 
The Synergies Decision and the Omnibus Decision have both been adopted with the aim of 
strengthening the implementation of the three conventions at national, regional and global 
levels, to promote coherent policy guidance and to reduce the administrative burden on 
parties. Furthermore, it attempts to maximize the effective use of resources and protect human 
health and the environment for the promotion of sustainable development, without losing 
sight of the global concerns and specific needs of developing and transition countries. The 
Omnibus Decision therefore determines that a review mechanism is installed. This 
mechanism will be used to assess how far arrangements adopted pursuant to the Synergies 
Decisions have contributed to achieving the objectives of the clustering effort – in particular 
on joint activities, joint managerial functions and joint services. The first review will take 
place during the COPs of the respective conventions in 2013, and is to be carried out by 
UNEP and the FAO on the one hand, and the secretariats themselves (in one joint report to the 
COPs) on the other.
598
 The review will also contain a questionnaire for the parties, and 
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 “By 2013, with the support of UNEP, FAO and the secretariats of the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm 
conventions, the Parties to the three chemicals and wastes conventions will carry out evaluations to ascertain 
whether the current synergies arrangements have contributed to strengthening the implementation of the three 
conventions at the national, regional and global levels; promoting policy coherence; reducing the administrative 
burden; maximizing the effective and efficient use of resources at all levels; taking into account global concerns 
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recommendations for the post-2013 period will be based upon, a.o., the information collected 
from the parties, specifically listed NGOs and other stakeholders.  
 
G. Successes and limitations 
 
1. Successes 
 
As has been described supra, political clustering has been seen by some as a way to improve 
the overall level of coordination in the international environmental governance scene. Even 
from a purely theoretical assessment one must conclude that the political clustering process 
provides clear and important benefits for the clustered MEAs in comparison with the 
fragmentation in international environmental law. These include, at the very least, scale 
benefits and cost-efficiency gains. For example, each MEA now has its own reporting 
obligations, which place a heavy administrative burden on the parties to these MEAs.
599
 If 
these reporting obligations would be clustered and only one report would have to be generated 
that would be re-usable for a series of MEAs (e.g. within the same thematic cluster), then this 
would effectively free money at the country level to be redirected towards the implementation 
of the MEAs involved. Similarly, considerable financial savings can be made if each cluster 
(thematic or otherwise) would have just one administrative centre, responsible for the 
organisation of meetings and providing services to the COPs.  
 
The idea behind political clustering is that it constitutes a cost and effort-effective way to 
further improve the governance of environmental issues at the global level. The ultimate goal 
of political clustering is therefore not to save money but indeed to provide better 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and the specific needs of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in this assessment; and, 
protecting human health and the environment for the promotion of sustainable development. This review will 
provide input to further shape the synergies process and provide guidance to stakeholders on deploying synergies 
in the future.” UN, “Synergies Success Stories on Enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, 
Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions”, New York, 2011, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/publications/sdt_toxichem/synergies_success_stories.pdf. 
599
 Bodansky, D., “The legitimacy of international governance: a coming challenge to international 
environmental law?”, American Journal of International Law, 1999, 93, 596-624; Biermann, F., “The rationale 
for a World Environmental Organisation”, in Biermann, F. and Bauer, S. (eds.), A World Environment 
Organisation. Solution or Threat to Effective International Environmental Governance?, London and 
Burlington, Ashgate, 2005; Muñoz, M., Thrasher, R. and Najam, A., “Measuring the Negotiation Burden of 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements”, Global Environmental Politics, 2009, 9(4), 1-13. 
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governance.
600
 However the question should be posed if that is a realistic and necessary basis 
upon which to decide whether or not clustering efforts are really worth their trouble. Cost-
cutting is not the ultimate goal of clustering, yet that does not mean it could not be an 
important rationale behind clustering attempts. The fact that financial savings would in some 
cases be the only benefit of the clustering efforts should however not be used to dismiss 
clustering as such. Given the current climate of savings and the growing concern with the 
legitimacy and representativeness of international environmental law, cost-savings and the 
limiting of international fora should be important elements to take into account when 
assessing clustering possibilities. Better country coordination and support, scale effects and 
indeed cost effects are important contributions of clustering towards a more synergetic and 
streamlined international environmental governance. That by itself should be reason enough 
to pursue political clustering also for other MEAs or clusters of MEAs. It leads to a different 
form of governance, a more centralized form of governance, and, essentially, a more effective 
governance structure from an economic point of view.   
 
The clustered MEA secretariats now provide countries with an integrated approach and 
assistance in dealing with chemicals and wastes from their discovery over their day-to-day 
uses to their disposal. Similarly, the creation of a joint head function for the three secretariats 
(with the exception of the FAO-part of the secretariat of the Rotterdam Convention) gives the 
secretariats more unity in purpose and provides countries with a single contact point for all 
issues related to chemicals management. It is therefore safe to assume that similar efforts with 
other thematically related MEAs has the potential to provide similar results.
601
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 Von Moltke, K., On clustering international environmental agreements, Winnipeg, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 2001, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_clustering_meas.pdf.; UNEP, Report 
of the simultaneous extraordinary meetings of the conferences of the Parties to the Basel, Rotterdam and 
Stockholm conventions, Bali, Indonesia, 22 - 24 February 2010. Available at http://excops.unep.ch/.   
601
 The secretariats themselves assess the linkages in the work done by the scientific bodies under the 
conventions and the joint training program which was implemented in 2010-11 on effective participation in the 
review committee’s work to be the biggest successes of the synergies process so far. “Improved use of available 
resources through more coordinated national frameworks, institutional mechanisms and enforcement capacity 
dealing with chemicals and wastes; reduced costs of implementing the conventions through synergistic efforts; 
raised profile of the issue at the national, regional and international levels which can result in increased resources 
to support chemicals and waste management programmes; better coordinated technical assistance activities and 
better use of resources to support developing countries and countries with economies in transition to implement 
the conventions; more integrated approach towards sound chemicals and wastes management and the 
opportunity to main-stream those issues into national development plans.” UN, “Synergies Success Stories on 
Enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions”, New York, 
2011, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/dsd/resources/res_pdfs/publications/sdt_toxichem/synergies_success_stories.pdf. 
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2. Limitations 
 
The relatively successful clustering effort for the treaties on chemicals management and 
hazardous wastes should not blind the international community for the limitations of what can 
maximally be achieved by the political clustering of MEAs. A number of limitations must be 
taken into account: time and efforts necessary to reach an agreement on clustering; mistrust 
for and misinterpretation of the clustering concept by many countries; legal and political 
limits to clustering; the practical hurdle of there simply being too much MEAs to cluster and 
the problem of ‘pick-and-choose’. Each of the aforementioned issues will be dealt with here.  
 
The three chemicals-related conventions were an excellent example of thematically linked 
yet, apparently for no good reason, separate entities within international environmental law. 
They are internally coherent, the texts of the three conventions are compatible and they offer 
the possibility of creating one mechanism for the international management of chemicals. 
Furthermore, the secretariats are hosted in the same location (Geneva) by the same institution 
(UNEP), apart from the part of the Rotterdam Convention’s secretariat that is hosted by the 
FAO – and this part is left out of the clustering effort. Finally, none of the three conventions 
needed amendment to fit into the life-cycle approach, a long-standing objective of 
international chemicals management.  
 
Nevertheless, despite all of these inherent advantages the process of clustering the three 
conventions still took an enormous amount of time, effort and goodwill from the countries 
involved. Officially, the process started in 2006 with the synergies decisions and reached its 
culmination point during the Special Session of the UNEP GC in 2010. However, the 
preparations and negotiations had been going on for much longer. The better part of the last 
decade has seen preparatory meetings, OEWGs and drafting committees. The idea behind 
clustering is that it is a cost and effort-effective way to further improve the governance of 
environmental issues at the global level. In practice however it turns out that the clustering 
effort for the chemicals treaties has been a lengthy and extremely work-intensive process.
602
 
 
Furthermore, the interim outcome of the process (the Omnibus Decision) creates several 
important improvements that will make the day-to-day working of the conventions easier. It 
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 In this respect, reference is made to the time and costs involved in the organisation of the clustering process 
itself, rather than the cost-benefits as a result of the clustering efforts.  
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can be expected that the practice of the clustered convention secretariat will further be 
streamlined and coordinated in the coming years, and additional benefits and efficiency-gains 
can be expected. The fact remains however that the decision has not reached full potential. 
Merging the secretariats for example turned out to be the proverbial bridge too far for many 
parties and even the creation of a joint head function was approved only after lengthy 
discussions and negotiations. Part of that reluctant attitude can be explained by the fact that 
many countries still struggle with the interpretation of the concept of clustering. During the 
negotiations of the Omnibus Decision, for example, many delegations expressed their 
suspicion that the synergies process was driven by the three convention secretariats rather 
than their COPs. This partly explains the difficulty in establishing a joint head for the three 
conventions. Apart from being a sign that many countries still consider synergies and 
clustering processes to be a fight for influence between themselves and the secretariats of the 
COPs, it is also symbolic for the multifaceted interpretations and therefore uncertain 
meanings of (political) clustering. Frustration with the process lingers because both the 
clustering concept itself, the motor and steering entities behind it and its ramifications are not 
clear to all nations involved. It has also made that the new global convention on mercury, 
which is currently being negotiated and should ready for signing and subsequent ratification 
by 2013, will (at least initially) not be included in the chemicals clustering process, even 
though the negotiation process is the best time to ensure future compatibility of the new 
convention with the existing cluster. That is a worrying sign for future synergies and 
clustering attempts and future negotiations would do well to take this uncertainty into 
account. The experience and insights learned from the chemicals cluster together with the 
practice and new balance that will have to be found in the coming years could in that light 
provide additional confidence. It could just as well, however, derail future negotiations. That 
does not bode well for clustering efforts with MEAs that are less naturally aligned than the 
chemicals treaties. 
 
Important political and legal restraints must also be taken into account when attempting to 
cluster. Firstly, without a clear and univocal backing of the respective COPs they serve, the 
freedom and mandate of the MEA secretariats to engage in these collaboration efforts is very 
limited. Secretariats usually do not want to be coordinated by UNEP, and look to their COPs 
for guidance on these processes. Secondly they do not consider UNEP to be the most effective 
institution in this regard. Finally, they do not want any interference in their day-to-day 
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workings from UNEP.
603
 In the same line of reasoning, the legal autonomy of each MEA is an 
element not to be disregarded. The will to engage in synergy building efforts must therefore 
primarily come from the Parties to the MEAs, which means that the COPs of the MEAs 
involved are the forum where action must be taken. This makes clustering initiatives very 
much a country-based and bottom-up affair, rather than being a part of a larger top-down 
institutional overhaul. Therefore it is also clear that the possibilities for UNEP or, potentially, 
a WEO, steering such process are very limited indeed.
604
  
 
Secondly, disparity in membership could be an issue in future clustering efforts. The 
chemicals cluster has not had major issues with this specifically, since no renegotiation of the 
respective underlying treaties was necessary. In fact, figures provided by the secretariat show 
that the disparity in membership has been beneficial for the least ratified conventions. Over 
the last 3 years the rate of ratification has increased spectacularly, an evolution that is visible 
especially for the Rotterdam Convention. The secretariat expects that the number of Parties to 
the three conventions will grow closer as the political clustering efforts encourage more 
countries to join the three conventions.
605
 However, for other conventions and specifically in 
the case of more ambitious (legal) clustering efforts, this disparity in membership could cause 
major issues.
606
 Similarly, separate financial arrangements could pose problems. For instance, 
the CBD is the only major convention in the biodiversity cluster that receives funding from 
the GEF.
607
 Institutional tinkering in this cluster may in this case be problematic. Thirdly, 
each MEA has its own political constellations, alliances and momentum. All of these elements 
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institutions”, International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2007, 7, 317-336, at 332. 
604
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could greatly affect the possible outcomes of cooperation efforts between the MEAs 
concerned.  
 
Additionally, from a pragmatic point of view, there are simply too many treaties to be able to 
create coordinated environmental governance in one sweeping move. It will require a 
painstaking, step-by-step, case-by-case approach. Furthermore, in certain cases, MEAs may 
not be suitable for clustering. Some MEAs may be easier clustered than others. Especially 
with very specialized and good-working MEAs or even MEA regimes, this could be an 
impediment to clustering efforts. For example, it is hard to see the advantages of the North 
Pacific Fur Seal Convention with the Agreement on the Conservation of Populations of 
European Bats and the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea 
Turtles being clustered, even though they are all three part of the thematic cluster around 
biodiversity issues. Again, of course, this depends on the interpretation of the concept 
“clustering” and how far it should be pursued; either way, in certain cases clustering will be 
seen as unnecessary and without benefits. Indeed, it may even work disrupting. It should be 
clear that clustering in these cases can not lead to any successes and may be harmful to the 
goal it sets itself, namely an improved and more effective and efficient IEG. In sheer cost of 
negotiation efforts, time and resources, it would be impractical to attempt to cluster all MEAs, 
even if they are based around the same theme, since it would require a thorough re-
negotiation of an important number of MEAs, all of whom are currently working under a 
delicate balance. Additionally, there is the problem of thematic and practical overlap between 
several MEAs. Clustering in these cases will be especially problematic as it will require a 
renegotiation of at least one of the MEAs, and in practice, a prioritization between the MEAs. 
One will have to take precedence over the other, which would be problematic in light of the 
legal autonomy of each of the MEAs and their respective COPs.  
 
H. Conclusion 
 
[...] “The efforts by countries to enhance cooperation and coordination 
among the Basel, Rotterdam and Stockholm conventions are a unique 
endeavour to achieve synergies within a cluster of related MEAs and 
have already become an outstanding example of enhanced 
international environmental governance. By pooling resources, 
making improved use of scarce financial resources, avoiding 
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duplication of efforts and increasing efficiency, Parties to the 
conventions are in a better position to tackle cross-cutting issues and 
implement the conventions. The consolidated action by all stakehold-
ers ensures that their comparative advantages are built upon, thereby 
maximizing their added value. Work on implementing the pillars of 
the synergies process is progressing well. Many innovative ways to 
forge synergies have been devised and applied and are contributing 
towards better protecting human health and the environment. As 
countries gather more experience over the next years, their activities 
will be even more effective and their impact will increase. [...]”608 
 
It has been observed that the process of building synergies between the MEAs of the 
chemicals cluster holds the potential for a paradigm shift, where the numerous and disparate 
instruments in existence would be holistically managed, achieving unity in purpose and effort 
and enabling the secretariats of the respective MEAs to undertake their work more effectively, 
on a larger scale and with better delivery and use of resources.
609
 While this conclusion may 
be too optimistic, it is undeniable that the relative success of the synergies and clustering 
efforts for the chemicals treaties means that clustering as a technique to improve the 
effectiveness of environmental governance becomes more attractive also in other fields of 
international environmental law. Exactly how the synergies will be governed and what 
unexpected issues and additional benefits may be encountered will have to be seen in the next 
couple of years, yet at the very least an institutional framework is now in place to legally and 
politically guide and govern the synergies within the chemicals management cluster. This 
framework is set in place with respect for the legal autonomy of each of the MEAs, an 
absolute precondition for the success of clustering. Since this cooperation is seen as an 
outstanding example of how international environmental treaties can collaborate to further 
their own agenda and implementation, without adversely affecting each other’s autonomy and 
integrity of the respective COPs, it could serve as an inspiration for other treaties or clusters 
of treaties.  
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 UN, “Synergies Success Stories on Enhancing cooperation and coordination among the Basel, Rotterdam and 
Stockholm conventions”, New York, 2011, available at 
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The conclusion is therefore clear: the possibilities for political clustering depend on the 
thematic interrelatedness of the MEAs involved, their mutual compatibility and political will 
in the COPs of the MEAs concerned to pursue synergies, the need for re-negotiation and the 
legal restrictions that apply and which may differ from one MEA to the next. The use of 
clustering across the board will always be limited since there are a number of specific 
practical, political and legal hurdles to be taken. The success of the clustering efforts of the 
chemicals-related convention can be seen as a prime example of what can be achieved, but it 
should also be carried in mind that this is a (thematically, politically and legally) specific 
situation whose general reproducibility may be called into question.  
 
V. Linkages between the Biodiversity and Climate Change-related conventions 
 
A. Growing awareness of linkages 
 
The 2010 biodiversity target aims “to achieve, by 2010, a significant reduction of the current 
rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level, as a contribution to poverty 
alleviation and to the benefit of all life on Earth”.610 While climate change is not explicitly 
named as beneficiary nor benefactor of the biodiversity target, the last couple of years have 
made it increasingly clear that the issues of biodiversity and climate change are closely linked 
together. Indeed, it is now understood that climate change drives biodiversity loss, affecting 
both individual species and their ecosystems and similarly that the loss of biodiversity and 
ecosystem services cannot be properly dealt with without linking it to climate change. 
Resolving concerns about climate change will therefore require a holistic approach in which 
biodiversity, amongst others, plays a pivotal role.  
 
This raises the question of how these two divergent fields of expertise, each with their own 
series of treaties, negotiation agenda and political constellations are to be linked into a more 
effective and synergetic international response to their respective underlying environmental 
concerns. To that effect, there could be programs advancing or protecting biodiversity with de 
facto positive consequences for the climate change issue, or vice versa. The same can be said 
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 CBD, “Strategic Plan for the Convention on Biological Diversity”, Doc VI/26, 19 April 2002. See also 
Millennium Development Goals, Goal 7, target 2.  
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about certain joint initiatives that can be taken without major coordination problems.
611
 Of 
course, to a certain extent, this is already happening in practice: the REDD and REDD+ 
projects
612
 can be seen as prime examples of both. However, providing a more 
institutionalized response to these linkages is a completely different and much more 
complicated story. Moreover, finding and formally establishing linkages is not at all limited to 
the biodiversity and climate change cluster. One could argue that there has been a steadily 
rising demand across the board of the entire environmental governance scene for closer 
cooperation between the existing MEAs, the ending of duplicative efforts and in short a more 
unified, effective and efficient international response when it comes to environmental 
concerns. The coordination and governing issues that arise from the piecemeal approach in 
international environmental law, the ad hoc creation and disaster-driven progress of different 
clusters of treaties combined with the lack of a singular, univocal vision on where 
international environmental law should go and how its institutions should be organized, are 
well-known.
613
  
 
B. Involved conventions 
 
Which conventions should be involved in the clustering efforts between the biodiversity field 
and the climate change regime? Estimates hold that as many as 150 different MEAs dealing 
with biodiversity-related issues are in force.
614
 While it is clear that it would be an 
unmanageable task to coordinate and cluster all 150 MEAs in force at the same time, there 
seems to be a general consensus that synergies between at least the Rio-Conventions should 
be pursued and that important mutually supportive processes could be established. Current 
efforts are consequently focussed on the CBD and its Cartagena Protocol.
615
 For climate 
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change, there are much less legal instruments in force than in the biodiversity field. Also here 
focus is given to the Rio-Conventions, with the UNFCCC and its Kyoto Protocol in the centre 
of clustering attention.  
 
C. Limitations based on experience gained by the chemicals-related conventions  
 
The UNFCCC has 194 Parties, enjoys near-universal membership and is one of the widest 
applicable multilateral conventions. The Kyoto Protocol has 192 Parties. The CBD has 193 
Parties (the most important non-member being the United States); its Cartagena Protocol has 
163 Parties. Both groups of MEAs thus have very broad membership. Clustering efforts, by 
their nature, must be steered by the COPs of these MEAs. The non-parallel membership of 
these MEAs may create difficulties. Experience with the chemicals-related conventions shows 
that unparallel membership did not hamper the clustering process there, but in fact made more 
countries willing to ratify all three conventions. Nonetheless, in the case of the US for 
example, which is a Party to the UNFCCC but not with the Kyoto Protocol nor the CBD or its 
Cartagena Protocol, clustering efforts may cause opposition. These efforts would be money- 
and time-consuming and countries unwilling to ratify one or more of the conventions involved 
would likely not be inclined to invest either in a clustering process in which they would gain 
very little. 
 
Even though both fields have been the subject of numerous studies, climate change in 
particular has received a lot of public and scholarly attention. Apart from making architectural 
suggestions for a post-2012 climate regime, research has explicitly focused on the 
effectiveness and efficiency of existing or adopted policies and architectures and the 
repercussions on overall costs of enhancing coordination, cooperation and overall synergy of 
these elements. It has been suggested that an open and global, gradually enforcing and more 
synergetic system (e.g. for cap-and-trading), in which countries could participate if and when 
they feel they are politically and economically ready to do so, might bring about the best (i.e. 
cost-effective) results.
616
 In this reasoning, the current deadlock in climate change 
negotiations could be broken, and the push for the lowest common denominator (the so-called 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Panama and Peru sign the Nagoya Protocol on access and benefit-sharing of genetic resources, Press release, 5 
May 2005, available at http://www.cbd.int/doc/press/2011/pr-2011-05-05-panama-peru-en.pdf. 
616
 Biermann, F., Pattberg, F. and Zelli, F. (eds), Global Climate Governance beyond 2012. Architecture, agency 
and adaptation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
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“race to the bottom”) could be circumvented. Moreover, models show that a more synergized 
system could provide more effective and efficient results (i.e. higher compliance with existing 
legal norms, less time needed to negotiate and close new agreements, etc.).
617
 It is however 
obvious that clustering efforts so far have focussed on the biodiversity-related conventions 
rather than the climate change conventions. Similarly, there has been little to no attention of 
actual clustering efforts between the two clusters. One way to reach more coordination and 
pursue synergies between the clusters could be to adopt a common program of work. At the 
very least, it would seem that a global solution, with more coordination between the existing 
MEAs, would give important scale, cost and coordination benefits over the existing two tier 
track. How this should be achieved politically however remains uncertain.   
 
VI. Legal clustering: Definition 
 
As established supra, clustering has so far been used mostly in a political sense. Legal 
clustering on the other hand looks at different parameters than the political feasibility of the 
project; similarly, cost-efficiency is no consideration, and neither are long-lasting negotiations 
(or indeed, even unfeasible negotiations). Also, from a legal perspective, why should 
clustering be limited to those MEAs that are thematically or geographically related? 
Geographical concerns are therefore no essential elements from a legal perspective: only the 
headquarters’ agreement with the host state will have to be altered. It is argued here that apart 
from these HQ agreements, the location of an MEA secretariat is a purely political 
consideration.  
 
Legal clustering should be understood as a technique to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of existing multilateral environmental agreements by building upon factual 
synergies between these MEAs. In contrast to political clustering however, the technique of 
legal clustering does not exclude the amending of the underlying treaties as part of the 
clustering effort. Similarly, within this context, merging MEAs is also not excluded from 
legal clustering. The clustering process is conducted averse to political sensitivities and 
realities. 
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Since the underlying conventions will possibly be amended and all articles and clauses of the 
convention texts of the MEAs that take part in the clustering effort are potentially subject to 
change, legal clustering will not only resort effects at the institutional level but also at the 
country level – which means that it potentially resorts changes in member states’ obligations. 
It therefore brings about much more legal effects than political clustering does. The legal 
limitations to the technique are necessarily much more defined (and constricted) than is the 
case with political clustering. Certain elements, such as the legal autonomy of the COPs or the 
non-parallel membership to the MEAs involved in the clustering process, also in light of 
merging regional and global conventions, have already been considered under political 
clustering and found to be of no significant consequence there. These elements also do not 
form an obstacle to legal clustering: the clustering process must be COP-driven; non-parallel 
membership to the MEAs can be assumed to have a communicating vessels effect.
618
  
 
There is, in practice, no concrete example of MEAs involved in a legal clustering effort. The 
only notable exception to this is the merging, in 1992, of the 1972 Oslo Convention
619
 with 
the 1974 Paris Convention
620
 into the OSPAR Convention
621
, creating a conservation regime 
for the North-East Atlantic Ocean. Both the Oslo Convention and the Paris Convention had 
each established a Commission to administer the respective conventions. Since 1992 however, 
the Oslo and Paris Commissions have worked as one entity, under the name OSPAR 
Commission. The OSPAR Commission is the “successor to the Oslo and Paris Commissions, 
to administer the Convention and to develop policy and international agreements [...]”. The 
OSPAR Commission itself refers to this merger as the situation where the Oslo and Paris 
Conventions were “unified, up-dated and extended” by the 1992 OSPAR Convention.622 
Interestingly, in its article 31, the OSPAR Convention itself speaks in terms of 
“replacement”.623 All decisions taken by the Oslo and Paris Commissions remain in force 
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unless specifically terminated or if they are considered to be inapplicable under the new 
OSPAR Convention.  
 
However, the Paris and Oslo Conventions were regional (European) conventions with parallel 
membership (14 governments), in need of an update and partial re-negotiation. Therefore, for 
the purpose of this chapter, focus shall be given to six global conventions related to the 
thematic cluster of biodiversity: (1) CBD, (2) CITES (3) the CMS, and (4) the Ramsar 
Convention. Lastly (5) and (6), the Cartagena Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol on Access to 
Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits arising from their 
Utilization to the CBD
624
 will also be taken into account. Clustering the CBD will 
automatically have far-reaching consequences for both its Protocols. It would therefore be 
impractical to institutionally separate them, especially in light of the goals of clustering - 
namely: to establish more effective governance structures.
625
  
 
While the choice for these conventions is to a certain extent arbitrary, these conventions have 
been selected for several reasons: (1) the Liaison Group for Biodiversity-related Conventions 
(LGBC) has the mandate, given by the COP of the CBD, to examine the (political) clustering 
process of the chemicals treaties in order to “identify options for improved implementation of 
and cooperation among the biodiversity-related conventions”626; (2) secretariats of the 
conventions part of the LGBC are in the process of setting up an extensive network of joint 
programmes and memoranda of understanding (MoUs); (3) these conventions are 
thematically linked and a heightened interrelatedness and synergetic collaboration would have 
clear political and practical added value; lastly (4), the biodiversity-related conventions will 
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most likely be considered in the following clustering effort.
627
 This effort promises to be a 
delicate balancing act, time-consuming and difficult, given the prominent issues of different 
location of the secretariats, disparate membership and the possibility that certain MEAs will 
need to be (partly) renegotiated or amended. In that respect, legal clustering seems to be the 
more appropriate framework in which to consider a successful clustering effort around the 
biodiversity-related conventions. 
 
The International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture (PGR) and the 
World Heritage Convention (WHC) are explicitly not considered, mainly because they are 
using a fundamentally different institutional framework: the International Treaty on Plant 
Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture is affiliated to the FAO; the World Heritage 
Convention is part of the UNESCO framework. Similarly, the PGR has established certain 
unique institutional mechanisms that would be difficult to integrate without a fundamental 
overhaul of the content of the treaty.  
 
VII. Application of legal clustering: the clustering of global biodiversity-related 
conventions 
 
Rather than analysing the political challenges the legal clustering effort between the six 
selected conventions would pose (which most likely would be insurmountable), focus will be 
given to the specific legal issues related to this process. How can legal clustering achieve that 
the six aforementioned conventions collaborate to satisfaction and what are the legal limits or 
boundaries that must be taken into account? Firstly, some brief observations concerning the 
amendment procedure applicable to the six conventions under considerations will be made. 
After this, the limitations to a legal clustering effort involving the selected MEAs will be 
considered, based on three different scenarios: (i) creating common long-term objectives and 
strategies, with the necessary ability to organize joint COPs, (ii) organising a joint secretariat 
and uniform secretariat mandates for all five conventions under consideration, and (iii) 
creating a common compliance regime or mechanism for the five conventions under 
consideration. These three scenarios have been chosen because the elements in them are often 
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being considered as part of the proposed solutions to respond to the level of defragmentation 
in international environmental law.  
 
A. Amendment procedures 
 
As has been established supra
628
, the competent organ for amending the underlying 
convention is the COP in the case of the CBD
629
, CITES
630
, CMS
631
 and the Ramsar 
Convention
632
. For the Cartagena and Nagoya Protocols, the COP of the CBD serves as the 
COP/MOP to both Protocols and has in broad terms the same competences. According to the 
convention texts, COPs must take their decisions on amendments by consensus, or, failing 
that, a two-thirds majority.
633
 The CMS requires “unanimity” instead of consensus, but in 
practice the COP has so far applied it as a consensus rule.
634
 The Ramsar Convention applies 
a simple majority rule, unless otherwise provided for in the convention.
635
 For the quorum, 
reference in all cases is made to the parties “present and voting”, meaning that abstentions do 
not count towards the quorum nor are they counted as a counter-vote. 
 
In the case of COP decisions adopting amendments, states remain in total control of the 
binding character of these decisions, because of the need for ratification before the 
amendments take effect. Ratification is arguably the procedure which offers the most 
protection to states from the view of consent and respect for their sovereignty. According to 
articles 29 and 30 CBD (which also apply to the two Protocols) amendments to the 
convention or the protocol only take legal effect for those states that have accepted the 
amendment. The CMS, CITES and Ramsar all identically stipulate: “An amendment adopted 
shall enter into force for all Parties which have accepted it”.636  
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Amendments are thus only binding for those states that have accepted to be bound by them 
through ratification. This also means in practice that the outcome of amendment procedures 
which are not accepted by all member states may be that, as Klabbers puts it, “different 
members are bound by different versions of the constituent document: member A may be 
bound by the original version, while members B and C, having accepted the amendment, are 
bound by the constituent document as amended”. Zacklin contends that the legal results of 
such a move would be “questionable”, since it would effectively create “[...] two (or more) 
parallel yet separate legal orders, consisting of different member states”.637  While conceding 
that this may lead to awkward situations, Klabbers nonetheless considers that this situation 
may be “unfair, but still not necessarily very problematic”, except in cases where the 
amendment deals with “such issues as voting or decision-making procedures”.638  
 
B. Three scenarios for legal clustering 
 
1. Creating common long-term objectives and strategies, with the ability to organize joint 
COP meetings 
 
Essential to more coordination and synergetic collaboration between the MEAs under 
consideration is the ability to organize joint COPs, or at the very least to organize them back-
to-back. Organizing COPs back-to-back is also a solution which has been proposed by many 
authors to lift at least part of the negotiation burden from the developing and even smaller 
developed countries.
639
  
 
As has been established supra
640
, the terms for the organisation of the COP meetings are 
determined by the COPs of the MEAs under consideration.
641
 This means that, in order to 
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change the term for regular COP meetings of the six conventions, no amending of any of the 
conventions under consideration is necessary. The regular COP meetings of the conventions 
could be held back-to-back without any legal restrictions – it would only require coordinated 
COP decisions.
642
 To a certain extent this is already a reality between the COPs of the CBD 
and the Cartagena Protocol and is proving its use. 
 
The same can be said of the legal limitations to the clustering of the long-term objectives of 
the conventions. To a large extent, the long-term strategies followed by the MEAs are already 
being coordinated by the COPs: the CBD 10-year strategic plan is being used as a “common 
framework” by the other four conventions in force when drafting and adopting their own 
strategic long-term plans.
643
 The difference in terms
644
 can be solved by COP decisions.  
 
Furthermore, the conventions under review all aim at protecting biodiversity and their 
respective pre-ambles are broad enough to be compatible. The only caveat should be placed 
with the CBD, where the objectives of the convention are part of the operative clauses of the 
convention itself. Article 1 CBD determines:  
 
“The objectives of this Convention, to be pursued in accordance with 
its relevant provisions, are the conservation of biological diversity, the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
641
 The CBD calls for the COP to decide on the term for its regular sessions (article 23 para 1). Initially, the term 
was set at one meeting every year; however, after a COP decision to that effect, COPs are now held biennially. 
The Cartagena Protocol explicitly provides for its COP/MOPs to be held “in conjunction with” the CBD COPs 
(article 29 para 6), unless the COP/MOP would consider that other arrangements are necessary and decide 
otherwise. The Nagoya Protocol speaks of a “concurrent” meeting (article 29 para 6). The CITES COP on the 
other hand is held “at least once every two years” (article 11 para 2), meaning that more frequent COPs are 
possible without amending the convention. Moreover, the convention states in the same article that the COP may 
decide on a different term (“unless the Conference decides otherwise”). The CMS and Ramsar Conventions both 
hold their COPs every three years; both also explicitly provide the competence to change the term to their 
respective COPs (article 7 and article 6 respectively). See also supra, Chapter 2.  
642
 However, it must be noted that it would be impracticable to organize too much COPs consecutively. While 
from a purely legal perspective there are no limits to this, the number of COPs organized back-to-back will 
necessarily be limited, in order to remain practicable for the host-country to actually organize the meetings and 
for the attending negotiators to be workable. Moreover, since the five conventions under consideration have 
unparallel membership, also the composition of the COPs will be different. For instance, the United States is a 
Party to CITES and Ramsar, but not to the CBD, Cartagena Protocol nor to the CMS. The status of non-Parties 
to the COPs is normally that these states cannot attend the COP meetings. Therefore, from a clustering 
perspective, it seems better to give these states observer status to the COP meetings of COPs to which they are 
not Parties.  
643
 This is based on the Strategic Plan of the Convention on Biological Diversity. See (a.o.) X, “Biodiversity 
community agrees a common approach to protect life on Earth”, CMS Press Release, Montreal, 7 September 
2010, available at http://www.cms.int/news/PRESS/nwPR2010/09_sep/meas-geneva_communique.pdf.   
644
 CITES and CMS use 6-year plans, each with different end-timing (2013 and 2017 respectively); the Ramsar 
Convention uses a 7-year horizon (from 2008 until 2015).  
211 
 
sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of 
the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources, 
including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by 
appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all 
rights over those resources and to technologies, and by appropriate 
funding”.  
 
Here the general rules of treaty interpretation apply: the consent of the parties cannot be 
impaired by the interpretation or change in interpretation that is given to the article.
645
 Apart 
from that however, the COP is free to interpret the convention as broadly as it chooses, since 
the long-term objectives and strategies are the exclusive competence of the COP.
646
  
 
2. Creating a joint secretariat and uniform secretariat mandates 
 
The political clustering of the chemicals treaties has so far resulted in a list of common 
secretariat functions, such as financial, administrative and legal support.
647
 However, this is 
fundamentally different from legal clustering. Here, the ultimate goal is to create one common 
secretariat for the six conventions under consideration.  
 
Currently, the differences between the secretariats of the six conventions are significant: the 
CBD and its protocols are located in Montréal, Canada; CMS has its headquarters in Bonn, 
Germany; the CITES and Ramsar secretariats are both located in Switzerland, yet in different 
cities (in Geneva and Gland respectively). Institutionally (from a host-perspective) however, 
there is considerable compatibility: UNEP is the host institution for the secretariats of the 
CBD, Cartagena, Nagoya, CITES and CMS. The secretariat for the Ramsar Convention on the 
other hand is provided for by the IUCN.  
 
No matter how far apart these situations may be, especially politically, from a legal point-of-
view these differences are not insurmountable. The location of secretariats is subject to COP 
decisions, as is the host of the secretariat. Given the fact that UNEP hosts five of the six 
conventions under consideration, it would make sense at least from a uniformity and 
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simplicity point-of-view to consider changing the host of the Ramsar Convention. The 
convention explicitly provides for the possibility for the COP to change the secretariat host; 
such decision must be taken by a two-thirds majority.
648
 In contrast to the general voting rules 
for other COP decisions, no explicit reference is made to the need to seek consensus first. 
This may be seen as an indication that the member states of the convention did not consider 
this to be an issue of critical importance and wanted to provide the COP with sufficient 
autonomy and leeway in this matter through a flexible voting arrangement in the convention 
text. 
 
Crucially, it is the COP that has the legal authority to decide on this matter and also to give 
the secretariat the mandate to enter into collaboration efforts with other convention 
secretariats. The CBD secretariat has a significant and broad mandate, for example, to enter 
into MoUs with other secretariats or organisations it deems relevant to fulfil its duties.
649
 
CITES and CMS are not explicit on this matter. The Ramsar Convention has no provisions 
concerning the secretariat mandate on the external plane. Similar to the clauses providing 
such a competence to the COP, all conventions provide their secretariat with an open-ended 
competence by means of a catch-all provision in the convention texts.
650
 Ramsar is slightly 
different from the other conventions in that it only provides this competence incidentally 
(“inter alia”). However, all six secretariats may be given different and, indeed, any task the 
COP decides it should take up.  
 
However, in contrast to the COPs, secretariats cannot be considered to be able to make use of 
implied powers.
651
 It must therefore be considered that the COP retains the ultimate decision-
making power and that also legal clustering processes must be steered by the COPs of the 
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conventions concerned. This also links back to the legal autonomy of each MEA. Without 
explicit COP consent secretariats do not have the legal mandate to enter into MoUs or 
strategic (or other) alliances with other conventions or institutions. Reference must also be 
made to the worries of certain member states in the clustering process between the chemicals-
related conventions. The clustering efforts there nearly failed because of concerns that the 
process was secretariat-driven rather than steered from and by the COP.  
 
The conclusion is therefore that changing the location and the host of the secretariats does not 
require any treaty amendment – it needs coordinated COP decisions. Creating one joint 
secretariat under UNEP auspices would be the most proper solution since UNEP already hosts 
all but one of the conventions under consideration. In addition, this solution would not require 
treaty amendments; coordinated COP decisions will suffice. The COPs have been given or 
have assumed the competence to decide upon their own secretariat arrangements. As 
established supra, only the headquarters’ agreement with the current host states and/or 
organisations will have to be altered and new ones concluded with the new host, in order to 
ensure the legal protection of the secretariat personnel. 
 
3. Creating a common compliance mechanism 
 
Arguably one of the most essential elements in the clustering debate is the implementation 
and compliance regimes of the MEAs. Theoretically, the most straightforward solution would 
be to create one common compliance mechanism which could harbour the conventions under 
consideration and appropriately deal with cases of non-compliance for all six conventions. 
This could at least in theory be done, for example, by creating a new common mechanism or 
to have the conventions join in an existing one (e.g.: the CITES mechanism). However, 
pooling the implementation and compliance mechanisms into one common mechanism is not 
as straightforward as having the COPs of the conventions decide upon it.  
 
All MEAs have a unique and independent legal status, making it impossible to construct a 
uniform compliance mechanism for all of the environmental conventions without overcoming 
distinct legal challenges. This was also the position of the EU ad hoc expert group in the 
‘Working Party on International Environmental Issues (WPIEI) (Compliance and Liability in 
MEA’s)’ on 14 December 2001, although less explicitly so. At the initiative of the Belgian 
presidency of the Council, horizontal elements that would be of interest to the EU during the 
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negotiations on compliance mechanisms in MEAs were discussed. The group concluded that 
“as regards the elements that could make compliance mechanisms more effective, the 
Community and its member states […] should try to include as much as possible the 
following elements into any compliance mechanisms, taking into account that particular 
MEA’s may require some tailoring of their formulation [...]”.652  
 
Three years later the European Commission re-addressed this Belgian proposal in a ‘staff 
working paper on compliance mechanisms in MEA’s’ in order to update the document.653 The 
paper was discussed in the WPIEI of 21 June 2005 and after comments from the member 
states the presidency of the Council presented a new version of the paper, which took a much 
clearer stance on the idea of a uniform compliance mechanism:  
 
“2. When developing lines to take on compliance mechanisms and 
procedures, it will be necessary to bear the following in mind: a) each 
Multilateral Environmental Agreement (MEA) is different. This 
means that each agreement may generate compliance issues that are 
specific to the particular instrument concerned; and b) each MEA will 
have different Conferences of the Parties (COP) and each COP will 
have its own dynamic. What is possible and/or desirable within one 
COP may not be possible and/or desirable within another. 3. It follows 
that it will not be possible to adopt a prescriptive and homogenous 
approach to be applied in the same way by the EU in all compliance 
mechanisms. The EU might also, quite legitimately, want to address 
specific compliance issues in different ways within different MEA’s”. 
 
While this paper was not addressing clustering as such, it shows that the adoption of one 
singular approach to all compliance issues under MEAs was considered to be politically 
unwarranted by the EU policy-makers. Each MEA requires its own approach and, 
consequently, its own compliance mechanism to deal with matters of non-compliance. In the 
following, this process will be examined further from a legal perspective. 
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As determined supra, the COPs have the unequivocal competence (and in some cases, based 
on the convention texts, even obligation) to establish compliance mechanisms. While this is 
true in general and counts for all MEAs, especially in light of the catch-all competence of the 
COPs, some MEAs, especially the more recent ones, have specific enabling clauses 
establishing this competence in an explicit manner.
654
 These clauses serve a double purpose: 
apart from establishing the competence of the COP (or other institutional arrangement) to 
adopt compliance procedures and/or mechanisms, they also establish a legal obligation for the 
COP to use this competence and adopt specific compliance procedures, sometimes within an 
explicit time-frame.
655
  
 
There are considerable differences in the implementation procedures and compliance regimes 
of the six selected conventions.
656
 The conventions in force attempt to play a coordinating role 
between the different national implementation strategies of the member states; however, the 
way this is organized differs significantly. The CBD COP has established a Working Group 
on the Review of Implementation.
657
 The COP of the Ramsar Convention has established the 
so-called Oversight Panel, to monitor and report on its Communication, Education, 
Participation and Awareness Programme.
658
 The CMS has not yet established any subsidiary 
body to the COP, competent to deal with implementation or compliance issues. In this case, it 
is the COP itself that has the responsibility to review the implementation of the convention 
and compliance by the member states, even though the convention provides for an enabling 
clause.
659
 The Cartagena Protocol has a standing Compliance Committee at its disposal, 
pursuant to a COP/MOP decision based on the enabling clause within the Protocol.
660
 The 
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first COP/MOP of the Nagoya Protocol will adopt decisions on issues of compliance.
661
 
Lastly, the CITES COP has established a compliance procedure in which the COP itself and 
the so-called Standing Committee are assigned specific tasks to ensure and enhance 
compliance with the convention.
662
 Both the CITES and the Cartagena Protocol’s compliance 
bodies are standing bodies, with the explicit mandate to review the implementation of the 
convention in a non-confrontational manner. If non-compliance measures are taken they must 
be aimed at the long-term implementation of the convention, for instance, by helping non-
compliant parties reach full compliance as soon as possible. This is in both cases a clear 
manifestation of a facilitative approach in cases of non-compliance with the conventions.
663
 
The conventions under consideration thus have mechanisms to deal with non-compliance 
which could be described as being in different stages of development: from no specific 
compliance mechanism at all (the CBD, Nagoya and CMS) over a soft and partial mechanism 
(Ramsar) to a complete, standing and autonomous compliance mechanism (CITES and 
Cartagena Protocol).  
 
Also the normative content of the conventions differs significantly. This also means that the 
approaches the COP or the competent subsidiary body takes towards cases of (potential) non-
compliance is based on the particularities of the underlying convention. At the same time, the 
purpose of the compliance mechanisms and the way that these bodies deal with cases of non-
compliance is similar: it is non-confrontational and facilitative in nature. The legal 
consequences of non-compliance with the conventions are also similar, as are the effects of 
and responses to non-compliance.
664
 Therefore, at least in theory, there is room for further 
synergies and clustering of the compliance mechanisms.  
 
As stated supra, at least in theory, the most straightforward solution would be to create one 
common compliance mechanism applicable for all six conventions. This could be done either 
by creating a new mechanism to which the COPs would accede, or to have the conventions 
join in an existing one. As established supra, the texts of the conventions under consideration 
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all provide for an enabling clause or an open-ended clause to the same effect. In addition, 
since the COP is competent to establish compliance procedures, the COP is also free to decide 
and to join the common compliance body of its choice, as long as the COP decision is taken 
with the required majority as set forth in the convention texts or in the RoP of the COP. As 
has been established supra, COP decisions can be considered binding upon member states if 
states have given their consent to the decision, expressed through the voting procedures, and 
if these decisions are intended to be binding.
665
 States unwilling to establish such a common 
compliance mechanism and unwilling to vote in favour of joining such a mechanism would 
likely argue that they do not consider themselves bound by the COP decision to join the 
common compliance body, on the grounds that the COP does not have the legal competence 
to go beyond the obligations that have been negotiated in the base conventions, since this is 
out of its mandate, and instead the amendment procedure to the convention should be 
followed. These countries would consider the new obligations and creation of the compliance 
mechanism to constitute an amendment to which they refuse to accede.
666
  
 
As stated supra, the non-acceptance by all member states of an amendment is “not necessarily 
problematic”, except in cases where the amendment deals with “such issues as voting or 
decision-making procedures”. Setting up a compliance procedure falls exactly within the 
caveat Klabbers poses. Potentially it would be impossible to challenge a member state to a 
convention in cases of suspected or even demonstrated non-compliance, or that the COP 
would not be able to make use of facilitative or any other measures towards that state to 
enhance its compliance. This is problematic, since it creates asymmetrical legal obligations 
for parties to the same convention, potentially harming the overall legal environmental 
protection regime established by the convention. 
 
In order to avoid this legally unsteady situation, it is argued here that an “umbrella” 
compliance mechanism would be the only legally viable option to create a common 
compliance mechanism. What is meant by this is that some form of convention on matters 
relating to compliance issues would be adopted by the member states of the conventions. This 
convention would deal with such compliance matters that are common to the six conventions. 
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These include (but are not limited to) secretariat functions (e.g. legal and administrative 
support), certain financial regulations and consequences of non-compliance.  
 
How could such a convention for compliance issues be established? First of all, there is an 
issue of legal competence: which organ could be considered to be competent to design such a 
compliance mechanism? Since the COPs hold the central decision-making power and are also 
the only competent organ to establish compliance mechanisms for their respective 
conventions, this is a legal issue of specific importance. The first step, in parallel to the 
chemicals clustering process, would be for the COPs to take parallel decisions establishing 
their wish for further synergy building in the area of compliance and to give a mandate to 
design the mechanism. That could for instance be under the form of a Joint Ad-Hoc Working 
Group, composed of member states to the conventions under consideration and in consultation 
with members of the secretariats and bureaus of the conventions. The existing liaison group 
for biodiversity-related conventions could be an equally suitable forum for such discussions. 
It is also argued here that UNEP could be considered as a suitable venue for these 
negotiations. This may be politically sensitive, especially in light of the experiences from the 
chemicals cluster. Nonetheless, since UNEP would only be the forum and not the decision-
making body, it is argued that this would not be at odds with the COP-driven nature of the 
synergies and clustering process.
667
 
 
Secondly, the common feature of the existing compliance mechanisms with the conventions 
under consideration is that they are non-confrontational in nature. Therefore, it is argued that 
a common compliance mechanism should, in light of these existing efforts, focus on 
facilitation rather than enforcement.
668
 Moreover, since the conventions as such set out very 
specific obligations for their member states, a certain degree of specialisation will be required 
within the compliance mechanism. It must be flexible enough to accommodate very different 
types of compliance issues, at the risk of losing its appeal to COPs if they feel that the body 
cannot provide a specialised enough answer to the specific compliance issues their MEA 
poses.
669
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Another essential element for member states in the review of implementation is the obligation 
to provide the compliance committee, secretariat or COP, whichever the case may be, with 
national implementation and/or progress reports. These reporting obligations have extensively 
been criticized in literature as being too fragmented, causing substantial double work and 
additional expenditures for already thin-stretched member states’ resources.670 In this respect 
reference must be made to the UNEP-WCMC Knowledge Management Project (KMP), 
establishing a joint reporting framework in which the five biodiversity conventions in force 
participate.  
 
One other element that has been argued to be problematic in cases of clustering is the non-
parallel membership to the MEAs being clustered. The membership to the conventions under 
consideration differs significantly: CBD has 193 parties; CITES has 175; the Cartagena 
Protocol has 163 and Ramsar 160; CMS has 114 parties. As one notable example, the United 
Stated of America is not a member to the CBD or CMS, but it is a member to CITES and 
Ramsar. It is also not a CMS member state, yet it is a signatory to several Agreements as 
established under articles 4 and 5 of that Convention. Since states’ obligations stem from the 
convention itself or from a COP decision, no specific legal issues arise with non-parallel 
membership when establishing a joint compliance mechanism.  
 
VIII. UNEP: alternative for or involved party with clustering? 
 
Clustering efforts and the building of synergies are bottom-up answers to the call for more 
effective and efficient environmental governance. However, as has been established supra, 
clustering possibilities are to be assessed on a case-by-case basis and depend upon a number 
of factors including thematic compatibility, political constellations in the COPs and certain 
legal restrictions.  
 
Given these aforementioned limitations and the COP-driven nature of the process, clustering, 
be it the political or legal version, will only be able to provide a partial answer to the demand 
for more centralised governance structures. Therefore, the question of how the evident 
linkages between, for example, the climate change and biodiversity regimes should be 
translated at the institutional level is also gaining importance. This institutional component 
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should not be neglected especially in light of the ongoing debate on the reform of UNEP and 
the IEG scene. UNEP’s core mission is to ensure coherent collective environmental efforts. It 
was established to “provide central leadership, to assure a comprehensive and integrated 
overview of environmental problems, and to develop stronger linkages among environmental 
institutions and the constituencies they serve”.671 In other words, UNEP was intended to 
provide an answer precisely to questions raised by intertwined yet separately dealt with 
issues. An evident question stems from that finding: what role could UNEP play in the 
clustering debate and ongoing clustering efforts – provided that such a role is at all necessary 
or relevant? 
 
As has been mentioned supra, the ongoing Belgrade process on IEG reform also focuses on 
MEAs and the synergies that could be pursued there.
672
 The set of options developed there 
includes multiple references to enhanced coordination and the search for synergies among 
MEAs. Efficient and effective administration and implementation of MEAs is one of the 
remaining options on the table for a reformed IEG system. More explicitly, the first meeting 
of the Consultative Group of Ministers or High-Level Representatives on International 
Environmental Governance, held in Nairobi in July 2010, established that the clustering of 
MEAs was to be considered an “essential way of reform” of the IEG scene.673 Possible 
solutions that are considered include the clustering of secretariat functions and common 
services, establishing a mechanism for global overall coordination among existing MEAs, 
with one mechanism having innovative tasks that are currently not being performed by MEA 
secretariats individually. Similarly, joint MEA institutional structures including secretariats, 
legal financial and conference services, reporting, scientific structures, programmatic 
structures and knowledge management and IT are being considered.  
 
The proposals on the table in the Belgrade process are a watershed compared to UNEP’s 
involvement today. However, it is still short of letting UNEP play its designated role of 
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‘coordinator’ as described in the original mandate of the Programme.674 Brainstorm sessions 
and early proposals on clustering of the chemicals treaties named the UNEP Executive 
Director as the joint head function of the joint secretariats. In practice however, the joint Ex-
COPs have decided to make an open call for recruitment and to appoint the post to an external 
candidate. Similarly, the lingering suspicions about who exactly is the driver behind the 
political clustering process also mean that central steering would not at all be welcomed. It is 
in the first place the COPs that are the motors of the clustering processes. The legal autonomy 
of each of the MEAs thus works against general UNEP involvement. Lastly, as mentioned 
supra, the secretariats of the conventions do not look to UNEP for guidance on the synergies 
processes, but to their COPs, and in general do not wish to be coordinated by UNEP.
675
  
 
Nevertheless, from a theoretical perspective, UNEP’s involvement might prove to be an 
added-value: it has the programmatic liberty to initiate processes dealing with overlap and 
linkages. It is institutionally ideally placed to establish natural linkages between separated 
environmental fields and to raise these with the concerned organisations (primarily the COPs) 
and to identify possible opposing or counterproductive actions (ranging from MEA provisions 
to field programs). It could define and identify policy gaps and provide country support for 
implementation. Additionally, UNEP could use its scientific expertise to provide the COPs 
with policy guidance and information sharing – as was one of the intentions of the founders of 
UNEP in the first place. Especially in the biodiversity and climate change fields UNEP could 
be a deal broker, an added value to the process of establishing and institutionalizing synergies, 
both within the two clusters separately as between them. Given the fact that the ultimate 
decision-making power remains with the COPs of the respective MEAs, this involvement of 
UNEP would not require a drastic institutional overhaul. The most important condition for 
this to work is that UNEP must be conceived as the scientific power-house in the 
environmental field. Until now, especially when it comes to climate change, it is the 
UNFCCC that has that privilege.  
 
It is therefore concluded that a general coordinating role for UNEP in the clustering processes 
(ongoing and future ones) is not a likely option. It is also unclear at this point if and how the 
                                                     
674
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creation of a WEO would be able to address these issues. It is unlikely that many countries 
will be willing to give up their negotiation freedom when negotiating new MEAs to establish 
“autonomous institutional arrangements”.676 Moreover, one common model may not be 
sufficient to fulfil the needs of all MEAs, including possible future cases. Another solution 
could be to work with general and common principles when establishing new MEA 
structures
677
; however how this should be translated in practice remains unclear.  
 
IX. Conclusion 
 
International environmental law has grown over the years to become a highly fragmented 
system. This has, in broad terms, led to a double reaction. Firstly, a mostly top-down debate 
on new (or at least: stronger) and more centralized institutional arrangements for the 
environment. The WEO debate is part of this reaction. Secondly, a bottom-up approach to the 
instrument par excellence of international environmental law: the clustering of MEAs. 
 
In theory, clustering provides important cost-efficiency gains and scale benefits. Ideally, it 
could be an instrument that helps the international community develop stronger, better and 
more centralized governance structures for the environment. The clustering efforts between 
the chemicals-related conventions confirm this generally positive outcome, and its relative 
successes are an incentive to try and use the technique in the biodiversity cluster. This 
promises to be a much more difficult exercise than the chemicals clustering effort. 
 
It also reveals the greatest weaknesses of the approach: the legal and political constraints and 
practical limitations; the fact that steering the process is impossible and the COPs of the 
different MEAs are the decision-making forum; the uncertainty of many countries about 
clustering as a concept and technique; and the negotiation burden that clustering places on an 
already overfull agenda in the environmental field. Furthermore, clustering has so far been 
used in a political sense; legally speaking however, the concept could be much broader. A 
veritable steering role for UNEP in clustering efforts is concluded to be impracticable, given 
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the legal autonomy of the MEAs and their respective COPs and the mistrust of the secretariats 
towards UNEP. Nevertheless, it is argued that UNEP could play a role in establishing 
linkages and synergies between existing MEAs and groups of MEAs, and thus help promote 
clustering as a general technique. It is clear that clustering will become an indispensible part 
of the international instruments to improve the overall level of coordination and collaboration 
between the MEAs.  
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Chapter 5: Legal challenges in the creation of a World Environment Organisation 
 
“Accept the challenges  
so that you may feel  
the exhilaration of victory” 
George Patton 
 
I. Introduction 
 
As described supra, ever since its establishment in 1972, UNEP has been under heavy 
scholarly scrutiny and has been criticized harshly. Many advocates for more centralised or 
more authoritative international environmental governance have argued for the creation of a 
World Environment Organisation (WEO).
678
 What this new institution should look like, 
which mandate it should have and exactly how it could practically be created has long been 
debated in academic circles. WEO stands for the concept of a World Environment 
Organisation, without prejudice towards the many different existing proposals.
679
 These range 
from a Global Environmental Organisation that would focus on global issues only with global 
participation and representation
680
; a global internalisation-based bargaining marketplace
681
; 
an upgraded UNEP
682
; or even a security council-style, powerful and supra-national 
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organisation
683
; the clustering of MEAs
684
; or a United Nations Environment Organisation 
(UNEO)
685
. While the political challenges the creation of a WEO would pose have been 
assessed numerous times, the same cannot be said about the legal challenges or consequences 
of such a move. It is here this chapter attempts to contribute to the debate.  
 
This chapter starts from the premise that a WEO is created and assesses the practical and legal 
consequences and challenges of such an institutional reform. In order to do this, a model for a 
WEO is created, after which the legal challenges in its creation are researched.  
 
Firstly, under (II), a detailed definition of the WEO is established. This definition is based 
upon a cross section of a selection of ten distinct proposals for a WEO and identifies a number 
of core elements this new organisation must incorporate. Once the WEO is properly defined, 
it must then be researched exactly what the legal requirements are for the establishment of 
such an organisation. This happens under (III), where an analysis is made of the legal 
challenges the creation of this WEO will encounter. Lastly, under (IV), an assessment of the 
added value of such a WEO to the existing framework at the UN level will be made.  
 
II. Which WEO? Establishing a definition 
 
As determined supra, there is a huge body of different proposals for the creation of some form 
of a WEO. In 2002, Lodefalck and Whalley bundled and reviewed 17 different proposals for 
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 Downie, D. L. and Levy, M. A., “The United Nations Environment Programme at a Turning Point”, in 
Chasek, P. (ed.), The Global Environment in the Twenty-First Century, Tokyo, UNU Press, 2000.  
684
 Von Moltke, K., On clustering international environmental agreements, Winnipeg, International Institute for 
Sustainable Development, 2001, available at http://www.iisd.org/pdf/trade_clustering_meas.pdf; Von Moltke, 
K., “Clustering International Environmental Agreements as an Alternative to a World Environment 
Organisation”, in Biermann, F. and Bauer, S. (eds.), A World Environment Organisation. Solution or Threat to 
Effective International Environmental Governance?, London and Burlington, Ashgate, 2005; Oberthür, S., 
“Clustering of multilateral environmental agreements: potentials and limitations”, International Environmental 
Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2002, 2, 317-340; Oberthür, S. and Gehring, T., “Reforming 
International Environmental Governance: An Institutional Perspective on Proposals for a World Environment 
Organisation”, in Biermann, F. and Bauer, S. (eds.), A World Environment Organisation. Solution or Threat to 
Effective International Environmental Governance?, London and Burlington, Ashgate, 2005. See also supra, 
Chapter 4.  
685
 X, “Citizens of the Earth”, Paris Call for Action, Paris, 3 February 2007, available at http://www.ambafrance-
au.org/spip.php?article2092; Golmohammadi, B., “Why We Need A Global Environmental Organization”, 
World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), 4 January 2012, available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bonian-golmohammadi/climate-change-rio-20_b_1184260.html.  
226 
 
the creation of an environmental institution at the international level.
686
 Each proposal has 
used its own definition or description of the organisation it intends to create. Consequently, no 
singular, widely accepted definition of a WEO exists.  
 
For the purpose of this chapter however, it is necessary to identify a clear-cut idea of what 
exactly a WEO is and what it will do. Therefore, a cross section of a selection of the most 
elaborate and advanced proposals will be made. Firstly, a brief description of each of the 
proposals will be made, with attention to the political rationale behind them. Secondly, one of 
the basic presuppositions in international affairs is that the format of an organisation should 
reflect what it is intended to do (“form follows function”). Hence, much under the idea that if 
one defines the functions of the WEO, one defines the WEO proper, special attention is given 
to the functionality of the organisations in each of the proposals under review. Thirdly, these 
elements will be combined in order to establish the functions a WEO must be able to fulfil.  
 
For the purpose of this chapter, ten distinct proposals for a WEO have been reviewed. They 
are divided into four categories: proposals for (1) a WEO based on the GATT/WTO, (2) a 
WEO based on the ILO, (3) the French UNEO proposal, and (4) the Brazilian proposal for an 
umbrella organisation for sustainable development. 
 
A. Existing proposals 
 
1.  A WEO based on the GATT/WTO format 
 
a. What? 
 
Five distinct proposals for the creation of a GATT or WTO-style environmental organisation 
have been identified and assessed.
687
 In their assessment of the current environmental 
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governance system, the vast majority of proposals for a WTO-style organisation for the 
environment argue that environmental affairs are often dealt with in a stepmotherly fashion, 
especially compared to matters of economy. When environmental affairs are being discussed 
at WTO-level, they often take the back-seat to the principles of free trade and economics. 
Therefore, these proposals assert that environmental governance should be brought to the 
same footing as the governance of international trade.  
 
In order to be able to do this, authors argue that a “WTO for the environment”688 should be 
created. In the proposals under review, decision-making is done by means of unanimity (yet 
without voting, as in the GATT). Typically, the proposals intend the WEO to be a legally 
autonomous UN specialised agency with its own budget, which integrates the existing MEAs 
into one body. Whether this WEO builds upon exiting organisations (such as UNEP and 
GEF), supplants them or coordinates them, varies amongst the reviewed proposals.  
 
b. Functions? 
 
One of the most important drivers behind these proposals is the successful dispute settlement 
system incorporated in the WTO. Hence, dispute settlement, together with the economic 
incentives found in the trade system (including the economic sanctions in cases of non-
compliance) is usually considered an essential part of the future environmental organisation.  
 
The main rationale for the establishment of a WTO-style environmental organisation however 
is the internalisation of externalities. It is based upon the idea that the current IEG system fails 
to properly deal with them. Also essential is the fact that the new organisation should define 
the rights and obligations of states under international law (a norm-setting ability) with a 
focus on cost-internalisation, guiding the negotiation processes of new MEAs and the 
monitoring of compliance with international obligations (also those emanating from the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
“The design of supranational organization for the provision of international public goods: the case of global 
environmental protection”, Review of agricultural economics, 2000, 22, 355-369. Furthermore, the proposals 
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MEAs). Technology and capacity-building in developing countries in some proposals is also 
named as a focus point for the new organisation.  
 
Some proposals
689
 also determine that all rules are obligatory for all members; others
690
 have 
a list of ‘core elements’, considered binding upon all members; rules not considered to be part 
of the core rules are voluntary.  
 
2. A WEO based on the ILO format 
 
a. What? 
 
Originally conceived already in 1972, each of the three proposals under review seeks to install 
a WEO based on the ILO.
691
 Essentially, it is the decision-making structures of the ILO that 
inspire these proposals most. Decision-making is done by means of a 2/3 majority, or in one 
proposal along the same lines as in the multilateral fund for the implementation of the 
Montreal Protocol: a general assembly that establishes the policies and funding levels, with an 
executive committee comprised of an equal number of developed and developing states in 
charge of the day-to-day operation of the organisation. All proposals under review identify the 
necessity to establish the WEO as a UN specialised agency.  
 
The decision-making process of the ILO comprises of the adoption of conventions or 
recommendations by 2/3 majority, with subsequent ratification of these conventions within 
between 12 and 18 months after their adoption.
692
 Equally important is the fact that this 
decision-making structure allows for businesses and NGOs to be represented along the 
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member states themselves, thus linking timely decision-making and entry-into-force of new 
rules with democratic inclusiveness and concerns of legitimacy. The tripartite structure of the 
ILO is repeated in some proposals. Others do not use it or combine it with the dispute 
settlement system of the WTO.
693
  
 
Essential to the rationale behind all of these proposals however is that the ILO is the only 
specialised agency where exerting normative functions (the setting of labour standards) is part 
of the normal day-to-day operations of the organisation. This happens by means of the 
adoption of conventions by a 2/3 majority. These conventions then must be brought before the 
national parliaments and the ILO must be informed on the action taken by the parliament 
(ratification or refusal of ratification). Some authors consider this to be a possible way to 
ensure that the MEAs get greater dissemination.
694
  
 
b. Functions? 
 
Since the emphasis of the proposals building on the ILO is clearly on the decision-making 
process, it is hardly surprising to find that the essential task for the WEO would be to 
establish rules for the environment. The format of this WEO facilitates compliance and 
enforcement abilities with timely decision-making. Palmer wants the WEO to establish 
incentives for membership; Biermann and Simonis intend the WEO to collect and disseminate 
information, coordinate environmental policy-making at the international level and set up 
programmes enhancing national action, especially in the South. Apart from this, early warning 
to newly-emerging threats to the global environment is also named as an essential task for an 
ILO-style world environment organisation.  
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3. A WEO based on the French proposal for a United Nations Environment Organisation  
 
a. What? 
 
France, then under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, first launched its idea for a United 
Nations Environment Organisation (UNEO) in 2005.
695
 This UNEO would be modelled after 
the World Health Organisation – meaning: a UN specialised agency based upon articles 57 
and 63 of the UN Charter. It would have the benefits of universal membership and be more 
independent to take and enact its decisions than UNEP can today. Lastly, it would have a 
more authoritative voice within the UN when defending environmental interests than the 
existing framework (and especially UNEP) does today.  
 
b. Functions? 
 
The functions of the UNEO are described as it being “the instrument used to assess 
environmental damage and understand how to repair that damage; an effective instrument to 
promote technologies and behaviours that respect ecosystems more effectively; a way to 
support the implementation of environmental decisions all over the planet.”696 Unfortunately, 
the proposal does not go into much further detail.
697
  
 
Tarasofsky and Hoare have made an overview of the UNEO proposal and what they consider 
to be the core elements and functions of the UNEO. They have included the following six 
functions: (i) surveillance and warning on the state of the environment, (ii) information, 
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communication and mobilisation of all interested parties, (iii) provide a platform for political 
discussions to elaborate the international legal and strategic framework, (iv) awareness of 
environmental policies and support for their implementation in developing and transitional 
countries, (v) strengthening regional governance, and (vi) amelioration of the coherence of 
various actions. However, the study often found it difficult to clearly identify the details of the 
UNEO proposal. Also, it was unclear to the researchers how and why a UNEO would find 
more or easier solutions to the problems the international environmental governance system 
than UNEP can in the current system.
698
  
 
According to an overview ordered by UNEP, the UNEO proposal includes an umbrella for the 
MEAs and describes the UNEO as having “legal authority over MEAs”, in line with the 
practice under the ILO. At the same time, reference is made to the WTO, in that the UNEO is 
understood to also install one common institutional framework over the MEAs by means of a 
General Agreement, which would install (a.o.) a common secretariat.
699
 Exactly how this 
relates to the legal autonomy of the MEAs is unclear.  
 
This indistinctness of the UNEO proposal and the obscurity surrounding its functionality has 
nevertheless not impaired France, and by extension the EU, to defend the creation of a UNEO 
within the UN system. Especially in the course of the Belgrade Process the EU has used the 
UNEO proposal to push for broader reforms within the IEG system.
700
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4. A WEO based on the Brazilian proposal for an umbrella organisation for sustainable 
development 
 
a. What? 
 
Mostly as a reaction to the French proposal, Brazil launched its idea of an umbrella 
organisation for sustainable development, which intends to bring economic, social and 
environmental concerns under one roof at the UN. However, similar to the French UNEO 
proposal, exactly what the form and mandate of the organisation would be and how that 
would contribute to a better international environmental governance system, is not further 
defined.
701
 Based on contact with Brazilian negotiators, it is understood that the umbrella 
organisation would attempt to unite economic, social and environmental concerns, but exactly 
how this organisation should function, whether or not it arches the WTO, ILO, CSD and/or 
UNEP, and what its decision-making structures should look like has never been made 
explicit.
702
 As part of the Rio+20 zero draft however, the Brazilian proposal resurfaced as a 
proposal for the establishment of a Sustainable Development Council (SDC). This SDC 
would be established to replace the CSD and with the aim of serving as “the authoritative, 
high-level body for consideration of matters relating to the integration of the three dimensions 
of sustainable development”.703 
 
b. Functions? 
 
In terms of mandate for the umbrella organisation the proposal remains vague at best. 
Supposedly, it would combine elements of the mandates of the organisations it would 
supplant. However there is no clearly defined mandate for the umbrella organisation.  
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The SDC would base its work (which is not further described) on the “fundamental 
documents on sustainable development such as Agenda 21, the Rio principles and related 
outcomes”. Furthermore,  
 
“The Council should, inter alia, fully carry out the functions and 
mandates of the Commission for Sustainable Development. It would 
be guided by the need to promote integration of the three pillars of 
sustainable development, promote effective implementation at all 
levels and promote effective institutional coherence. It should help in 
enhancing the involvement of all stakeholders, particularly major 
groups, in the follow-up of Rio+20”.704  
 
Establishing the form and functions of this SDC would be the mandate of a negotiation 
process to be initiated at the Rio+20 Conference.
705
 However, for the further purpose of this 
chapter, it is not at all clear what the SDC would look like and what mandate it would have.  
 
5. Overlap between the proposals under review 
 
In many ways these WEO proposals build upon the existing critiques on UNEP and 
alternative scenarios for UNEP that have been around in literature for a long time. However, 
so far, tangible political progress towards its effective creation is lacking, also because the 
proposals are very divergent in terms of the level of ambition of reform, the mandate that is 
set for the new organisation, the level of authority bestowed upon it, or the format it would be 
given.
706
 Proposals intend to create the WEO as a UN specialised agency rather than a 
Programme, wish to provide the structure with universal membership and to change the 
funding base upon which UNEP works.  
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Virtually all proposals for institutional change assert that the role and authority of UNEP must 
be strengthened, its financial basis expanded and made more predictable and the coordination 
across the UN system for environmental affairs enhanced. These changes would be 
implemented in order to ensure that environmental policy and law-making at UN level would 
“be more effective, faster, more coherent and more ambitious”707. 
 
B. Functions of the WEO: cross section of the proposals 
 
It is thus clear that the proposed functions for each of the envisioned environmental 
organisations at the international levels vary considerably. Each author has identified certain 
thresholds a WEO must meet for his or her liking. There are however also clear areas of 
overlap.  
 
Firstly, it is clear from the proposals under review that all authors consider the decision-
making processes of UNEP too slow and cumbersome and that a WEO should change this. 
Easier and more timely decision-making is thus of the essence. Nonetheless, the WEO should 
also answer to demands of legitimacy and inclusiveness. Short of giving voting rights to 
NGOs or other social stakeholders, inclusiveness in the debate appears to be an essential part 
of the vast majority proposals. Secondly, many of the proposals intend to unite the MEAs, by 
bringing them under the same organisation. The way this is presented is mostly parallel to the 
organisational model of the ILO, which also governs a series of conventions. Other proposals 
look to the GATT as an example of how the WEO should manage the MEAs. Authors differ 
however on how far the competences of the WEO should go in this regard. Thirdly, a 
minimum norm-setting ability is granted to the WEO in most proposals. This combines with 
the enforcement the WEO is expected to bring to the table – the WEO would set norms, 
standards and rules and control compliance with them. This is also intended to enhance 
compliance with the MEAs. This last element is linked to the idea that a WEO should provide 
a forum for negotiations of new MEAs. Lastly, all proposals under review determine that the 
WEO should establish new and additional sources of financial and/or technical assistance, 
either to developing countries alone or to all countries experiencing compliance issues. This is 
usually combined with a call for increased regional presence of the WEO.  
 
                                                     
707
 X, “Citizens of the Earth”, Paris Call for Action, Paris, 3 February 2007, available at http://www.ambafrance-
au.org/spip.php?article2092, at 2.  
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Looking at the politically agreed functions for international environmental governance in the 
Belgrade Process and the Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome Document, it is striking to note that none 
of the abovementioned functions has as such explicitly been identified in the political process 
as a function for enhancing the overall level of international environmental governance, with 
the exception of the capacity-building function.
708
 However, for the purpose of this chapter, 
the outcomes of this political process are of less importance than the legal validity of the 
proposals under review. 
 
C. Format for the WEO 
 
In terms of format, virtually all proposals under review conclude that it would be best to 
establish the WEO as a specialised agency of the UN as defined in articles 57 and 63 of the 
UN Charter. This has, according to these proposals, some clear advantages: it would provide 
the WEO with more political authority and autonomy within the UN system, it would ensure 
the WEO would have an independent budget at its disposal and it would provide the 
possibility of membership for all UN Member States, rather than the process of universal 
participation as is being used at the moment by UNEP.
709
  
 
Interestingly, this element is the one that is repeated in all proposals under review, also by 
commentators who do not necessarily have a completely worked out model for a WEO in 
mind. The specialised agency option seems to be indispensable.
710
 Also combined with the 
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 As established supra, the Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome Document identifies six functions for the international 
environmental organisation: (i) to strengthen the science-policy interface and strengthen the capacity of 
developing nations to meaningfully participate in this process; (ii) to develop a system-wide strategy for the 
environment in the UN system; (iii) enhance synergy-building processes between compatible MEAs; (iv) to 
widen and deepen the funding basis for the environment, making funding more predictable; (v) to develop a 
system-wide capacity-building framework in order to fully implement the Bali Strategic Plan; and (vi) to 
strengthen the strategic capacity at the regional level. See UNEP, “Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome”, Consultative 
Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives, Second meeting of the Consultative Group of Ministers or 
High-level Representatives on International Environmental Governance, Espoo (Finland), 23 November 2010, 
available at http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/documents/Events/NairobiHelsinkifinal 
outcomeedited.pdf, para 7.  
709
 On universal participation: see supra, Chapter 1. See also infra, this chapter, under IV.  
710
 See for instance Harada, N., “Campaign for a Global Environmental Organization: A French Perspective”, 
Global Environmental Governance: the Post-Johannesburg Agenda, 23-25 October 2003, available at 
http://www.agirpourlenvironnement.org/pdf/harada.pdf. See also more recently: Golmohammadi, B., “Why We 
Need A Global Environmental Organisation”, World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA), 4 
January 2012, available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bonian-golmohammadi/climate-change-rio-
20_b_1184260.html; Stefania Prestigiacomo, S. and Michuki, J. N., “Why we need a world environment 
organisation”, The Guardian, 28 October 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-
green/2009/oct/28/world-environment-organisation.  
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call for timelier and easier decision-making, it is clear that for the purpose of the chapter, the 
WEO should be given the specialised agency format. The Nairobi Helsinki Outcome 
Document also identifies five possible options for the format for the institution that should 
carry out these functions, of which the specialised agency format is only one.
711
 
 
D. Definition 
 
Therefore, for the purpose of this chapter, the WEO is defined as follows: the WEO is a UN 
specialised agency, with as its most important functions the competence to (1) provide an 
umbrella for the existing MEAs, (2) provide a high-level policy forum for new and ongoing 
negotiations, also in light of newly emerging environmental threats, and (3) help strengthen 
the capacity of those countries meeting with implementation and compliance issues.  
 
III. Legal challenges a WEO must overcome 
 
A. Form: the creation of a Specialised Agency 
 
The creation of a specialised agency legally requires two elements, based on the definition of 
articles 57 and 63 of the UN Charter: (1) a multilateral treaty establishing the organisation 
(the ‘constitution’) and (2) a so-called relationship agreement with the United Nations.712  
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 Paragraph 11 of the Nairobi-Helsinki Outcome Document determines: “Strengthening the global authoritative 
voice, as well as other voices, for the environment is a key outcome of the international environmental 
governance reform process, providing credible, coherent and effective leadership for environmental 
sustainability under the overall framework of sustainable development. During the Belgrade Process and in the 
Co-Chairs’ document on elaboration of ideas for broader reform of international environmental governance 
(UNEP/CGIEG.2/2/2), various options for broader institutional reforms were put forward, including the 
following five options: (a) Enhancing UNEP; (b) Establishing a new umbrella organisation for sustainable 
development; (c) Establishing a specialized agency such as a world environment organisation; (d) Reforming the 
United Nations Economic and Social Council and the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development; 
(e) Enhancing institutional reforms and streamlining existing structures.” 
712
 For a detailed overview of the legal differences between a UN specialised agency and a UN programme, see 
UNEP, “United Nations Specialized Agencies versus United Nations Programmes”, Note by the Executive 
Director, background note for the Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives on Broader 
International Environmental Governance Reform, 7 June 2010, available at 
http://environmentalgovernance.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2010/05/UN-Specialised-Agencies-vs-UN-
Programmes_17May20101.pdf. See also supra, chapter 1, under II.  
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1. Constitution 
 
UN specialised agencies are autonomous intergovernmental organisations established by 
means of a multilateral treaty
713
, which is often referred to as the ‘constitution’.714 This 
constitutive instrument establishes, apart from the organisation itself, the organs and their 
composition, determines the functions of the organisation and details the decision-making 
(and / or voting) procedures.
715
  
 
Thus, in order to establish the WEO a multilateral treaty establishing the organisation will 
have to be negotiated. This may be done in a separate inter-governmental conference or 
within (a committee established by) the General Assembly. This treaty will also establish the 
primary organs of the WEO: a plenary body, a secretariat and a dispute settlement system are 
essential to the working of any specialised agency. Further subsidiary bodies may be 
established either by the constitution itself or by the plenary of the organisation. Also the 
functions of the organisation will be established in the constitution. 
 
Interestingly, most of these constitutive instruments provide for amendment procedures and, 
much in parallel to the MEAs, the central plenary organ of the agency is the highest legal 
authority in the procedure. 2/3 majority voting is the general practice among specialised 
agencies. In most cases, the constitution also provides specific rules as to the binding nature 
of the amendments so adopted and as to the effect of the amendment on those states that 
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 A multilateral treaty is the most commonly used technique. Also possible is that the consititution of the WEO 
would be negotiated in the General Assemblee and adopted as a resolution there. See UNEP, “Annotated table of 
broader IEG reform in a standardised format”, Information note from the Executive Director, Second Meeting of 
the Consultative Group of Ministers or High-level Representatives on International Environmental Governance, 
Doc UNEP/CGIEG.2/2/3, 7 September 2010, available at 
http://www.unep.org/environmentalgovernance/Portals/8/AnnotatedtablebroaderIEGreform.pdf.  
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 Zacklin, R., The amendment of the constitutive instruments of the United Nations and specialized agencies, 
Leiden, Sijthoff, 1968. The word ‘constitution’ is used in the cases of the ILO, FAO, UNESCO, WHO, UPU and 
UNIDO, yet other UN specialised agencies apply the term ‘Agreement’, ‘Articles of Agreement’ or 
‘Convention’. See also Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of public international law, Amsterdam, New York 
and Oxford, North Holland Publishers, 1983, at 353.  
715
 It is generally accepted that the constitutive treaties of multilateral organisations, such as the specialised 
agencies, take a specific place in international law. See for instance International Law Commission, “Draft 
Articles on the Law of Treaties”, 1966, available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_1_1966.pdf.  
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opposed its adoption. Amendments are binding only for those states that have explicitly 
accepted them by means of ratification, acceptance or approval.
716
  
 
Essentially, the constitution also provides for the conditions for membership to the 
organisation.
717
 It is therefore perfectly feasible, in light of the idea that the WEO will provide 
an umbrella for the MEAs, to establish that ratification of certain MEAs is compulsory before 
membership is granted. This would in effect mean that the WEO could make membership to 
the organisation dependent from the ratification of (a number of) certain MEAs and establish 
a core list of conventions.  
 
While legally feasible, the question immediately comes to mind which MEAs then should be 
made compulsory and which should not. Furthermore, having a core list of conventions does 
not ensure ratification: as under the ILO, each and every convention remains subject to the 
consent rule as established by international treaty law.
718
 Some countries might simply refuse 
to ratify certain core conventions, which in turn would make them inadmissible for 
membership to the WEO. Since one of the aims is to ensure the broadest possible membership 
for the WEO, the idea of a core list would be contrary to the idea of inclusiveness of 
environmental governance.  
 
2. Relationship agreement 
 
Specialised Agencies are legally autonomous and their legal autonomy and legal personality 
is based on their founding legal instrument. Nonetheless, they also require an explicit link to 
the General Assembly, by means of an agreement between the agency and ECOSOC.
719
 This 
link is one of the two formal constitutive acts required to establish a specialised agency.
720
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 See for instance the WHO Constitution, which determines in its article 73: “Texts of proposed amendments to 
this Constitution shall be communicated by the Director-General to Members at least six months in advance of 
their consideration by the Health Assembly. Amendments shall come into force for all Members when adopted 
by a two-thirds vote of the Health Assembly and accepted by two-thirds of the Members in accordance with their 
respective constitutional processes.” See also supra, Chapters 2 and 3.  
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 Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of public international law, Amsterdam, New York and Oxford, North 
Holland Publishers, 1983, at 88.  
718
 See also supra, Chapter 2.  
719
 See also article 63 of the UN Charter: “1. The Economic and Social Council may enter into agreements with 
any of the agencies referred to in Article 57, defining the terms on which the agency concerned shall be brought 
into relationship with the United Nations. Such agreements shall be subject to approval by the General 
Assembly. 2. It may co-ordinate the activities of the specialized agencies through consultation with and 
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The conclusion of such agreements between the UN and the specialised agency usually 
follows the same procedure: ECOSOC adopts a resolution directing its Committee on 
Negotiations to enter into negotiations with the organisation. The draft outcome document is 
submitted to ECOSOC for approval; after that, it is submitted to the General Assembly for 
approval, and the plenary body of the organisation. It enters into force upon approval from 
both of them.
721
 The agreement is then registered and published according to the procedure 
established in article 102 of the UN Charter.
722
  
 
3. Organs, membership and decision-making 
 
Each UN Agency has a plenary body, a smaller body acting as the central executive organ and 
a secretariat, charged with the day-to-day operations of the organisation.
723
 In addition, 
several specialised subsidiary organs may be created, either by the founding document of the 
organisation or by decisions adopted by the plenary organ.  
 
Membership to the specialised agencies is regulated by their constitutions. Most agencies 
distinguish between original (constituting) members (ie: original members who were involved 
in the drafting and negotiating of the constitution) and other states. These last categories are 
not usually entitled to become member to the organisation, but must apply for membership. 
The application will then be voted upon in the plenary of the organisation and must receive a 
2/3 majority to be accepted.
724
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
recommendations to such agencies and through recommendations to the General Assembly and to the Members 
of the United Nations.” 
720
 The exception is the International Atomic Energy Agency, which does not have a link to the ECOSOC, but to 
the General Assembly proper. For more details on the IAEA and its sui generis character, see Goeteyn, N., 
“Internationaal Atoomenergie Agentschap (IAEA)”, in Reyngaert, C. (ed.), De Gespecialiseerde Instellingen van 
de Verenigde Naties, Vereniging voor de Verenigde Naties, 2011, 211-227, and reprinted in Reyngaert, C. (ed.) 
De Gespecialiseerde Instellingen van de Verenigde Naties, Brussel, ACCO, 2011. 
721
 Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of public international law, Amsterdam, New York and Oxford, North 
Holland Pub., 1983, at 353. 
722
 Article 102 of the UN Charter provides: “1. Every treaty and every international agreement entered into by 
any Member of the United Nations after the present Charter comes into force shall as soon as possible be 
registered with the Secretariat and published by it. 2. No party to any such treaty or international agreement 
which has not been registered in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article may invoke that 
treaty or agreement before any organ of the United Nations”. 
723
 Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of public international law, Amsterdam, New York and Oxford, North 
Holland Pub., 1983, at 356. 
724
 Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of public international law, Amsterdam, New York and Oxford, North 
Holland Publishers, 1983, at 354-355. 
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Exceptions notwithstanding
725
, specialised agencies have an open membership, meaning that 
all states can apply for membership to the organisations. These organisations are thus 
potentially universal. Since the WEO should strive for the broadest possible membership, this 
is also a strong motive for proponents of the creation of a WEO in the form of a specialised 
agency and a departure from the limited membership of UNEP’s Governing Council today. 
Whether or not this would make effective decision-making easier as such remains doubtful.
726
 
 
Withdrawal of membership of a specialised agency is legally always a possibility, even if the 
constitutive instrument itself does not explicitly provide for this possibility.
727
 Withdrawal 
from specialised agencies has occurred often in the past. For instance, the US left the ILO in 
1977 (and rejoined in 1980)
728; another example is the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea withdrawing from the IAEA in 1994.
729
 However, this situation should be avoided at 
all costs, since the effectiveness of environmental law at least depends upon the ability to 
engage with potential non-compliant parties: if countries are not member to certain 
conventions and/or organisations, they cannot be engaged with effectively.  
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 See for instance the WMO Constitution, which determines that only states with their own meteorological 
service can become member. Article 3 reads in relevant parts: “(a) Any State represented at the Conference of 
Directors of the International Meteorological Organisation convened at Washington, D. C., on September 22, 
1947, as listed in Annex I attached hereto, and which signs the present Convention and ratifies it in accordance 
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Membership in the Organisation shall be open to any State which is a member of any of the Unions as defined in 
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Unions, provided that: (i) it is a member of the United Nations, any of the Specialized Agencies brought into 
relationship with the United Nations, or the International Atomic Energy Agency, or is a party to the Statute of 
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Convention.” See the Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), 1967, 
828 UNTS 3. See also http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/convention/trtdocs_wo029.html.  
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 See also infra, this chapter, under IV. 
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 Zacklin, R., The amendment of the constitutive instruments of the United Nations and specialized agencies, 
Leiden, Sijthoff, 1968 and Bernhardt, R. (ed.), Encyclopaedia of public international law, Amsterdam, New 
York and Oxford, North Holland Publishers, 1983, at 355. See for instance also the case of the withdrawal of 
Indonesia from the United Nations in 1965, even though no such possibility exists in the UN Charter and the 
withdrawal took place averse from the declaratory statement on withdrawal adopted at the San Francisco 
Conference where the UN Charter was adopted. After 20 months of effective non-membership, Indonesia re-
joined the UN without ever following the application procedure. After paying 10% of the contributions it would 
normally be due, Indonesia was assumed never to have left the organisation in the first place. See Bernhardt, R. 
(ed.), Encyclopaedia of public international law, Amsterdam, New York and Oxford, North Holland Publishers, 
1983, at 150.  
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 Withdrawal from the ILO is possible yet (in theory) subject to a two year’s notice to the secretariat.  
729
 Another example of pressure on international organisations may be through funding: in 2011, the United 
States withdrew its funding, close to 30% of the total budget, from UNESCO after UNESCO had recognised the 
Palestinian Territories as a full member. The US did however retain its membership.  
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The same goes for expulsion. It may of course be argued that expulsion is the ultimate legal 
deterrent for a non-compliant party and could be used as a measure of last resort. However, in 
the rare cases where expulsion is at least a theoretical possibility in some of the existing 
specialised agencies
730
, this option has never been applied. Furthermore, membership to the 
WEO is paramount to effective international pressure on a state if it has not complied with its 
international environmental obligations. Therefore, it is maintained that expulsion from the 
organisation should not be included as a possibility in the WEO constitution.  
 
B. Functions: Unite the MEAs, act as a high-level policy forum and enhance capacity-
building efforts for developing countries 
 
As established supra, the WEO would at a minimum be responsible for (i) uniting the MEAs, 
(ii) providing a high-level policy forum for new and ongoing negotiations, also in light of 
newly emerging environmental threats, and (iii) help strengthen the capacity of those 
countries meeting with implementation and compliance issues.  
 
Uniting the MEAs could of course mean very different things. At least theoretically, uniting 
MEAs could mean organising joint meetings, devising joint strategies, or it could mean the 
creation of a joint secretariat, a common compliance mechanism and/or dispute settlement 
system and the creation of overarching joint initiatives and strategies. As has already been 
discussed in detail supra
731
, applying changes to the existing legal framework of the MEAs 
would be a legally extremely challenging function. The current clustering efforts undertaken 
in the chemicals cluster and the planned efforts in the biodiversity clusters show that countries 
are unwilling to let UNEP (or indeed, a WEO) play a coordinating role. Therefore, providing 
an umbrella for the MEAs would require a process of legal clustering, in which the COPs of 
the MEAs that are brought under the umbrella would be engaged and be given the choice to 
either join or refuse to join under the WEO. That by itself trumps any steering intention of 
uniting all the MEAs under one cap.  
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 See for instance articles II.4 and 5 of the UNESCO Constitution, providing that membership to the 
organisation is dependent upon continued membership to the UN itself. United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization Constitution, 1945, 4 UNTS 275.  
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 See supra, Chapter 4, specifically under VII. 
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The same goes for the management of newly emerging environmental threats and the high-
level policy forum necessary to deal with these. It is true that there is a lack of integration and 
collaboration between the many different global initiatives in existence.
732
 Surveys of 
UNEP’s scientific work show that themes such as biodiversity, chemical hazards, land cover 
change and soils are under-assessed.
733
 There is no body in existence today that could identify 
assessment needs and such a body could easily be established within the WEO, either as part 
of the overall architecture of the organisation as established by its constitutive instrument, or 
as a subsidiary body to its plenary meeting. Similarly, a WEO as a specialised agency could 
provide the main forum for negotiations and elaboration of system-wide UN policies. UNEP 
has been established as the leading authority on international environmental concerns and is 
the main agenda-setter for the environment. However, the dispersion of the political debate on 
environmental affairs over a huge number of fora within and outside of the UN has made it 
difficult for UNEP to coordinate all of these. The WEO might have more political influence 
or administrative authority than UNEP has today, but legally speaking there are no specific 
legal requirements to be fulfilled for the effective execution of this function.
734
  
 
Finally, for the capacity-building function of a WEO, UNEP is involved in an enormous list 
of capacity-building programs.
735
 UNEP is also but one of the UN institutions and 
organisations involved in such programs: also UNDP, the GEF and many of the MEAs 
themselves have specific programs for raising the capacities of emerging countries and 
developing countries.
736
 The WEO would be expected, first of all, to assume UNEP’s role in 
these programs, and secondly, to provide new and additional funding for these capacity-
building programs. Lastly, the WEO would be expected to coordinate these programs in order 
to get a clearer view of potential overlap and gaps in the current framework. Naturally, this is 
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 To name but a few: International Geosphere Biosphere Programme; World Climate Research Programme; 
Global Diversity Assessment; Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.  
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 UNEP, “Synthesis of responses on strengthening the scientific base of UNEP”, Doc 
UNEP/GCSS.VIII/5/Add.3, 26 January 2004, 7 and following.  
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 Tarasofsky, R. G. and Hoare, A. L., “Implications of a UNEO for the global architecture of the international 
environmental governance system”, Institut de Dévelopment Durable et des relations internationales, 
Gouvernance Mondiale, 6/2004, Chatham House, December 2004, available at 
http://iddri.com/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/id_0406_tarasofsky.pdf.  
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 For a short overview, see: UNEP, “Elements for an intergovernmental strategic plan on technology support 
and capacity building: Report of the Executive Director”, Doc UNEP/GCSS.VIII/5/Add.1, 13 February 2004. 
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 Tarasofsky, R. G. and Hoare, A. L., “Implications of a UNEO for the global architecture of the international 
environmental governance system”, Institut de Dévelopment Durable et des relations internationales, 
Gouvernance Mondiale, 6/2004, Chatham House, December 2004, available at 
http://iddri.com/Publications/Collections/Idees-pour-le-debat/id_0406_tarasofsky.pdf, at 10.  
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linked to the idea that a WEO as a specialised agency will be able to secure more and more 
predictable funding than UNEP can today. 
 
IV. Effects and added value of a WEO on the current IEG system: is the creation of a 
WEO the best solution? 
 
UNEP’s Governing Council works under the system of universal participation. Decisions are 
taken by the Governing Council, consisting of 58 member states. Nonetheless, no voting takes 
place in the Governing Council itself and all UN member states may participate in the 
deliberations.
737
 Also the specialised agencies of the UN may participate in the deliberations, 
yet do not have a right to vote.
738
 A similar solution is applied to representatives from NGOs, 
who are free to join the meetings and participate as observers.
739
 Afterwards, the decisions 
adopted by the Governing Council are forwarded to the General Assembly of the UN in New 
York, through the Economic and Social Council, where they are formally confirmed.  
 
A specialised agency would indeed make decision-making less cumbersome, in that decisions 
adopted by the plenary of the WEO would no longer need to be explicitly reaffirmed by 
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 See Rule 67 of the Rules of Procedure of the Governing Council, under the heading “Participation of states 
not members of the Governing Council”: “Any State Member of the United Nations or member of a specialized 
agency or of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is not a member of the Governing Council, may 
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 Rule 69 of the Rules of Procedure of the Governing Council: “1. International non-governmental  
organisations having an interest in the field of the environments, referred to in section IV, paragraph 5, of 
General Assembly resolution 2997 (XXVII), may designate representatives to sit as observers at public meetings 
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international non-governmental organisations may make oral statements on matters within the scope of their 
activities. 2. Written statements provided by international non-governmental organisation referred to in 
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circulated by the secretariat to members of the Governing Council of the subsidiary organ concerned in the 
quantities and in the languages in which the statements were made available to the secretariat for distribution.” 
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ECOSOC to resort legal effect. In terms of inclusiveness and legitimacy however, the 
institutional overhaul would bring less benefits than is generally assumed. UNEP’s Governing 
Council already provides an opportunity for NGOs and other agencies to participate in the 
debate. Furthermore, the ECOSOC council also has specific rules of participation
740
; sending 
the decision of the Governing Council there also means that social stakeholders have a second 
opportunity to effectively influence the debate. Changing UNEP to a specialised agency will 
not, at least for this specific issue, change this for the better and necessarily generate positive 
effects.  
 
A similar conclusion is reached when analysing the functions for the environmental body at 
UN level. As far as the functions of the WEO go, it is not at all clear what the added value of 
a specialised agency would be over UNEP.
741
  
 
In terms of clustering MEAs, the WEO would find it legally as challenging as UNEP does 
today to unite the MEAs under one cap. Since the COPs of each of the MEAs remains in 
charge of potential clustering efforts, so also do they have the final say in joining an umbrella 
organisation. The idea of establishing a core list of conventions also has its limits – and could 
be installed today for UNEP as well, for instance, by requiring the ratification of certain 
conventions before a seat in the Governing Council of the Programme can be taken.  
 
As far as the function of providing a high-level forum goes, the WEO could provide added 
political and administrative clout. However, UNEP provides a high-level forum by means of 
the yearly global ministerial environment forum (GMEF) today.  
 
UNEP’s decisions are effectively adopted by the General Assembly rather than the plenary 
organ of a specialised agency. They therefore are discussed not only in the preparatory 
meetings in UNEP and at the Governing Council, but they are also taken up by the highest 
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political organ of the United Nations. It is therefore argued here that UNEP is actually better 
placed to serve as an early warning mechanism and to instigate a system-wide response 
mechanism than a specialised agency could.  
 
Lastly, as far as the capacity-building efforts go, UNEP as a programme has a broad network 
of regional and national offices. While varying in terms of effectiveness and impact on the 
ground, it is also not clear what a specialised agency could do from a legal perspective that 
would enhance the current situation. A common platform for all capacity-building initiatives 
and aid to developing countries as such is missing and more coordination would be welcome. 
A WEO as a specialised agency would have more political clout than UNEP to coordinate 
these meetings. However from a legal perspective the WEO cannot be expected to coordinate 
these efforts any more successfully than what UNEP is currently achieving
742
, also because 
there is as such no inherent difference in mandate and legal capacities between a specialised 
agency and a programme in this respect.  
 
Some proposals seem to anticipate that the WEO would be better fitted to provide overarching 
policy advice for the use of funds from the GEF. However in order for this to happen, a 
reform of the GEF would also be necessary. The GEF is an independent financial actor that 
was established by UNEP, the UNDP and the World Bank. Its projects however are managed 
by no less than 10 so-called GEF Agencies
743
, of which UNEP is only one. There is no legal 
reason to expect that a WEO would be able to steer the GEF any more than UNEP can today.  
 
One last element to underscore this is the fact that UNEP, despite being the instigator of the 
negotiations leading to the adoption of many of the MEAs involved, is not a member of any 
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the liaison groups
744
 that have been established so far. Clearly, legally autonomous 
conventions and COPs are unwilling to let themselves be coordinated by UNEP.
745
 It is not at 
all clear what, if anything, a WEO as a specialised agency could do to resolve this situation 
that UNEP as a programme cannot.  
 
V. Conclusion 
 
The reform of UNEP into a WEO has received very broad attention over the years, both 
scientifically and politically. Also in the ongoing Rio+20 negotiations the idea of establishing 
a specialised agency for the environment based on a reform of UNEP is on the table, and it 
seems a very likely outcome of the Rio+20 conference that membership to the GC of UNEP 
will be made universal.  
 
There are multiple definitions of a WEO available and many scholars have provided their 
ideas for the architecture of the organisation and what it should do. However, after reviewing 
the most commonly repeated proposals, it must be concluded that most of the proposals under 
review take the added value of such a sweeping institutional overhaul for granted.  
 
It is true that there may be political arguments for the overhaul of UNEP into a specialised 
agency. These range from the idea that the current system for dealing with environmental 
concerns is not inclusive enough – which would then warrant an overhaul into an ILO-style 
organisation; over the idea that the current system lacks the clout, both politically, financially 
and institutionally to fulfil its mandate adequately – which would warrant the creation of a 
WTO-style organisation; to the idea that environmental affairs do not have one voice, but are 
scattered over many fora with many (and thus: weaker) voices – and thus the creation of one 
strong environmental institution would be necessary (either as a UNEO for the environment 
or as an Umbrella organisation for sustainable development).  
 
The legal challenges for the establishment of such a WEO are as such not insurmountable. 
The most important legal requirement will be to establish the WEO based on articles 57 and 
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63 of the UN Charter. Clearly defining what the functions are of such an organisation 
however would be extremely difficult. Furthermore, while all of the proposals under review 
may have sound political grounding, the legal impact of these proposals is found to be 
minimal. None of the proposals under review have been found to have an actual structural 
impact on the current situation of environmental governance.  
 
In terms of political progress at Rio+20, the creation of an SDC is a likely outcome of the 
conference. However, what this council should do remains very vague at the time of writing. 
The zero-draft speaks in terms of the SDC being “[...] guided by the need to promote 
integration of the three pillars of sustainable development, promote effective implementation 
at all levels and promote effective institutional coherence”.746 Exactly what that means and 
how it will be implemented, will be subject of a negotiating process:  
 
We request the President of the General Assembly to conduct open, 
transparent and inclusive negotiations, with the aim of establishing the 
mandate, modalities, functions, size, composition, membership, 
working methods and procedures of the Council and report on the 
outcome before the end of the 67th session of the General 
Assembly.
747
 
 
Lastly, making the membership to the UNEP GC universal is also on the table, and will very 
likely be adopted in Rio. The legal effect of this is argued to be negligible: it will change 
nothing fundamental to the decision-making processes at UNEP. In fact, it is concluded that it 
will make decision-making in the GC even harder. Given the fact that the GC works under the 
principle of universal participation, the added value of universal membership on its decision-
making will be marginal at best.  
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Conclusions and lessons learned 
 
The two central overarching research questions from which this study started were: (1) how 
can the international community ensure more effective international environmental 
governance, and (2) how can compliance with international environmental obligations be 
enhanced.  
 
In terms of creating the conditions for more effective international environmental governance, 
the processes leading up to the creation of UNEP and the reform debate that has been going 
on for 40 years have been researched. The ongoing reform debate to transform UNEP into a 
specialised agency shows striking similarities with the debate that preceded UNEP’s creation. 
It has therefore been concluded that many of the questions on how to effectively manage 
environmental concerns at the international level have not been answered adequately. Clearly, 
the reform debate on International Environmental Governance and UNEP’s reform has been 
largely ineffective. That is a shared responsibility.  
 
Firstly, it is the responsibility of the countries involved, which seem unable to clearly define 
their needs of an international institution for the environment. Some countries want UNEP to 
be a minimal coordinating agency that serves as an early-warning mechanism for emerging 
environmental threats. Others also want UNEP to assist developing countries in the execution 
of their environmental obligations and development potential. Some countries want it to be 
the scientific powerhouse of the UN on environmental issues. Others still believe it should 
take charge of the MEAs and the ongoing synergies processes between them, while at the 
same time leaving the legal autonomy of these conventions untouched. Many countries also 
seem to consider that UNEP should not only take environmental concerns into account, but 
should be part of a UN system-wide effort in promoting the agenda of sustainable 
development. At the same time, it is clear that UNEP is not given the power, both in terms of 
political and legal influence and in terms of financial prowess, to effectively fulfil all of these 
tasks.  
 
Secondly, it is the responsibility of the scientific community. Most scholars tend to agree that 
UNEP is a fairly weak institution with too broad a mandate. It is located far out of the way, 
has too little budgetary means and operates too low on the hierarchical ladder to effectively 
influence the UN system with an environmental perspective. At the same time, the scientific 
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community seems unable to reach a conclusive and uniform answer to the question what 
exactly is going wrong with the present IEG system. Solutions to the perceived problems vary 
significantly. Some have called for the creation of a WEO, based on the WTO, or the ILO, or 
they use still other blueprints. Others have concluded that UNEP’s headquarters should be 
moved, its mandate should be changed (either deepened and given more focus; or made 
broader) or its funding sources should be altered. Still others have determined that UNEP 
should focus more clearly on its core functions and that an institutional overhaul is redundant.  
 
There is thus a double dichotomy at play: firstly between the expectations and the means 
(both in terms of financial and political influence) that are bestowed upon UNEP; secondly 
between the minimalist country perspective and the maximalist scientific perspective of what 
an international organisation for the environment should look like and what it should achieve.  
 
All of these contentions have been put to the test. Looking at UNEP’s effective record, it is 
submitted that much criticism on UNEP is too harsh. The choices made when creating UNEP 
in terms of form, mandate, location and finances were the result of a political process within 
the United Nations. Moreover, the choices made at the time were done so with the best 
intentions: to provide the UN with as broad an environmental perspective as possible, to 
provide the Programme with as much budgetary means as possible, and to ensure that it fitted 
well within the already existing architecture.  
 
While the outcome could arguably have been better (which should be understood to mean 
‘more effective’), the fault is hardly UNEP’s. On the contrary, UNEP has been nothing short 
of extremely successful in its core tasks: setting the environmental agenda and initiating new 
initiatives to respond to newly emerging environmental threats. Especially in terms of 
initiating negotiations and the conclusion of new MEAs, UNEP’s influence cannot be 
overrated in, amongst others, the biodiversity, chemicals and atmosphere clusters.  
 
In fact, UNEP itself has probably been the first victim of its own success: since more and 
more environmental instruments have been negotiated over the years and have entered into 
force, the task of coordinating this vast body of international law has become incrementally 
harder. It could of course be argued that UNEP itself is to blame for this situation, by creating 
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a vast network of sub-par and ineffective institutions.
748
 However, the effectiveness of these 
institutions is as much the responsibility of the countries negotiating them, and their founding 
instruments, than it is UNEP’s, whose effective influence on the content and outcome of these 
negotiation processes is very limited. Moreover, it is UNEP’s task to set the agenda and 
instigate the creation of new environmental instruments and institutions, rather than examine 
compliance with the developed instruments.  
 
UNEP’s financial base is now the highest it has been since its creation in 1972. In 2000 
however, the financial prowess of the Programme had shrunk to the lowest level in its history. 
Some claim that this is linked to the aforementioned proliferation of institutions and 
conventions. Indeed, UNEP’s influence had dwindled and reached an all-time low around the 
turn of the century. However, the relatively new focus on compliance and the need for 
coordination also coincides with growing financial means for UNEP. Also the new financing 
mechanism of voluntary contributions seems to have positive effects on the overall financial 
prowess of the Programme: more countries than ever pledge and contribute more money than 
ever to UNEP. Clearly, states still believe that UNEP is well-placed to take on a central 
coordinating role in the UN system.  
 
While it seems obvious at first sight that the decision-making processes are slow and 
cumbersome and are hampering the adoption of fast and decisive measures, it is also 
submitted that that is not (and should not be) the core task for an anchor institution for 
environmental affairs at the international level. UNEP is extremely well-place to infuse the 
UN system with an environmental perspective. From that angle, the fact that it is a 
programme rather than a specialised agency is clearly an advantage for the effective fulfilling 
of its mandate. 
 
International environmental law is a highly legalised system, meaning that it is a system 
 
“[...] in which rules are obligatory on parties through links to the 
established rules and principles of international law, in which rules are 
precise (or can be made precise through the exercise of delegated 
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authority), and in which authority to interpret and apply the rules has 
been delegated to third parties acting under the constraint of rules”.749    
 
In the past, states have relied heavily on treaty law in the form of MEAs to regulate their 
relations in the environmental sphere, mostly because international customary law turned out 
to be insufficient as the sole instrument to regulate inter-state behaviour in this field. This 
evolution is found to be changing: the willingness of states to enter into new treaties is 
dwindling, mostly because of overindulgence in the 1980s and 1990s. Instead, focus is now 
given to the implementation and compliance control of the already existing instruments. That 
is also the main reason behind the growing importance of the COP system and the main driver 
behind putting a bigger emphasis on compliance with existing international obligations and 
the development of compliance mechanisms. This has been the focus of Chapters 2 and 3.  
 
It is concluded that the COPs have gradually taken up a leading role in the decision-making 
processes at the international level. The normative powers of the COPs are indispensible to 
the current law and policy-making processes for the environment at international level. The 
competences of the COPs are extensive and growing, but the status of their decisions is not 
unequivocal. While international treaty law remains the most suitable framework for their 
normative work, it is also clear that this has far-reaching consequences for the binding nature 
of COP decisions and thus also on the legal leeway that COPs have to steer the international 
law-making processes for the environment. The competence of the COPs to further develop 
the normative content of the MEA regimes is confirmed and is as such not contested. It is 
rather that the legal nature of the adopted COP decisions depends on the basis upon which 
states have given their consent to be bound by them and whether or not the decisions intend to 
have binding effects on the states.  
 
One of the most visible ways that COPs have used their normative powers has been the 
establishment of compliance mechanisms. The role of compliance mechanisms in 
international environmental law has been researched, and it is concluded that they enhance the 
effectiveness, good working and implementation of the convention that established them. 
They also provide fixed and well-defined procedures to be followed in cases of (suspected) 
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non-compliance, which enhances the legal certainty and due process of the proceedings for 
the state involved, and helps to answer questions of legitimacy.  
 
No trend towards the application of more or more punitive measures in cases of non-
compliance has been found. The goals and methods of many of the compliance mechanisms 
however show considerable similarities: these mechanisms aim, much in line with the 
managerial approach, to help non-compliant parties reach compliance in a non-adversarial 
manner. The most effective positive impact on compliance has been found with compliance 
mechanisms that establish a fixed committee with independent experts. This committee 
ideally operates independently from the COPs and should be competent to take measures 
without the political intervention from the parties. It has also been concluded that compliance 
mechanisms in MEAs provide a form of dispute prevention rather than dispute settlement in 
the legal sense. 
 
International environmental law is thus found to have evolved into a highly fragmented legal 
system. There are many reasons behind the proliferation of institutions and international 
conventions for the environment: growth in piecemeal and ad hoc lawmaking (exemplified by 
the explosion of the number of MEAs); periodic international conferences, each creating their 
own processes and momentum without much of an overarching vision; and the creation of 
permanent structures that are constantly competing with UNEP, because of an overlap in their 
mandate or functions, such as the GEF and the Commission on Sustainable Development.  
 
This has, in broad terms, led to a double reaction. On the one hand there’s a bottom-up 
approach to enhancing cooperation and collaboration between the principle carriers of 
environmental law, the MEAs, in the form of synergy processes and clustering. On the other 
hand there’s the debate for the creation of a new institution for the environment, as a top-
down response to more coordination and effectiveness in international environmental affairs. 
These responses have been looked at from a primarily legal perspective. 
 
Clustering has been found to have broad impact on and possible far-reaching implications for 
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the MEAs. The possible application of 
clustering is, in theory, limitless. Because of the COP-driven character of these processes 
however, their application is highly dependent upon the political constellations and realities 
within the COPs of the MEAs that are involved in the clustering process. It has also been 
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found that clustering could be applied in order to enhance coordination of the COP meetings, 
to establish a joint secretariat or pool secretariat functions, or even to create a joint 
compliance mechanism for a selection of MEAs. Even though these scenarios are politically 
unfeasible and legally challenging, this does not impair the possible application of clustering 
for such a move.  
 
It is also concluded that while UNEP may in theory be well-placed to give advice and 
guidance to these clustering processes, steering them in a top-down manner would be 
practically impossible because of the legal autonomy of the COPs. The fact that UNEP as the 
most prominent international institution responsible for coordinating efforts in the 
international environmental field is not part in the ongoing clustering efforts and is not even a 
member of the liaison groups as established by some of the MEAs, is exemplary to this 
finding.  
 
Additionally, because of the limits to COP competences and the lingering doubts about the 
legal nature of COP decisions, it is clear that the freedom of COPs to engage in these 
scenarios is dependent upon consensualist decision-making and a unified political view in the 
COPs on what these processes entail and what their effects will be on the existing framework. 
This is hampered because of the lack of political agreement and the legally challenging 
conditions and repercussions of legal clustering.  
 
Finally the legal challenges to the creation of a WEO as a specialised agency have been 
investigated and the expected outcomes of such a move have been put to the test. Both in 
terms of political clout and overall influence this new organisation is expected to have on the 
politics behind the environmental governance of today, many proposals seem to be done from 
an activist perspective: ‘because environmental concerns do not get the same level of attention 
or money or political visibility as economical concerns, a WEO based on the WTO should be 
installed’; ‘because environmental affairs are not inclusive enough, we have need for an ILO-
style organisation’. However, none of the proposals under review have been found to have an 
actual legal impact on the current state of affairs. On the contrary, the creation of a WEO 
would require overcoming distinct legal challenges – not to mention the insurmountable 
political challenges, most likely without any positive outcome for the current environmental 
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governance system. Moreover, to paraphrase Chayes, some of the proposals seem to envision 
a level of symmetric design that is at odds with the real world.
750
  
 
It is concluded that the creation of a WEO would not have the effects that many of the 
proponents for its creation envision. It is for instance not at all clear why a specialised agency 
would be better placed to cluster MEAs, or to provide an early-warning mechanism, or a high-
level political forum, or organise better the processes for technical assistance to developing 
countries. There are no legal reasons to conclude that a WEO would be any better at these 
tasks than UNEP is today. 
 
It is furthermore considered that the transformation of UNEP into a specialised agency will 
not bring the expected improvements to the IEG system policy-makers envision. It is 
concluded, based on the assessment of the proposals on the table and the impact these 
proposals would have on the current IEG system, that the creation of a specialised agency for 
the environment would not make the implementation of the goals of IEG any easier: 
providing rapid, system-wide and influential responses to environmental concerns at the 
international level. 
 
In the ongoing Rio+20 negotiations, there are two options on the table for institutional reform 
of the IEG system: a choice between (i) the strengthening of UNEP, meaning establishing 
permanent membership to its Governing Council and calling for an increase of its financial 
basis, and (ii) the establishment of a Specialised Agency for the Environment, based on 
UNEP, also with universal membership of the GC, with a revised and strengthened mandate, 
supported by stable, adequate and predictable financial contributions and operating on an 
equal footing with other UN specialized agencies.  
 
These choices presented in the zero-draft document of the upcoming Earth Summit also imply 
that universal membership to the UNEP Governing Council is a very likely outcome of the 
reform process. Policy-makers seem to believe that this will heighten the political influence of 
UNEP and thus of environmental concerns at the UN level. That may, or may not, be the case: 
some argue that it will provide UNEP with a broader and more broadly supported voice for 
environmental concerns; others argue that it will make decision-making at the GC even more 
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complicated and will in effect mean that decisions are negotiated twice by the whole of the 
UN: once at GC level, once at General Assembly level.  
 
It is submitted that the legal effects of such a move would be marginal at best. The UNEP GC 
works under the principle of universal participation, and thus, potentially, each country that is 
invested in a certain issue or issue area can participate in the decision-making processes at GC 
level, and again at General Assembly level. Expanding the membership of the GC to universal 
membership may make it look like the decision-making processes have been made more 
inclusive, but in reality they won’t be. It is more likely that the universal membership will 
burden the GC in its decision-making.  
 
It is furthermore considered that it is commonplace in the UN system, be it in programmes or 
specialised agencies, to have a body consisting of a limited amount of member states to be 
responsible for running the day-to-day operations of the organisation. The added value of 
having universal membership to this body (in this case the GC) is not at all clear. Quite on the 
contrary, it would seem that such a move would only make the general management of the 
programme progressively harder. It is therefore concluded that the institutional changes on the 
table at the Rio Earth Summit will most likely prove to be either insufficient or without 
impact on the current system of IEG.  
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